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SUMMARY 
The United States, and the world over, is amidst a major socio-technical transition 
of its energy and water systems. Environmental concerns, such as climate change and 
resource scarcity, present complex management and societal challenges. New 
technological innovations present opportunities for more efficient, economic, and 
equitable use of natural resources but will require substantial shifts in the policy 
processes, regulatory institutions, user behaviors, and the frameworks that govern 
resource use. Addressing these challenges can only be realized by deep structural changes 
in the behavior of energy and water systems and society (Van den Bergh and Bruinsma, 
2008; Grin et al., 2011) as well as strategic analysis to support a path forward.  
This dissertation is a compilation of five research projects into the dynamics of 
sustainable transitions in the Unites States’ Energy and Water Systems. Throughout the 
dissertation, the Multi-Level Perspective Framework is applied, a heuristic developed 
from the sociotechnical transition literature to diagram the relationship between three 
primary levels of any transition - the niche, the regime, and the sociotechnical landscape 
While each project is distinct in nature, I utilize the policy science and engineering 
literatures of participatory democracy, policy entrepreneurs, and systems analysis 
throughout the dissertation.  Combined, I evaluate the role of actors and policy 
institutions, including regulatory frameworks and legal structures. I also develop new 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This introduction section provides an overview of the theoretical framework that guides 
my dissertation, identifies the key analytical themes of each section, and provides an outline of 
each research project as well as defense for the methods chosen. Mine is a non-traditional 
dissertation and is a collection of five research projects all dedicated to examining the dynamics 
of sustainable transitions in water and energy systems.  
The United States, and the world over, is amidst a major socio-technical transition of its 
energy and water systems. Environmental concerns, such as climate change and resource 
scarcity, present complex management and societal challenges. New technological innovations 
present opportunities for more efficient, economic, and equitable use of natural resources but 
will require substantial shifts in user behavior as well as the regulatory processes and 
frameworks that govern resource use. Addressing these challenges can only be realized by deep 
structural changes in the behavior of energy and water systems and society (Van den Bergh and 
Bruinsma, 2008; Grin et al., 2011).  
Such systemic changes are often called ‘socio-technical transitions’, because they involve 
alterations and reconfigurations of the technologies, policies, markets, actors, infrastructure, and 
the cultural meaning of a system to society (Elzen et al., 2004; Geels, 2014; Geels and Schot, 
2007). Inherent in any socio-technical system transition is the recognition that the status quo 
state of an existing system is not desired wholly by all societal actors. In contrast to the study of 
technology innovation driven simply by economic growth issues, the broad focus of the socio-
technical transition literature is on understanding how surrounding and supporting societal 
constructs evolve and innovate to facilitate systematic change (Kemp et al. 1998). Under this 
 2 
conceptualization, a system innovation can be understood as a change from one socio-technical 
system to another.  
Within the socio-technical transition literature, sustainable transition studies focus on 
analyzing how the socio-technical innovations, that are necessary for the creation of new, more 
sustainable trajectories, evolve from interacting cultural, technological, behavioral, economic, 
and institutional developments (Geels and Schot, 2007; Elzen, et al,2004; Grin, Rotmans, & 
Schot, 2010; Loorbach, 2007;). According to Elzen, et al, there are three primary aspects of any 
sustainable transition. One is the technological substitution, which is comprised of three sub-
process:  
(i) emergence of new technologies,  
(ii) diffusion of new technologies, and  
(iii) replacement of old technology by new technology.  
The second aspect of the innovation is a coevolution, which includes changes in elements such as 
user practices, regulation, policy, actors, infrastructure, and cultural meaning. The final aspect of 
a system innovation is the emergence of new functionalities, which result in radical and new 
technical or behavioral capabilities as a result of the technological substitutions and coevolution 
innovations (Abernathy and Clark, 1985).  
While each chapter in this dissertation is distinct, every work is situated in a broader field 
of understanding the dynamics of sustainable transitions in the energy and water system. I start 
this dissertation with the basic premise that the transformation of our water and energy systems 
towards a more sustainable state is not determined simply by any scientific or economic 
 3 
rationality, but rather there exists a wide range of social, political and institutional factors which 
interact to influence innovation. Specifically, the work presented in this dissertation is focused 
on understanding the innovation process of coevolution (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Utterback, 
1994) and how changes in regulation, the emergence of new actors, and new policy instruments 
are shaping a sustainable transition at multiple scales of society. Where many studies in the 
transition literature focus on the innovation of a specific technology, or groups of technologies, I 
expand the framework to also explore how new approaches to governance can also serve as 
innovations in the sustainable transition.  
1.1 Guiding Framework: A Multi-Level Perspective on Sustainable Transitions 
Throughout the dissertation, the sustainable transitions theory will serve as a conceptual 
framework by which I integrate different literatures and analytical themes to explore key 
questions of the sustainable transition of energy and water systems. One distinct heuristic of the 
transition literature will guide much of the context for my analysis. This is the concept of a 
Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) in sustainable transitions, which includes the elements of the 
socio-technical regime, niche, and landscape. 
 At the core of the sustainable transition theory is an attempt to understand the complex 
dynamics of socio-technical change (Elzen, et al).  The elements and linkages of a socio-
technical system is a product of the activities and social groups which reproduce them, which can 
either be aligned or in tension with one another. The Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) has been 
developed within the transition literature to describe and analyze these complex, long-term 
processes. It has also been used to help design policy and as a heuristic to ex ante assess policies 
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to stimulate socio-technical transitions (Hodson, 2010). Under the MLP there are three primary 
structures of any socio-technical transition.  
The first is the socio-technical regime, which refers to the ‘deep structure’ that accounts 
for the stability of an existing socio-technical system (Geels, 2014). Regimes (which can be 
conceived at the meso-level) constitute the “whole” of policy, regulatory, structural, institutional, 
societal and environmental systems that are inherently normative at a particular scale, and as 
such constitute the “system” that is evolving and changing (Geels, 2014). Regimes are often 
characterized as a set of semi-coherent rules that coordinate and orient the activities of the social 
groups and various elements of socio-technical systems. On the one hand, actors enact, 
instantiate and draw upon rules in concrete actions in local practices; on the other hand, rules 
configure actors. Examples of regime rules range from cognitive routines and shared beliefs, to 
lifestyles and user practices, to favorable institutional arrangements and regulations, and legally 
binding contracts (Elzen, et al).  
Regimes account for the stability of a socio-technical system and provide orientation as 
well as coordination to the activities of relevant actor groups (Elzen, et al). Existing regimes are 
often characterized by lock-in. While science, technology, politics, markets, user preferences and 
cultural values have their own distinct dynamics, and are coordinated by different sub-regimes, 
they also intertwine and co-evolve with each other (Dewald and Truffer, 2010) When these sub-
regimes are coordinated and aligned, stability remains. Under a stable regime, innovation often 
occurs within sub-regimes, but it does so incrementally. When these sub-regimes are misaligned, 
this leads to new trajectories (Geels, 2004).  
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In contrast, niches (which can be conceived at the micro-level) are small markets where 
users have special demands and are willing to support emerging innovations. While regimes 
generate incremental innovations, radical innovations are generated by niches (Elzen, et al). 
Niche actors (such as policy entrepreneurs or technological innovators) work on radical 
innovations in either technology or behavior that deviate from existing regimes. Niche actors aim 
to either integrate into the regime or even replace it (Geels et al, 2007). Niches are crucial for 
transitions, as they provide the seeds for systemic change. However, the niche transition is not 
easy because the existing regime is stabilized and because niche innovations may have a 
mismatch with existing regime dimensions (e.g. lack of appropriate infrastructure, regulations or 
markets) (Geels et al, 2007). While actors may push for change, they may often be deterred by 
historically established steering mechanisms and other actor groups. This can create systemic 
resistance to change and results in path dependencies and regime lock-in. For example, in 
Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation, I examine the electric utility as the existing regime within 
the current energy system and how the regulatory system, which has governed the electric utility 
in concert with energy markets and user preferences and cultural values, is in conflict with the 
niche innovation. 
The socio-technical landscape (macro-level) is then the wider context, which influences 
the niche and regime dynamics (Kemp et al 1998). Divergences between the desired and current 
system states create pressure for change and corrective actions within the socio-technical system. 
The landscape is exogenous to the regime and constitutes the pressures that emerge from 
regional and global influences. Landscape pressures open up spaces within the regime for niches 
to evolve and change to occur. As niches accumulate and penetrate at the regime level, regimes 
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begin to transition to qualitatively different modes of operation and behavior; i.e. the path 
dependencies change.  
Key to understanding socio-technical innovations is the notion of niches as spaces where 
the viability of an innovation is demonstrated and changes in its context are being made that 
foster its wider diffusion against a backdrop of existing regimes (Kemp et al,1998). In the 
sustainability transition literature, the concept of innovation is expanded from a focus just on 
technological change to policy change and the co-evolutions of innovations that support 
transition, including behavioral and policy innovations that conflict with the presiding regime 
dynamics (Eltzen, et al). In many ways, policies can be both direct innovations and co-
evolutions. For example, the work by Geels (2014), examines the development of carbon 
markets, as both individual innovations and as co-evolutions within a broader socio-technical 
landscape. 
The Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) empirical work on sustainable transitions has shown 
that transitions require changes not only on the niche level, but also on the level of incumbent 
regimes (Raven et al, 2010). Because it is the response of regimes to niche innovations (and the 
niche supporters to the regimes responses) that constitute much of the dynamics of a sustainable 
transition, when studying any innovation and co-evolution, it is important to not only analyze the 
purposeful interventions by the government and other actor groups, but also counteracting 
steering mechanisms, which reflect power asymmetries and path dependence in the system 
(Raven et al, 2010). Smith (2007) argues socio-technical innovation should be understood in 
terms of a dynamic interweaving of both the niche and regime, which implies a focus in analysis 
on ‘translation processes between niche practices and regime practices’ (Smith, 2007, p. 431)  
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Following that argument, the relationship between the concept of the niche, regime, and 
socio-technical landscape can be understood as a nested hierarchy. As shown in Figure 1-1, the 
nested character of these concepts means that regimes are embedded in the socio-technical 
landscape, and the niches within the regimes. Actors in the social networks, governance, and 
users which support the niche work to replace the regime. The diffusion of new technologies 
occurs at the outcome of linkages between developments at multiple levels. Innovations can 
transition from the niche-level when the sub-processes at the regime and landscape level create 
an opportunity. System innovations therefore are not just about the technology but the 
surrounding markets, regulation, infrastructure, actors, and networks. 
Understanding the process of how a niche innovation occurs is another aspect of the 
MLP.  In the MLP, regime transition is intimately dependent upon influences that emerge from 
the landscape and niche levels, which are ultimately direct drivers as well as complex processes 




Figure 1-1 Diagram of the Multi-Level Perspective Framework (Geels, 2002, p. 1261) 
Understanding how subsystems, at different scales, work to influence a regime transition 
continues to be a major focus of the MLP literature (Geels, 2002). However, changes in 
subsystems do not always equate to innovations as is conceived in a sustainable transition. Stable 
diffusion of technologies or behaviors points to incremental innovation trajectories and stability 
in the overall evolution of the system. In contrast, qualitative changes in the fundamental 
behavior or the structure a system indicate radical innovations and shifts in the regime (Geels, 
2007). Quite simply, for true transition, there must be a qualitative change in the behavior and 
operations of the socio-technical landscape.  
The literature on niche innovation (Kemp et al., 1998; Schot and Geels, 2008) 
distinguishes three core processes in niche development: 
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1. The articulation (and adjustment) of expectations or visions, which provide guidance 
to the innovation activities, and aim to attract attention and funding from external 
actors. 
2. The building of social networks and the enrollment of more actors, which expand the 
resource base of niche-innovations. 
3. Learning and articulation processes on various dimensions, e.g. technical design, 
market demand and user preferences, infrastructure requirements, organizational 
issues and business models, regulatory and policy instruments, symbolic meanings. 
It is in these second and third core processes that much of my dissertation research is focused. 
Throughout my dissertation three themes of the niche-regime relationship will be explored. The 
first is the role of regulation and policy instruments in the sustainable transition of our energy 
system and their relationship to the niche-regime dynamic. The second is how the enrollment of 
new actors in the governance of energy and water systems and the behavioral changes of these 
new actors is shaping the niche-innovation development. The third, which is largely an extension 
of the second theme, is an examination of the role of the public in niche-innovation development 
and transition. All of these explorations contribute to a larger examination of whether the 
behavior and the dynamics of the subsystems within these core processes are actually facilitating 
a sustainable transition or just incremental change.    
 While my research is focused on the sustainable transition of energy and water systems 
and involves the examination of energy and water niche innovations (both technological and 
social/political), my interest is not on the technology or policy itself (i.e. energy efficiency 
policies or distributed solar photovoltaics) but rather the causal interactions between attributes or 
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specific dimensions of the socio-technical system that guide and shape the niche innovation 
development. Furthermore, as explained more fully below, each case study also builds on 
supportive and additional relevant streams of literature to better understand the dynamics within 
the subsystems of a sustainable transition. Throughout the dissertation, I pull from the 
participatory democracy literature as well as the literature on policy entrepreneurs to help guide 
my examination of the innovations and co-evolutions sustainable transitions in energy and water 
systems. Finally, throughout the dissertation I explore the concept of scale in sustainable 
transitions. 
1.2 Section 1.2 Methodological Approach 
1.2.1 Section 1.2.1 Defining the Level of Analysis and the Units of Analysis  
Sustainable transitions first happen on the micro scale (i.e. at the niche level) before 
moving to the meso and macro levels. To understand a sustainable transition, it is important to 
understand the dynamics of innovations at the niche level to identify what successful behaviors 
of the subsystem (i.e. institutions, policies, relationships) transition the niche to the regime.  
Throughout the dissertation, I take a case study approach and apply the MLP framework, in 
combination with other theoretical disciplines, to examine active niche innovations that are 
trying to transition to the regime level. All four of my case studies isolate a specific subsystem of 
interest to examine in the transition. In all four case studies the level of analysis, within the MLP 
framework, is the niche, as it exists within the larger regime and socio-technical system.  The 
units of analysis are the subsystems, at various scales, that are working to develop the niche 
innovation (i.e third-party actors, regulatory process, public participation, policy framework). In 
some cases, these subsystems are local actors working to scale–up the niche to the regime. In 
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other cases, these are national actors, scaling down to the local level, to develop the niche to the 
regime. While all case studies are distinct, across the entire dissertation my goal is to use the 
MLP framework to assess active phenomena with the intention of determining whether the 
behaviors of the subsystem in question are qualitatively changing in a way that will facilitate a 
sustainable transition or if there are other changes that need to occur in order to facilitate 
qualitative change.  
1.3 Section 1.3 Applying the MLP to the Local Level 
Where this body of work stands out from much of the MLP literature is in its 
geographical focus. Early work using the MLP was criticized for its neglect of geography and 
continued focus on national level transition (Smith et al, 2010; Truffer and Coenen, 2012). 
Truffer and Coenen (2012) argued that there was a need for a “richer special and scale 
conceptualization within transition studies.” Similarly, Monstadt (2009) explicitly called for a 
greater attention to urban studies. This need for local-level analysis has been largely driven by 
the recognition that cities are at the forefront of sustainable transitions (Bulkeley et al, 2010; 
Hodson and Marvin, 2010).  
Geels (2010) argues that cities themselves play three important roles in sustainable 
transitions at the national level. First as ‘primary actors,’ who enact a transition. Second as 
‘seedbeds and locations’ for radical niche innovations in the early phase of transition. And third, 
in a more limited role that contributes to the coevolution of innovation and helps transform 
existing regimes through powerful incumbent actors and strong market interactions.  
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Similarly, Hodson and Marvin (2010) argue the importance of analyzing transitions at the 
city level in order to examine the inclusion or exclusion of particular interests or communities in 
the mobilization of a niche innovations. Following Hodson and Marvin (2010), studying the role 
of public participation at the local level can inform the role of the public at a national level.  
However, there remain concerns over applying the MLP framework to the local level. As 
Naess and Vogel (2012) point out, the regimes in cities are often multi-segmented and are 
integrated across multiple scales, making it difficult to isolate and assess independent subsystem 
behaviors.  Nonetheless there is a need to translate and adapt the MLP to the local level and 
integrate the elements of transition theory with other frameworks to understand urban sustainable 
transition (Dixon and Eames, 2014).  
1.4 Section 1.4 Assessing Qualitative Change in the MLP 
According to Ulli-Beer (2013) there are two core systemic properties and two dimensions 
in a sustainable transition that are interrelated but should be differentiated. This is an important 
distinction to make as it will aide in crystalizing exactly how to determine if the case studies 
presented in this dissertation are in fact examples of active sustainable transitions or just studies 
of incremental change. In the transition from stability to change, the two core systemic properties 
of interest are the structure of a socio-technical system and its behavior over time. The system 
structure refers to the dynamics and causalities between element- or subsystem-specific 
attributes. Qualitative change may emerge in the structure if new institutions or new actor 
networks are established. When conducting any case study into a sustainable transition, this 
aspect of qualitative change in the institutions, behaviors, etc. of a socio-technical subsystem is 
critical. As highlighted in Figure 1.2, the circular, casual dynamics within a system are important 
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process structures that influence system behavior over time, as they help to link system structure 
to behavioral characteristics. Change only occurs if the process results in qualitative change.  
 
Figure 1-2 Core properties and analysis units in a Sustainable Transition (Ulli-Beer, 2013a) 
 
 Now, how to define and measure qualitative change within the sustainable literature is 
less clear.  In this dissertation, I follow the guidance of Grubler (2012) and chose case studies 
where the behavioral characteristics of the subsystem of interest are in a state of change. As such 
the reference variable becomes the behavior of the subsystem of interest. For example, in my 
research examining the niche innovation of energy efficient buildings and the third-party actors 
working to develop the transition, I chose a case study where the behavior of the third-party 
actors is markedly different from its historical behavior within the policy process. As noted, 
while my focus is on understanding the dynamics occurring at the niche level and in the niche 
transition, across all chapters I broadly explore to what degree the subsystems in question are 
actually facilitating a sustainable transition. To that end, I explore whether the qualitative change 
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in subsystem behaviors are resulting in structural changes within the socio-technical landscape 
that may enable qualitative system change. 
1.5 Section 1.5 Defense of the Methods 
As noted, this dissertation is a compilation of five case studies. Case study research 
involves intensive analysis of an individual unit and as such provides an opportunity to gain a 
deep holistic view of the research problem in question, and is useful when describing, 
understanding, or building a new area of research. Whilst case studies have traditionally been 
viewed as soft research, Yin argues that case study is necessary and appropriate for specific 
research interests (Yin, 1981).   
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident (Yin, 1981).  The purpose of case studies is to explain a causal link, describe an 
intervention, or illustrate certain topics within an evolution (Yin, 1981).    
Case studies are a preferred strategy when the research is asking ‘how’ or ‘why’ of a 
specific phenomenon, the researcher has little control over the events, or when the research focus 
is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. According to Schramm (1971) 
the essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to 
illuminate a decision or set of decisions; why they were taken; how there were implemented; and 
with what results (Schramm, 1971). Given that the purpose of my dissertation is to explore 
contemporary phenomena, describe the process of change transpiring, and explore how a niche 
innovation transfers to a regime, case studies are appropriate.  
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However, by choosing to do four completely separate case studies I run the risk of 
producing a body of work with internal validity but very little external validity. As King et al 
(1994) state; “in all social science research and all prediction, it is important that we be as 
explicit as possible about the degree of uncertainty that accompanies our prediction” (p 212). To 
overcome this lack of generalizability I have attempted to pick case studies that are atypical 
cases within a standing literature or build directly on established work where more research is 
warranted.  
 While case studies are traditionally seen as purely qualitative, I use both qualitative and 
quantitative methods in my case studies. In the case studies where I employ quantitative 
methods, I provide thorough justification for each analytical approach within the chapter. In 
terms of my qualitative work, the analysis presented in two of the four case studies draws on data 
and information derived from historical research, semi-structured, face-to-face, interviews and 
field observations. The richness of the information derived from our face-to-face interviews has 
the strength to reveal the critical interactions of complex social phenomena (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). However, qualitative case studies may suffer from what Miles and Huberman 
(1994) have termed the “limitations of interpretivism”—there may be a “person-specific, artistic, 
private/interpretive act that no one else can viably verify or replicate it (p. 281)”. 
My research adopted several measures to overcome these limitations. First, the 
interviewees were carefully selected as actors who occupy roles or positions in the subsystem of 
interest and are knowledgeable about the issues studied (Johnson, 1990). Additionally, I 
attempted to interview as many diverse actors as possible. Second, I used semi-structured 
questionnaires which were developed on the basis of a thorough literature review as a way to 
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facilitate systematic interviews across interviewees. Third, I conducted e-mail correspondence, 
and follow-up telephone interviews were conducted to collect supplementary information and to 
clarify data. Fourth, the interviews were recorded and transcribed to reduce inaccuracies due to 
poor recall.  
1.6 Overview of the Dissertation  
In Chapters 2 and 3, I examine the unfolding energy transition with an examination of the 
growing adoption of the niche innovation, distributed solar photovoltaic resources. The energy 
transition in both the United States and throughout the world has been studied from many 
perspectives. Scholars have examined questions related to technology diffusion (Jacobsson & 
Johnson, 2000; Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006), scales of change (Schreurs, 2008; Sovacool & 
Brown, 2009), and political backlash to sustainable energy legislation (Stokes, 2013). Here I build 
on work by Hess (2016), which was among the first to use the MLP framework and the dynamic 
of the niche-regime relationship to understand the tension between distributed solar resources, 
incumbent utilities, and the regulatory process that relates the two. Because the growth of 
distributed generation (DG) solar is dependent on regulatory policies that affect its economic 
feasibility, the outcome of the regime-niche relationship is highly dependent on public policy and 
the regulatory process (Hess, 2016).  Hess (2016) outlined that more attention needs to be given 
to how power is controlled in sustainability transitions in non-traditional ways. As Grin et al. 
argues, a central challenge of transition studies is to understand how “to tilt the balance of power 
and legitimacy between incumbent and sustainable practices” (2011: 80). 
 In reviewing all the major net metering controversies over the past five years, Hess 
(2016) recognizes how the current transition from a regulatory landscape that has been 
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dominated by Renewable Portfolio Standards and Net Energy Metering (NEM) to a more 
discrete valuation process of distributed resources presents new challenges for the niche regime. 
I build on this recognition and look specifically at how behavioral changes in the regulatory 
process, specifically the movement towards a Value of Solar (VOS) for DG solar, presents new 
complications to the regulatory subsystem that guides the niche-regime dynamics. First, I 
examine the implications of the policy instrument VOS (the subsystem) and highlight how the 
transition from Net Metering to Value of Solar may not result in the qualitative change necessary 
to facilitate a true sustainable transition but rather continue incremental change. Second, I 
examine one of the largest arguments made by the regime electric utility against the development 
of DG - the argument that DG causes a cost shift. This is supported by a case study in Georgia.  
 The purpose of this case study is to examine an active niche innovation of the energy 
system with the goal of first, examining the regulation’s role in the transition and second, 
identifying which subsystem processes (i.e. policy instruments and regulatory structures) are 
facilitating innovation and which ones are not. In the absence of a federal energy policy or plan, 
every State in the U.S is individually engaged in a niche-regime dynamic. What is successful 
behavior of the subsystem in one state may not be effective in another and therefore may not 
translate to the national level. Furthermore, the regulations and policies that the niche supporters 
may perceive to be leading to innovation, may not result in the qualitative change necessary. As 
the sustainable energy transition is active, throughout the world, it is important to distinguish 
between those processes that lead to innovation and those which lead to incremental change.  
 In Chapters 4 and 5, I turn to understanding another core process in niche development 
within sustainable transitions (Kemp et al., 1998; Schot and Geels, 2008) - the enrolment of new 
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actors in the governance process. In my first case study, I examine the strategies of intermediary 
actors in the policy process with the intention of understanding how the strategies of these actors 
are influencing the sustainability transition of urban energy systems and the niche innovation of 
more energy efficient buildings. In the second case study, I expand my definition of niche 
innovation from a technology (i.e. solar or energy efficiency) to include a new structure for water 
resource management. Here, I explore whether the niche of collaborative resource management 
and in inclusion of public participation in the governance process (which I define as grassroots 
stakeholders) can transition from being a successful tool for small-scale watershed management 
to large-scale resource planning.  
The first case study explores the role and strategies of third-sector intermediary actors in 
the sustainable transition of energy systems in cities. As cities are increasingly becoming the 
thought leaders and drivers of the sustainable transition, it is critical to understand the 
governance structures and dynamics that are driving the transition. In this work, I examine the 
strategy of ‘strategic capacity seeding’ (Clark, 2017) by third-sector intermediaries as a 
subsystem working to develop the niche innovation of energy efficient buildings in the local 
sustainable transition process. I focus on how third-sector intermediary actors are shaping local 
institutions in the sustainable transition and the role of public participation. As Hendriks (2009, 
p. 341) has observed, ‘[r]ecent debates on how to “manage” policy transitions to sustainability 
have been curiously silent on democratic matters, despite their potential implications for 
democracy’.  
I use a case study of Atlanta, GA to explore the strategies of third-sector intermediaries in 
the sustainable transition as well as the implications of the coevolution for local institutions, 
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institutional capacity, and the role of the public in the policy process. My research suggests that 
the strategy of strategic seeding can provide immediate benefits to the municipality, in terms of 
reducing resource barriers, but it is unclear whether or not it has any lasting qualitative impact on 
the institutions that govern municipal energy policy. Furthermore, there may be a need to 
consider more actively the role of the public in the policy process. Whether the strategies of 
intermediaries will facilitate the qualitative change of the institutions necessary for niche 
innovation is unclear. But understanding how these dynamics work in the city will be critical in 
determining how to translate the city level innovation to a national scale.  
The second case study continues the theme of examining the behavioral changes of third-
party actors and the role of public participation in sustainable transitions. However, in the second 
case study I expand the use of MLP from focusing on a technological evolution to examine the 
inclusion of local actors in the management of large-scale water resources as the niche 
innovation in the sustainable transition of water systems. The literature on sustainable water 
resource management continually points to the need for including local actors and local users in 
the management of water resource (Ostrom, 2009). While there are multiple cases of this 
‘commons’ approach working at the watershed level, there are few cases of governance models 
where local, grassroots actors are included in the management and planning of large-scale 
resources, that cross multiple political and geographic boundaries.  In this chapter, I extend the 
MLP framework to treat the governance model of collaboration and public participation in the 
governance process as the ‘niche’ innovation that struggles to be integrated into the established 
management regime - which is dictated by centralized legal battles and failed cooperation 
between user states. I apply the extended MLP framework to a case study on the Apalachicola- 
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Chattahoochee - Flint (ACF) water wars. The subsystem of interest is the emerging actor of the 
ACF Stakeholder group- a grassroots, non-government organization working to develop a 
platform for local interests in large-scale resource management.  
Where the first case study examined the role of large, national non-state actors in the 
local policy process, the second case study examines the role of a small, local non-state actor in a 
state and federal policy process. This second case study was originally the primary research 
endeavor of my dissertation but, due to the politically sensitive nature of the topic, I was unable 
to finish the research. What is presented here is the work to date.  
Chapters 4 and 5 also share two core analytical themes. First, both draw attention to the 
role of actors and their agency in sustainable transitions. These niche and intermediary actors are 
in many respects policy entrepreneurs and at the forefront of this transition, as a driving force for 
niche development and transition. As O’Neil and Ucbasaran (2016) recognize, these 
entrepreneurs may represent a new type of entrepreneurial behavior combining economic, 
environmental and social aims to shape the institution of a sustainable transition. As such, I 
utilize the literature on policy entrepreneurs in both case studies to examine the institutional 
elements shaping these subsystems and to understand how these actors are shaping the niche 
development which they either constitute or support.  
The second draws attention to the recognition that from a governance perspective, the 
sustainable transition literature views the engagement of a wide variety of stakeholders in policy 
development as a necessary element, yet has paid relatively little attention to public participation 
in socio-technical change (Upham et al., 2015). In concert with understanding the behaviors of 
non-state actors in the niche innovation, it is critical to understand how these actors may shape 
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how participatory democracy operates within a transition. Furthermore, it is important to explore 
at which stage in the transition the public is effective. While the literature on sustainable resource 
management continually recognizes the need for public engagement, more research is need to 
understand how public support for a niche innovation translates to the regime.     
In both case studies, I follow a similar methodological format. Recognizing the 
importance of combining other fields of research for analyzing sustainable transitions (Avelino et 
al, 2016), I build hypotheses pertaining to my research questions by combining the literature of 
sustainable transitions with other relevant literatures. While the overarching lens by which I 
examine these cases is within the context of sustainable transitions and the MLP, I build my 
hypotheses from relevant supporting literatures, mainly participatory democracy and policy 
entrepreneurship among others.  Second, I utilize in-depth semi structured interviews with 
relevant actors to explore my research questions and test my hypotheses. In my second case 
study, I developed and operationalized a survey to also test my work but did not receive enough 
responses to justify statistical significance.  
Chapter 6 moves beyond examining active subsystems and processes within the energy 
and water subsystem to explore the potential for a qualitative shift in the governance of energy 
and water and the isolated niche technologies of each system. Here, I return to the city and 
combine the MLP framework with the Water-Energy-Climate Nexus to examine the potential for 
the adoption of a ‘nexus’ view in local policy instruments to support the niche innovation of 
distributed energy resources. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE ROLE OF NICHE REGULATORY POLICIES IN 
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY TRANSITIONS: A CASE STUDY OF NET 
METERING AND VALUE OF SOLAR 
2.1 Introduction 
In the United States, the effort towards a sustainable transition of the electricity system 
away from dependence on fossil fuels has become a highly divided and political process. A 
sustainable transition requires substantial changes in electricity regimes that result in resistance 
from the incumbent utilities (Geels, 2014). This tension is evident in the conflict between the 
incumbent U.S electricity system regime and the growth of distributed energy resources (DERs), 
specifically the growth of the niche technological innovation, distributed solar photovoltaics 
(DGPV). The literature on sustainable transitions has given significant attention to the transition 
of the electricity system and the role of regulatory policies. Elzen et al. (2011) argues that a 
successful transition of the electricity system requires not only a technically and economically 
feasible technology mix but also the alignment of these factors with political conditions such as 
regulatory openings and normative pressures.  
The growth of DGPV is dependent on regulatory policies that affect its economic 
feasibility, user adoption, and ability to compete against incumbent technologies; furthermore, 
the outcome of the regime-niche relationship is highly dependent on the structures of regulatory 
frameworks and the supporting policy decisions. Therefore, understanding the specific 
dimensions of regulatory policy as it relates to the development of niche innovations is critical to 
understanding how to foster sustainable transitions (Hess, 2016). This research builds on prior 
research that recognizes the need to include greater attention to the impact of regulatory 
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decisions and how they shape the sustainable transition of our electricity system (Avelino and 
Rotmans, 2009; Geels, 2014; Jiusto and McCauley, 2010; Kern and Smith, 2008).  
After a background section that reviews the conceptual framework and the history of 
solar energy policy in the U.S., I turn to analyzing the role of regulatory policies in the 
sustainable transition of the U.S electricity system, focusing on the two policies of Net Metering 
(NEM) and a Value Solar Tariff (VOST). In this chapter, I explore several policy implications 
related to NEM and VOSTs, including-the functional differences between the use of NEM and 
the use of VOST; the challenges facing implementation of a VOSTs; the consequences 
associated with the methodologies employed to determine a VOST; and the overarching 
challenge of regulating the value provided by a niche technology in a market dictated by the cost 
structure of the regime. I then demonstrate how the framework and methodological decisions 
made in a value of solar (VOS) study can greatly impact the resulting VOST. I use a case study 
in the state of Georgia using public electricity generation and electricity demand data for the 
Georgia Power Company (GPC) as well as environmental and generation data from multiple 
state and national databases. In the Chapter 3, I will use these VOS calculations to build on the 
work by Hess (2015) and examine one of the major regime arguments against the niche growth 
of DGPV- the strategy of characterizing DGPV as an economic burden on non-solar customers. 
This argument is often referred to the ‘cost shift’ argument. In conclusion, I provide a discussion 
and additional thoughts on the role of the regulatory structures in the sustainable transition of our 
electricity system as well as policy implications of the current approach and suggestions for 
further analysis.  
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2.2 Analytical Framework 
In this chapter I use the Multi-Level-Perspective framework as a heuristic to diagram 
the technical, economic, and political dynamics of a sustainable transition of the U.S 
electricity system (Need to includes refs here, unless this is your own framework). The MLP 
framework distinguishes between three analytical levels with increasing temporal stability. 
The first is the niche. The niche is the level at which innovation occurs and is characterized by 
a flexibility and uncertainty.  The regime is the presiding stable set of practices, technologies 
or rules that have been legitimized through institutional and technological lock-in (Geels, 
2014; Brown, et al., 2007). The sociotechnical landscape contains the slow-moving societal 
processes that provide the context for regime stability or change. Sustainable transitions, 
defined as regime change, occur through the interplay between niche innovation, internal 
regime change and landscape factors (Geels, 2014).  
Applying the MLP to the electricity system in the United States, the regime consists of 
three interlinked dimensions (Geels, 2005): (a) network of actors and social groups; (b) formal, 
normative and cognitive rules that guide the activities of actors; and (c) material and technical 
elements. In this chapter, I am focused on the formal rules that guide niche development, 
specifically regulations and the utility business model.  
According to Verbon and Geels (2007) electricity regimes are characterized by path 
dependence; resulting from stabilizing mechanisms which include regulations and standards that 
stabilize the economics of the regime and existing machines, and infrastructures (i.e power 
plants) that stabilize regimes through sunk investments and technical complementarities between 
components (Unruh, 2000; Walker, 2000; Brown and Wang, 2015).  
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The niche is the micro level where niche technological innovations emerge. In the context 
of this research, the niche innovation is distributed solar photovoltaics. Niche policies work to 
develop innovations through multiple policy spaces so technological innovations can be 
incorporated or can overthrow the regime. Niche policies are necessary as the incumbent regime 
is often resistant to niche growth and will employ several strategies to stifle adoption. This is 
especially true for electric utilities, that are historically opposed to innovation.  For example, 
over the past ten years, on average electric utilities in the United States have spent less that 1% 
on R&D (NRI, 2015). In this chapter, I focus on the supportive niche policies of net metering 
and value of solar tariffs.  
The socio-technical landscape then represents the socio-economic, cultural, and 
environmental context in which the niche-regime relationship exists and in which policy plays 
out (Brown and Sovacool, 2011). In the context of electricity system, the landscape represents 
the national and international trends, macro-economic patterns, the totality of infrastructure, and 
political cultures that are even beyond the direct control of the regime and niche (Grin et al. 
2010). Such examples include concerns over climate change, energy access, resource scarcity, 
energy security, migration, wars, and economic development patterns (Brown and Sovacool, 
2011). The dynamics of the landscape level, shape the dominant economic and political 
discourses, and influence the patterns of behavior of actors within the regime and outside the 
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Figure 2-1 The multi-level perspective (landscape, regime, niche) and corresponding 
dynamics in the context of the U.S Energy System 
 
2.3 Research Questions 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer four primary questions.  
RQ1. What are the market and policy differences between the niche the policies VOST and 
NEM?  
RQ2. What are the policy implications of utilizing a VOST for niche innovations and the 
sustainable transition?  
RQ3. How does the framework, inputs, and methods utilized in a VOS methodology impact the 
VOST?  
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RQ4. What is the value of distributed solar in Georgia and how do estimates of a VOST vary 
based on different methodological assumptions?  
To answer these questions, first I examine the literature on VOST and NEM and outline 
the critical role of regulators in the adoption of niche technologies as well as how the lock-in of 
the incumbent utility business model creates major barriers for niche development. I then 
examine how the valuation methods as well as how the dynamics of the electric utility, the 
decisions of policy makers, and the policy structure can result in varying estimates for a VOST. 
To this end, I explore the implications of these dynamics within the niche regime relationship 
and the pace of the sustainable transition. Second, I provide a basic estimate of a VOST for the 
state of Georgia, using DGPV production information in conjunction with public GPC financial 
data to assess the value of power exported from behind-the-meter (BTM) DGPV to GPC. I assess 
a VOST under three different discount rates and three different scenarios for the components of 
avoided energy costs, avoided generation capacity costs, and with or without the inclusion of 
societal and environmental benefits. 
2.4 Background: History of Solar Policy in the United States and Framing the Dynamics 
between Net Metering and Value of Solar 
While in some areas of the country, electricity generation, transmission, and retail sales 
are divided among separate organizations, that are increasingly guided by market competition 
forces, other states are dominated by utilities which still function under the incumbent, integrated 
model. Though few in number, these investor-owned utilities (IOUs) service the largest number 
of customers in the United States (DOE/QER, 2016). In this chapter, when I refer to the electric 
utility, I am referring to IOUs. IOUs are regulated by a state’s public utilities commission (PUC) 
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as regulated monopolies. PUCs, or their equivalent in each state, are a replacement for the 
competitive market. In exchange for granting the exclusive right to sell electricity in a given 
service territory, PUCs determine how much the utility is allowed to invest using ratepayer 
resources (and in what), how much it can charge, and what its profit margin can be. Often 
referred to as the “regulatory compact” and first laid out in the Binghamton Bridge Supreme 
Court case of 1865, this legal structure has given PUCs mechanisms to define the market for 
electricity in a state. (Jamison, 2005)  
The revenues and the profits a utility earns is also determined by the PUC.  PUCs 
determine a utility’s total revenue requirement, which represents the amount of money a utility 
must collect in order to cover its operating costs and make a guaranteed profit. The PUC decides 
what the revenue requirement will be based on a number of factors, but generally speaking it is 
comprised of the value of a utility’s capital assets multiplied by the allowed rate of return (i.e the 
guaranteed profit) plus some additional operating and administrative expenses. The allowed rate 
of return (the return on capital assets) drives a utility’s profitability.  
An inherent downfall of the ‘regulatory compact’ approach is that it incentivizes 
investment in assets over efficiency and services, research and development, and (more 
importantly for this analysis) dictates the value of electricity not in terms of market forces but in 
terms of a single monopoly’s investment patterns.  By having a set rate of return, the only way 
for utilities to increase their profits is to increase rate base, which is tied to capital investments. 
This essentially incentivizes utilities to make large investments, even if unwarranted, and pass 
any and all costs on to customers. In other words, the more assets a utility acquires, the more 
profits grow. And the only way to justify continued asset investment is through continued growth 
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in demand. Of course, under a regulated monopoly model, there is no alternative for the 
customer as the utility is the only game in town. The growing adoption of DGPV, fundamentally 
challenges the incumbent electricity regime.  
The conflict between DGPV and the utility industry in the U.S. dates back nearly half-a-
century.  In the 1970’s and 80’s, the emerging green-transition coalition emphasized that DGPV 
provided citizens with local control over their electricity use (Laird, 2001), a vision that 
contrasted with the utilities’ desire to maintain exclusive and guaranteed control over the 
electricity market (Lipschutz and Mulvaney, 2013; Reece, 1979) and a vision that is still 
espoused by DGPV advocates today. When unable to win favor federally, the green transition 
coalition shifted its attention to state governments, which by the early 1980s were already 
developing renewable portfolio standards and net metering laws to help incentivize DGPV 
adoption (Lipschutz and Mulvaney, 2013).  
Net metering is a compensation mechanism that credits solar energy system owners for 
the electricity exported to the grid. There are two primary forms of net-metering in existence in 
the U.S. The first, and the one focused on in this chapter, is retail rate net metering (NCSL, 
2016). Retail-rate NEM credits solar system owners for the electricity they export to the grid at 
full retail rate. The second is non-retail rate NEM which compensates exported power at rate 
lower than retail rate, typically at the utilities avoided cost rate.  
NEM rules vary from state to state. Some of the common differences between states 
include the capacity limits on qualifying systems and the ownership of renewable energy credits.  
In most jurisdictions, NEM is treated as a compensation mechanism where any exported energy 
is treated as a credit against the owner’s next bill cycle. Typically, customer’s monthly net 
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excess generation is carried forward at the utility's retail rate to a customer's next bill for up to 12 
months. At the end of a 12-month billing period, the utility either pays the customer for any 
remaining unused credits or the credits are lost (NCSL, 2016).  
From the early 1980’s until 1996, there was a slow increase in net metering laws at which 
point the rate of state government support grew rapidly based on a regional diffusion pattern 
(Stoutenborough and Beverlin, 2008). Then the Energy Policy Act of 2005 required state 
electricity regulators to "consider" rules that mandate public electric utilities make available 
upon request net metering to their customers (Verzola, 2015).  By 2016, 38 states had NEM 
policies, and 29 states had mandatory renewable portfolio standards, with voluntary standards in 
seven other states. Additionally, many states adopted various financial incentives to support the 
deployment of DGPV, including property, sales, or income tax incentives for system purchasers, 
grants or rebates, third-party financing, low- or zero-interest loans, or feed-in tariffs requiring 
utilities to purchase solar energy from producers at an above-market rate (DSIRE, 2016). 
While NEM laws are now widely diffused, they are not without limits. In about half of 
the states with NEM, there is a subscriber limit for DGPV, generally in the range of 1–5% of 
peak demand. As such, current NEM laws are a perfect representation of supporting niche 
policies as they are designed specifically to grow a market to the ‘acceleration stage’ where 
niche innovations enter the mainstream market and start to compete with the incumbent regime, 
but are intended to provide support during the final phase of diffusion when the market 
transformation does not require further public assistance (Hess, 2015).   
Due to a supportive niche policy landscape coupled with continued cost reductions, the 
residential solar market has grown from a few MWs in 2010 to over 2.5 GWs in 2016 (Wood, 
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2016). However, as DGPV adoption grows, so too does resistance from the incumbent regime. 
The leading utility argument against DGPV is that solar customers are not paying their ‘fair 
share’ of the costs to maintain the grid infrastructure and are inherently causing non-solar 
customers to recover those costs, creating a cross-subsidy. Utilities contend that the increased 
use of DGPV could reduce utilities’ revenue to the point that they cannot pay off existing capital 
investments, resulting in lost revenues and potential stranded assets (Raskin, 2013; Johnson, et 
al. 2017). Under the ‘regulatory compact’ model, in order to continually earn a profit, utilities 
will need to shift the recovery of these lost revenues on to non-solar customers. These 
arguments, while often exaggerated (Johnson et al, 2017) are a consequence of the fundamental 
conflict with DGPV and the incumbent regime-the utility business model, which is locked-in by 
regulatory policies. This ‘cost-shift’ argument has been at the forefront of much of the recent 
effort by utilities to reduce or eliminate NEM and RPS’s and implement standby charges on solar 
customers.  
Thirteen states have introduced bills to repeal RPS (Plumer, 2013), with West Virginia 
repealing its RPS in 2015 (Light, 2015). Multiple utilities have challenged the use of net-
metering programs, either through direct repeal or by implementing stand-by charges, which 
allow utilities to levy a monthly fee to owners of solar PV systems to undermine the financial 
incentive provided by net-metering (Warrick, 2015). In 2011, Virginia became the first state to 
allow these charges, and by 2016, dozens of utilities throughout the country were engaged in 
regulatory proceedings to initiate stand-by charges for residential net-metered systems (Virginia 
State Corporation Commission, 2014; North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, 2014; 
Turkel, 2014). Utilities’ pursuit of standby is supported by their argument that an expansion of 
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DGPV will result in revenue erosion and an inadequacy of cost recovery for the utility, resulting 
in a cross-subsidy between solar and non-solar customers. This argument is usually referred to as 
the ‘cost shift’ argument.  
It is important to recognize that the rise in adoption of DGPV corresponded with (and has 
contributed to) a change in demand growth. States throughout the country have been 
experiencing flat to declining load growth as a result of changing economic demographics, which 
presents an additional challenge to the utility business model (EIA, 2017). Without demand 
growth, utilities must find other ways to continually ensure upward profits and consistent returns. 
From a sociotechnical perspective, changes in demand based on shifts in the economy and user 
preferences represent the landscape pressures, whereas the growth in DGPV is a bottom-up niche 
innovation that is putting pressure on the regime utility model.  
Now PUCs throughout the country are engaging in regulatory debates over the rising use 
of DGPV, the supportive NEM policies that have fostered the adoption of DGPV, and the 
arguments made by incumbent utilities about the negative consequences of DGPV. At the crux 
of this regulatory debate is how to incorporate the power generated by DGPV owners for any 
electricity that is exported to the grid, into the incumbent regime market, i.e the utility business 
model.  This issue of determining how to best structure the electricity market for DGPV and 
compensate owners accordingly for their exported energy reveals a fundamental impediment to 
the sustainable transition and the embeddedness of the regime in incumbent policy structures. 
Valuing customer-sited energy assets in a market that is dominated by regulated monopolies 
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whose business model is dictated by large capital investments and increasing demand, presents a 
host of ‘wicked’ challenges. 1  
In response to the debate over NEM, PUCs are exploring a number of different niche 
policy instruments. For the purpose of this research, I focus on the development of a VOST, as it 
is a perfect case to illustrate the importance of regulatory decisions in the sustainable transition. 
Similar to NEM, a VOST is a rate design policy that provides solar generating customers with 
credit for the electricity generated by a DGPV system. Solar customers can generate power for 
and take power from the grid. However, instead of tying compensation to retail rates or utility’s 
avoided costs, a VOST requires utilities and regulators to evaluate and determine a ‘value of 
solar,’ and establish a method to govern the market value of distributed solar energy. A VOS 
methodology seeks to quantify the costs and benefits of distributed solar to the electricity system, 
the presiding utility, and society at large — the summation of which is intended to reflect the 
market value of the generation provided by distributed solar. A Value of Solar tariff (VOST) is 
the compensation provided to DGPV customers by the utility based on the VOS methodology.  
Currently there are only two VOSTs in practice, Minnesota and Austin, Texas, but several states 
are engaging in the value of solar methodology (NCSL, 2016).   
                                                
1 Rittel and Webber (1973) explained that the problems of modern society and public policy are 
often ‘wicked’ as they are ‘ill-defined’, interlinked, and relying on political judgments rather 
than scientific certitude. Wicked problems are inherently complex, resistant to a clear statement 




Determining a VOST requires a detailed understanding of the specific costs and benefits 
that DGPV provides to the utility. There have been a wide-range of efforts by non-profits, 
academics, technical consultants, and state and federal agencies to establish a VOST for specific 
utilities. However, to date, there is no uniform methodology for assessing the VOS or 
determining a VOST. While some studies focus strictly on how DGPV relates to the cost 
structure for the presiding electric utilities only (E3, 2012; Hoff, 2006) others include broader 
societal and environmental impacts (Perez, 2012; Jones, 2012; Rabago, 2013).   
Utilizing a VOST as a regulatory tool is fundamentally challenging from both a process 
and an implementation perspective, and underscores the influence of regulators in the sustainable 
transition. The components included in the valuation process, the valuation methods, and the 
guiding frameworks vary significantly throughout the literature, which can create confusion and 
the opportunity for regime resistance to the use of VOS studies in the regulatory process (Hess, 
2015). The lack of consistency in the components and methods used in the valuation process 
essentially leaves the decision of how to value DGPV to the discretion of the PUC. 
 The components assessed in a VOS study, and how they are assessed, have 
consequences not only for the economics of DGPV and the adoption of DGPV in the market, but 
also for the institutions that govern and influence the electricity market in a sustainable transition 
impacted by the continued dynamics of the niche-regime relationship. Many utilities have argued 
that the VOS should be limited only to the economic value DGPV provides to the utility cost 
structure. Solar advocates argue that DGPV should be assessed for its value outside of avoided 
utility costs. The challenge for regulators is determining which goods and services provided by 
solar should be ascribed value, how to value them, and then how to structure a market for 
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compensation. Ultimately, each decision made in the valuation process reflects on the regulator’s 
view of the role and importance of DGPV, their commitment to the regime structure, and their 
preference on the role of future customer owned electricity assets in the sustainable transition. 
From a sociotechnical perspective, the introduction of VOST represents a regulatory opportunity 
in the transition of the electricity system, from one characterization of the electricity market to 
another, and a pivotal role for regulation. PUCs throughout the country have the power to utilize 
a VOS to fundamentally change the regulatory lock-in of the utility system and facilitate niche 
transition or accept incremental improvements on the niche policies of DGPV. Similar 
assessments of the lock-in aspects of PUC regulation were debated in comprehensive regulatory 
hearings and deliberations in the 1990s with respect to the role of utility investment in energy-
efficiency programs. The result was a series of well-defined cost-effectiveness tests that span an 
array of different utility and societal costs and benefits, beginning with the California Standard 
Practice Manual and ultimately resulting in a set or international protocols (Brown and Wang, 
2015). Distributed solar is now in need of a similar set of well-honed evaluation principles and 
metrics, which the VOST debate is beginning to develop. 
Instead of introducing a good to a market of buyers or sellers, a VOST requires regulators 
to determine the confines of the market. Regulators must decide whether to value DGPV strictly 
based on the cost structure of presiding utility or if to include other value streams such as 
environmental, social, human health, and economic benefits of solar — including reduced water 
use, reduced carbon emissions and local pollutants, and job growth. In many cases the local 
policy landscape may dictate which components are recognized in the valuation, but in any case, 
a VOS methodology will explicitly reflect the values of the PUC and set precedence for how to 
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structure a market for customer-sited resources. These power dynamics could have multiple 
implications for future energy resources in an era of electricity generation that is becoming 
increasingly more distributed and disaggregated.  
If executed to reflect the value of DGPV to society, a VOST has implications for the 
niche-regime relationship as the implementation of a VOST inherently recognizes that customer-
sited solar has a market value beyond individual customer benefits. The implementation of retail-
rate NEM was, and continues to be motivated by the public’s desire to incentivize the adoption 
of customer-sited solar. NEM never had the purpose of creating a market for exported solar 
energy and there is a significant difference between initiating a niche policy with the intention of 
incentivizing technology adoption and a policy which attempts to define the market value of a 
technology. A VOST could be a tool for creating an entirely new market. By ascribing market 
values outside the regime, but to the multiple attributes of a resource, the implementation of a 
VOST challenges the traditional market for electricity generation and the business model 
between the utility and the customer from a one-way contract to a two-way contract. This could 
have policy implications for other technologies and resources, including energy efficiency and 
demand response, although well-debated protocols have already been developed. This could also 
hold greater policy implications for how the future electricity market is structured in terms of 
market players and regulatory models.   
However, if the VOST is executed within the confines of the utility business model (i.e 
limited to the costs and benefits of the utility value stack) this inherently discourages competition 
between the niche and the regime and rather ties all value of the niche innovation to the 
incumbent regime.  Unfortunately, while there are some instances of VOS methodologies that 
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include components that are not part of the utility value stack, overwhelmingly how a VOST is 
determined is by dictating the value of DGPV by the utility cost structure (Hess, 2015).  
Additionally, a VOST opens the opportunity to incorporate the values of the user. Under 
a NEM structure, the value of solar powered was capped by retail cost of electricity generated by 
the regime (often powered by fossil fuel generation resources).  It may be that users throughout 
the country would willing pay more for solar generated electricity than for fossil-fuel generated 
electricity but this market preference is not reflected in the valuation process. In fact, we see this 
very dynamic playing out in other areas of solar policy, such as community solar or green-riders, 
where utility customers are willingly paying more to get solar energy.  
Ultimately, the question for PUCs is one of purpose in the sustainable transition. The 
policies employed for DGPV hold weight for more than just a single technological development 
but for the institutions that shape our electricity system and underscore the role of regulatory 
bodies in the transition. Depending on the PUC, the implementation of a VOST could challenges 
the traditional market and utility business model for electricity generation and could have greater 
regulatory and market implications, or could result in simply incremental change to policies 
guiding the niche-regime relationship. Given the opportunity that a VOST holds, more research 
is needed to understand the complexities concerning policy design and implementation. 
2.5 Understanding a Value of Solar Methodology and Value of Solar Tariff  
 VOS methodologies establish a formula and a framework for assessing the per kWh market 
value of customer-sited distributed solar. Since the current electricity market does not provide an 
arena for customers to sell their generated power, the off-taker of any solar generation (not used 
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on-site) must, at least for now, be the utility. Therefore, a VOS methodology must take into 
consideration the unique nature of the presiding utility. A VOS also must quantify the multiple 
economic, environmental, and public costs and benefits to the greater society. Generally 
speaking, the values represent the benefits associated with avoided costs to the utility and the 
society as well as any costs of incorporating solar into the utility system. These value streams are 
added together to arrive at a single VOST, expressed in cents per kilowatt-hour. The VOST is 
then used to compensate customers for electricity generated by DGPV systems. 
While there is no uniform approach to a VOS methodology, there are congruencies 
between the multiple existing studies (Acadia, 2015a; Acadia, 2015b; NREL, 2014: NREL, 
2015). The National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s 2014 report (Denholm, et. al, 2014) 
examined various solar valuation methodologies, concluding that the main components being 
valued, include:  
・	Energy 
・	Emissions  
・	T&D loss savings  
・	Generator capacity  
・	T&D capacity  
・	Ancillary services  
・	Environmental impacts  
・	Fuel price hedging 
・	Diversity 
・	Market price suppression 
・	O&M costs 
・	Integration costs 
・	Grid support services and Resiliency 
In principle, the VOS methodology will result in a real value for the electricity generated 
by DGPV systems. However, there is disagreement between stakeholders in the valuation 
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process on which value streams are legitimate. Some categories of value, such as avoided energy 
costs and avoided line losses are not controversial, and there is general agreement among a 
variety of stakeholders on their inclusion in the VOS methodology and how they should be 
calculated. There is significantly less agreement on overall approach to estimating other 
categories, including capital and operating investments in electricity generation, transmission, 
and distribution, or financial and security risk (Hansen, 2013). 
DGPV advocates argue that since DGPV generates during daylight hours and on average 
generates in greater quantity during summer months, DGPV is particularly valuable to summer-
peaking electricity systems as power from DGPV is produced disproportionately at times when 
the value of electricity is high.2 Because PV power is generated on-site, line losses are avoided. 
Additionally, because power from central station generation requires significant investment in 
transmission and distribution infrastructure, by utilizing DGPV located near or at load, the 
investment in transmission and distribution could potentially be reduced if more power were 
generated on site (Cohen 2015).   
Utilities argue that DGPV is not a reliable resource and therefore cannot be depended on 
consistently to reduce capacity investments or defer costs to the transmission and distribution 
system or management of the grid. Additionally, utilities argue that when DGPV is connected 
into the distribution systems, it changes the power flow conditions: instead of power flowing in 
one direction it can now transfer from one customer to another, or from customers back to the 
transmission system. At high penetrations of DGPV, this can result in thermal stress on the 
distribution system as well as voltage fluctuations that may be difficult to manage at times of 




high loading. For example, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory recently analyzed the impact 
of DGPV on Duke Energy’s system in North Carolina and found minimal impact to the stability 
of the electricity grid so long as DGPV remained less that 20% of peak load (Lu, et al., 2014) 
These engineering issues have created concern among distribution engineers, regulators and 
researchers as to how distribution systems will accommodate very high penetrations of PV – and 
what the associated costs will be (Cohen 2015).  
Of course, solar advocates argue that there are many benefits that DGPV can provide to 
the distribution system including: resistive losses; deferred capacity investments; reduced 
transformer aging; and if utilized effectively, voltage regulation. Several studies have assessed 
the engineering impacts of PV in distribution systems (Quezada et al.,2006; Shugar, 1990; 
Woyte et al., 2006; Thomson and Infield, 2007; Navarro et al., 2013; Wid´en et al., 2010; Hoke 
et al., 2013; Cohen and Callaway, 2013; Cohen, 2015). Cohen (2015) is one of the few studies to 
translate the full range of engineering impacts into economic values, finding that DGPV has 
relatively little impact on the distribution system and can, in certain areas, provide substantial 
value.  
Additional categories, such as environmental and social benefit of DGPV, elicit much 
more debate among stakeholders. Utilities often argue that all environmental, societal, or 
economic benefits are peripheral to their costs models are not relevant for a VOST. Solar 
advocates argue that all values provided by DGPV should be recognized whether or not these 
values accrue directly to the utility or to society at large (Hansen, 2013).  
Recently, a few public service commissions have engaged in studies weighing both the 
benefits and costs of DGPV, with varying results. A 2014 study commissioned by the Maine 
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Public Utilities Commission found that DGPV has a has a net value of US$0.33 per kilowatt-
hour. A 2013 study by the Vermont Public Service Department (Vermont Public Service 
Department, 2013) found a statewide net cost/benefit of essentially zero for DGPV systems 
installed in 2013. A study commissioned in 2013, by the Arizona Public Service, accounting for 
a full range of costs and benefits, found that current DGPV provided a net benefit of around 
US$.08/kWh (Beach, 2013). Minnesota’s VOS methodology estimated DGPV to have a value of 
US$0.14 per kilowatt-hour. Whereas, Austin’s VOS methodology originally estimated DGPV’s 
value, at US$0.13 per kilowatt-hour. Finally, a recent study for the Public Service Commission 
of Mississippi found a range between a net cost of around US$0.02 per kilowatt-hour to a net 
benefit of about US$0.06 per kilowatt-hour, depending on scenario assumptions, such as changes 
in future natural gas prices (Synapse, 2015).  
There are also a handful of valuation studies, mostly utility-sponsored, that have focused 
strictly on the costs of increasing net-metered DGPV. A 2011 report by the Virginia State 
Corporation Commission examined the potential costs of increasing net-metered distributed solar 
power to 1 % of each utility’s peak load, crediting solar with only the avoided generation costs 
plus a small amount of avoided generation capacity costs. The study found a net cost to utilities 
of US$0.03 per kilowatt-hour of solar energy produced, which when spread across the entire 
customer base would only increase average annual customer bills by less than 0.5 % (Pitt D, 
2014; Virginia State Corporation Commission, 2011). A 2010 study conducted for NV Energy 
found that net-metered DGPV could create a net revenue shift of between US$6 million and 
US$10 million, assuming a market penetration of 1 % of total statewide energy generation, 
which works out to approximately US$5–US$8 per customer per year or less than .4%. At higher 
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market penetration levels of 9 and 15%, the revenue shift is estimated at US$50 million to 
US$150 million, or about US$40 to US$125 per customer (Navigant, 2010; NV Energy, 2015). 
Additionally, multiple independent studies have assessed the costs and benefits of solar 
(Acadia, 2015a; Acadia, 2015b; Hoff, 2012). Table 2.1 provides a list of the major valuation 













Table 2-1 Recognized Value Streams in VOS Methodologies 
Potential 
Benefits to the 
Utility 
Description Min- Max Average Year 
Range for 
Estimate 
Avoided Energy   All fuel, variable operation and maintenance 
emission allowance costs and any wheeling charges 








Capacity   
 
Contribution of distributed generation to deferring 
the addition of generation capacity resources, 
including those resources needed to maintain 






     
                                                
3 Xcel Energy, Inc. (2013). Costs ad Benefits of Distributed Solar Generation on the Public 
Service Company of Colorado System. May 2013.; SAIC (2013) Updated Solar PV Value 
Report. Arizona Public Service. May, 2013; Beach, R., McGuire, P., (2013) The Benefits and 
Costs of Solar Distributed Generation for Arizona Public Service. Crossborder Energy May, 
2013. Norris, B., Jones, N. The Value of Distributed Solar Electric Generation to San Antonio. 
Clean Power Research & Solar San Antonio, March 2013; Beach, R., McGuire, P. (2013) 
Evaluating the Benefits and Costs of Net Energy Metering for Residential Customers in 
California. Crossborder Energy, Jan. 2013; Rabago, K., Norris, B., Hoff, T.(2012) Designing 
Austin Energy's Solar Tariff Using A Distributed PV Calculator. Clean Power Research & 
Austin Energy, 2012.; Perez, R., Norris, B., Hoff, T. (2012) The Value of Distributed Solar 
Electric Generation to New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Clean Power Research, 2012. Mills, A., 
Wiser, R. (2012) Changes in the Economic Value of Variable Generation at High Penetration 
Levels: A Pilot Case Study of California. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, June 2012; 
Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc.(2012) Technical Potential for Local Distributed 
Photovoltaics in California, Preliminary Assessment. March 2012; Energy and Environmental 
Economics (2011), Inc. California Solar Initiative Cost- Effectiveness Evaluation. April 2011; 
R.W. Beck, Arizona Public Service (2009) Distributed Renewable Energy Operating Impacts 
and Valuation Study. Jan. 2009; Perez, R., Hoff (2008), T., Energy and Capacity Valuation of 
Photovoltaic Power Generation in New York. Clean Power Research, March 2008; Contreras, 
J.L., Frantzis, L., Blazewicz, S., Pinault, D., Sawyer, H., (2008) Photovoltaics Value Analysis. 
Navigant Consulting, Feb, 2008; Benjamin L. Norris, Philip M. Gruenhagen, Robert C. Grace, 
Po-Yu Yuen, Richard Perez, and Karl R. Rábago (2015) Maine Distributed Solar Valuation 
Study. Presented to the Main Public Service Utilities Commission. April 14, 2015. 
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Table 2-1 (Continued) 
 
Avoided System 
Losses   
Preventing energy lost over the transmission and 
distribution lines to get from centralized generation 








Contribution to reduced or deferred costs associated 
the utility’s requirement to maintain a reserve margin 







The grid security attributable to potential to reducing 
outages by reducing congestion along the T&D 
network and increasing fuel diversity. Quantified 
typically as the value of avoided outages based on 










Contribution to deferring the addition of transmission 
and distribution resources need to serve load pockets, 






DRIPE The reduction or mitigation of market prices due to 
reductions in demand for capacity and energy as 








Costs   
















Fuel Hedge Avoided costs to lock in future price of fuel as 
protection against price volatility 
.03-3.7 
c/kWh1 
2 c/kWh 2008-2013 
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 Table 2-1 (Continued) 
 
   
Market Price 
Mitigation 
Reduction in energy and capacity wholesale market 

















Avoided costs associated with marginal reduction in 














Pollutant Cost or 
Criteria Pollutant  
Avoided costs associated with marginal reduction in 
emissions of SO2, VOCs, NOx, PM2.5, PM10 and NH36.  







                                                
4 Acadia 2015a; Acadia 2015b 
5 Tennessee Valley Authority (2015) DG-IV Process.  
6 SO2 – Sulfur Dioxide; VOC – Volatile Organic Compound; NOx – Nitrogen Oxide; PM2.5 – 
Fine Particulate; PM10 – Particulate Matter; NH3 – Ammonia;  
7 Crossborder, 2012; Epstein, P., Buonocore, J., Eckerle, K. et al., Full Cost Accounting for the 
Life Cycle of Coal, 2011; Muller, N., Mendelsohn, R., Nordhaus, W., Environmental Accounting 
for Pollution in the US Economy. American Economic Review 101, Aug. 2011. pp. 1649 – 1675; 
National Research Council. Hidden Costs of Energy: Unpriced Consequences of Energy 
Production and Use, 2010.  
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 Table 2-2 (Continued) 
 
   
Renewable 
Energy Credits 
The value of utilizing the exported value of DGPV to 
sell Renewable Energy Credits. 





Job impact based on enhanced tax revenues associated 









Table 2-3 Potential Cost/Benefits in VOS Methodologies 
Potential 
Costs/Benefits 






Additional costs to the utility to integrate solar pv to 
the existing grid in terms off added T&D lines for 












   
                                                
8 TVA, 2015 
9 CPR, NJ/PN, 2012 
10 Xcel, 2013; CPR (NJ/PN) 2012 
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Table 2-3 (Continued) 
Integration / 
Interconnection 
Increased costs for regulation and operating of current 
reserves to manage, integrate and interconnect variable 
DG resources 








Additional investments necessary to acquire reserve 
requirements necessary to supplement wholesale power 
-1.5-.5 
c/kWh12 
0 c/kWh 2013 
Ancillary 
Services  
Reactive supply and voltage control; frequency 








As we can see, there are multiple components that can be included in a VOS 
methodology. And there is significant range in estimates.  All valuation is a function of the local 
system and the methods used and the assumptions made in valuation process. For example, the 
wide range in benefits from avoided generation capacity will be determined by how much 
generation capacity the presiding utility plans to procure over the lifetime of the solar system. If 
there is little need for additional generation capacity, DGPV many receive little capacity value. 
Every utility has different variable costs (fuel and purchased power), fixed costs (generation 
                                                
11 Lu, S., Warwick, M., Samaan, N., Fuller, J., Meng, D., Diao, R., & Vyakaranam, B. (2014). 
Duke Energy Photovoltaic Integration Study: Carolinas Service Areas. Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory. 
12 Crossborder (NC) 2013  
13 Crossborder (AZ), 2013; Crossborder (CA), 2013; LBNL, 2012; E3, 2012; NREL 2008; APS, 
2009		
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capacity, transmission, and distribution), line losses (distribution and transmission), different 
demand profiles, different restrictions regarding ancillary services (to maintain grid reliability), 
and different policy objectives such as the reductions of carbon emissions. In terms of the utility 
avoided costs, utilities with high fuel costs, immediate capacity needs, and heavy congestion on 
the distribution system will likely see a higher value for DGPV compared to systems with low 
fuel costs and no capacity needs. Similarly, the degree to which environmental and social 
components are recognized in the VOS methodology, can greatly impact the overall value of the 
resource.  In states with strong SREC markets or carbon emissions policies, solar has an 
additional market value as compared to states or jurisdictions that do not recognize the economic 
impacts of climate change or emission damages. 
2.5.1 Methods impacting a VOS methodology 
In addition to which components are assessed in a VOS methodology, the modeling 
assumptions, the modeling framework, and sources of cost information will greatly shape the 
result. While in theory, every component is variable to methodological assumptions, we touch on 
five input assumptions that can greatly impact both the valuation process and ultimately the 
VOST. These components include:  
・	The discount rate  
・	The system life or contract length used to evaluate the value of DGPV 
・	Financial forecasts on the cost of fuel that will be displaced by DGPV 
・	Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) attributed to DGPV.  
・	The amount of DGPV on the system 
The discount rate is the rate used to depreciate the future benefits and the costs of DGPV 
into an equivalent present value, given in real dollars. The discount rate functions as a parameter 
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to inform an analysis on the long-term impacts of a policy. The discount rate can reflect the 
importance of future benefits, attitudes towards risk, uncertainty about future impacts, and even 
the potential inequality between members of current and future generations (Lind, 1982; 
Dasgupta, 2008). Which discount rate a VOS methodology employs may be uniform across all 
components our change based on the participating stakeholders’ concern. Generally speaking, 
low discount rates will discount the future costs and savings less than compared to higher 
discount rates. From a policy perspective, the social discount rate influences the degree of 
concern society displays about a policy’s effects on individuals in the future (Kelleher, 2012). 
For a VOS methodology, the discount rate chosen impacts every single component and the 
resulting VOST.  
The system life or contract length used to evaluate the value of DGPV can also impact 
the overall value attributed to DGPV. Typically, most VOS studies assume a 20 or 25-year 
system life for DGPV. The contract length, in conjunction with the discount rate can either 
increase the value attributed to DGPV, depending on the utility’s current and future system 
needs. Ultimately the contract length is another reflection of risk. Longer contract lengths are 
inherently riskier to the utility but provide more certainty to the customer. Additionally, whether 
the VOS framework chooses to levelize the analysis or use annual values will impact the results.  
Financial forecasts on the cost of fuel that will be displaced by DGPV will greatly impact 
the energy value attributed to DGPV. For most utilities, DGPV will displace gas-fired generation 
resources and thus estimates on future natural gas prices will impact the value of DGPV towards 
avoiding fuel costs. In many VOS methodologies, additional components such as ancillary 
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service, capacity and spinning reserves, as well as fuel hedging are all tied to the forecast of 
future fuel prices. 
Effective Load Carrying Capacity (ELCC) is a metric that captures a generating 
resource’s contribution to meeting a utility’s capacity requirement. ELCC and similar concepts 
are generally applied to intermittent resources to determine what percentage of their installed 
capacity can receive credit towards reducing capacity needs (Norris, 2014).  The ELCC is 
typically calculated against the utility’s peak demand period.  
In a VOS Methodology, the ELCC is used to adjust the calculated economic value of the 
following components to reflect the intermittency of DGPV (Norris, 2014):  
・	Avoided Generation Capacity Cost and O&M 
・	Avoided Reserve Capacity Cost 
・	Avoided Transmission Capacity Cost 
 
 Finally, the orientation of the DGPV systems and the amount of modeled DGPV on the 
system also impacts the value attributed to the resource and can shape other methodological 
components including the ELCC and potential integration costs. In any VOS methodology, 
stakeholders must establish a reasonable estimate for DGPV growth so as not to attribute benefits 
or costs that will not be realistically realized. Also, the difference in production from a south or 
west-facing system can vary significantly. When available stakeholders should utilize empirical 
estimates from multiple, variant oriented systems. 
2.6 A Value of Solar Case Study in Georgia 
2.6.1 Background on DGPV in Georgia 
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Georgia is one of the few states in the country that does not have either a renewable 
portfolio standard or a net metering program. Accordingly, since 2001, the residential solar 
market has grown minimally. From 2007-2016, only 754 homes installed distributed solar in the 
entire state. The primary in utility in Georgia, Georgia Power, does offer minor compensation for 
exported power to customers, but maintains that NEM will result in upward pressure on non-
solar customer rates.  
The Georgia Cogeneration and Distributed Generation Act governs distributed solar PV 
capacity additions in the service territories of Georgia’s utility monopolies, including Georgia 
Power Company.  The Act requires utilities to “make either bidirectional metering or single 
directional metering available to customer generators,” depending on how the customer's facility 
is connected to the grid. For distributed generation (DG) facilities connected on the customer’s 
side of the meter, energy flow must “measure the electricity produced or consumed during the 
billing period,” with a credit given to customers for excess generation. This credit for excess 
kilowatt-hours (kWh) must be compensated at an agreed to rate as filed with the Commission. 
Since 2001, Georgia Power has adopted three distributed solar initiatives – the 
Renewable & Non-Renewable Tariff (RNR), Solar Purchase Tariffs (SP), and the Advanced 
Solar Initiative (ASI). RNR, which was Georgia Power’s way of implementing the Act, is 
structured as an avoided cost tariff, with a slightly higher energy rate than the utility’s traditional 
avoided cost to account for solar energy’s unique production profile. Under the RNR program, 
participants retain the right to consume on-site generation and to export any excess generation to 
the grid. This is often referred to as “behind-the-meter” generation. RNR provides participants 
with an export rate that is essentially equal to Georgia Power’s avoided cost of fuel. This rate is 
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variable but averages around $0.04/kWh. In contrast, the SP programs have been structured as 
buy all/sell all arrangements funded through voluntary customer subscriptions to the Green 
Energy program.  The current SP program provides a fixed rate of $0.17/kWh to eligible 
participants. The ASI program is the most recent to include DG offerings.  It too is structured as 
a buy all/sell all program. In its initial phase, Georgia Power provided a fixed rate of $0.13/kWh 
to eligible DG solar participants with contract terms of 20 years.14 Under the current phase of the 
program, the Company is offering fixed rates ranging from $0.089 to $0.114/kWh depending on 
the contract term, which can range from 15 to 35 years, for projects under 500 kW.  
Despite these programs, the residential DG market in Georgia has seen little growth in 
the past ten years. In part this is due to the way Georgia’s solar policies are structured. The ASI 
programs have provided limited capacity and have been structured to encourage large-scale 
commercial and utility-scale development. As for the SP program, as of 2014, it has just 193 
contracted solar projects, with a wait list currently in effect. The result is that a large majority of 
Georgia Power customers interested in DG solar are left with the RNR program as their only 
option. At present, the RNR program provides only minimal compensation for solar exports and 
does not provide the option of fixed, long-term contracts.  
2.6.2 Methods 
As outlined, the value of customer-sited DGPV electricity is ultimately a function of the 
value streams regulators deem appropriate. The values are shaped by the local electricity 
                                                
14 The most recent order for ASI Prime for systems under 500 kW projects ranges from 8.9 c to 
11.4 c depending on contract term, with contract lengths of 15, 20, 25, 30 and 35 years. 
However, these values have yet to be adopted. 
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demand, local generation, electricity markets, transmission and distribution systems, the potential 
impacts DGPV may have on the environment, society, and ultimately the valuation methods 
employed. The purpose of our analysis is to determine a value of customer-sited DGPV with 
publicly-available data and illustrate how the estimates of a VOST can range dramatically based 
on differences in the valuation methods and the included value streams. For my analysis, I 
include the following value streams: avoided utility costs, costs to the utility, environmental 
benefits, and societal benefits. For avoided utility costs we include: avoided energy, avoided 
capacity, avoided ancillary services, and avoided transmission and distribution costs. For utility 
costs, I include integration costs associated with the operations and maintenance of the 
distribution system. For environmental and societal benefits, I include avoided carbon emissions, 
avoided common pollutants, and the value of Solar Renewable Energy Credits. Given that my 
analysis is limited to public data there are a number of value streams that we cannot estimate, 
specifically the benefits that DGPV may bring to the transmission and distribution system.   
For my analysis of a VOST we estimate values over the lifetime of GPC current solar 
contracts, which is 20 years. Accordingly, I calculate the benefits and costs of DG over a 20-year 
period in order to capture fully the value of these long-term resources. I model all energy 
components in the analysis under three different discount rates- 3%,5%, and 8%, and all 
environmental components are modeled at a 3 % discount rate. The 3% rate was assumed based 
on precedence set by the Office of Management and Budget for program cost-benefit analysis 
and public investment on programs that have societal implications (OMB,2016). The choice to 
model the energy components under different discount rates are done so in order to illustrate how 
the discount rate can greatly impact the valuation process. I also conducted sensitivity analysis 
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for our estimates of avoided energy costs and avoided capacity costs as these two variables, and 
how they are estimated, greatly impact many of the other components. Additionally, while I 
estimate our values over 20 years, our results illustrate how a longer or shorter time period can 
impact the final estimates of a VOST. To calculate the components for a VOST the following 
data are needed for each hour of the selected load analysis period (Minnesota Department of 
Commerce, 2014): 
・	Hourly Net Generation Load – Total net generation and purchased power required to 
satisfy the utility’s customer load. 
・	Hourly Solar Fleet Production – Total generation from solar systems across the utility’s 
service territory. 
Again, neither of these data series are readily available from public sources. Therefore, hourly 
data was approximated or simulated using the methods described below. 
Section 2.5.3 Determining an Hourly Generation Profile for GPC 
To determine an hourly generation profile, I combine information about the hourly 
demand, GPC’s generation portfolio and historical generation deployment. We utilize data from 
the Environmental Protection Agency’s AMPD database, the Energy Information Administration 
Forms 923 and 860, SEC Filing 10-K, FERC Form 714, and the Environmental Protection 
Agency National Emissions Inventory.  
We use total capacity, capacity value, and total generation information about each power 
plant, by fuel-type in GPC territory to determine whether the plant is primarily a baseload plant 
or peaking plant. In general, very large plants tend to be baseload, as do coal and nuclear plants. 
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Plants with higher capacity factors are also likely being used to meet baseload demands. Power 
plants are then grouped by fuel-type and whether they are baseload or peaking resources. For 
example, there might be five baseload bituminous coal plants of 500MW capacity each, so the 
value calculated would be 2500MW of baseload bituminous coal. Then the total capacity from 
these plants are grouped together and weighted by the average capacity factor for both baseload 
and peak capacity. These calculations provide estimates of the total weighted average baseload 












Table 2-4 Variables used to determine baseload, peak, and purchase power for GPC 
Fuel Type Baseload Peak Capacity (MW) Average Capacity Factor 
Bit Coal x  6533.5 27% 
Natural Gas x  4073.8 58% 
Nuclear x  1933.3 95% 
Subbit Coal x  794.2 67% 
Baseload Coal Subtotal x  7327.7 33% 
Distillate Fuel Oil x 965 0.02% 
Natural Gas  x 972.05 1% 
Residual Fuel Oil x 0 0% 
Solar  x 1.1 15% 
Water  x 1186 14% 
Baseload Sum   15283.5  
Peak Sum   3124.15  
Total Generation Baseload (MWh)  59,740,934     
Total Generation Peak (MWh) 3,513,776     




To determine an hourly demand curve, I utilize historical average hourly demand data by 
month reported to FERC. FERC Form 714 provides hourly demand data for GPC through 2015. 
Figure 2.2 Provides the average hourly demand profiles for GPC in 2015.  
.  





Figure 2-3b Average Hourly Demand profiles for GPC, 2015 
 
 
Figure 2-4c Average Hourly Demand profiles for GPC, 2015 
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I then compare the average hourly demand profile for each month to the weighted 
average baseload and peak capacity available. Each average demand hour is first met by 
baseload resources, then peak resources, then purchased resources. If demand exceeds the sum of 
the average baseload and peak capacity, I assume power purchases are made until demand is 
met. Figure 2.3 shows how purchase power varies throughout the year, based on 2015 data. For 
the data used to estimate demand, baseload, peak, and purchased power see the Appendix. 
 




Figure 2-3b Purchase-power profiles for GPC 
 
 
Figure 2-5c Purchase-power profiles for GPC 
 
2.6.3 Determining a Distributed Solar Generation Profile 
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The aggregate production profile of distributed solar generation is relevant for the 
determination of DGPV’s energy and capacity value, of which my estimates of transmission 
and distribution as well as ancillary services are produced.  
To approximate both aggregate and hourly production of DGPV in Georgia I utilized data 
from Southface Energy Institute’s Energy Dashboard Database (2016). We estimate a total 
capacity of 702 MWs of roof-top DGPV. I utilize NREL’s PVWatts calculator to generate the 
hourly generation profile. Given that the majority of the rooftop DGPV is located in Atlanta, GA, 
I chose to analyze our production in Atlanta, Georgia, using a 16% capacity factor, assuming 
system losses of 14%, an inverter efficiency of 96%, a 30-year useful life, and a DC to AC Size 
Ration of 1.1. From PVWatts, we calculated that for every kW of distributed residential solar, 
the system generates an average of 1,456 kWh/year, resulting in a first-year annual output of 
1,022 MWhs. I assume a degradation rate of .5% over a thirty-year system life, resulting in a 
total system output of 18,852 MWh.  
2.7 Model Components  
Determining the value of any energy resource, whether distributed or conventional, is 
complex and requires a thorough analysis of the electricity system it supports. Distributed solar 
energy adds an extra layer of analysis because there are additional values associated with 
distributed solar energy, as compared to conventional power plants. Some of these values 
include: avoided capital investments in conventional power generating units; reductions in fuel 
costs during high-demand periods; emissions-free generation; and reductions in water use during 
high-demand periods. In this section, I provide an overview of the multiple components included 
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in determining the value of solar for Georgia Power’s system and how these values are evaluated 
marginally, in c/kWh.  
2.7.1 Avoided Energy  
Solar energy has zero fuel costs, as such it provides a benefit to the utility compared to 
generation sources with fuel costs. In my analysis, we define Avoided Energy costs as the 
avoided fuel costs incurred by a utility by utilizing solar energy. According to GPC’s 2016 IRP, 
peak energy will be met largely through purchased power or through gas-fired resources. In my 
analysis, we compare our baseline generation profile and our baseline solar profile to determine 
the proportion of hours met by purchased power and the proportion of hours met through peak 
generation resources. Under current penetration levels, generation from distributed solar 
primarily displaces purchased power during peak hours, as GPC typically purchases power for its 
top peak hour needs, and displaces power from gas-powered resources in non-peak hours.15 To 
determine the value of avoided energy I assess the average value of purchased fuel costs against 
the average energy costs of gas-fired generation resources.  To estimate avoided energy costs, I 
first develop a long-term forecast of GPC’s cost of natural gas. This forecast uses current 
(February 1, 2016) forward gas price data from the Southeast Reliability Corporation East and 
Southeast markets. Figure 2.4 compares the natural gas cost estimates. Because our forecast is 
based on forward market natural gas prices, it represents a potentially volatile variable cost that 
                                                
15 GPC decision to purchase power is dependent on a comparison between the cost of purchased 
power and GPC’s cost to ramp dispatchable units to meet demand. GPC’s units generally 
dispatch at a lower cost than their purchasing affiliates (GPC, Annual Report, 2015) 
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GPC could fix for the next 30 years. This captures the fuel price hedging benefit of distributed 
solar.  
 
Figure 2-6 Projected Natural Gas Prices for the SERC Region 
 
I assume that distributed solar avoids generation from natural gas combustion turbines 
(NGCTs) with a heat rate of 10850 BTU/kWh (EIAa, 2016) and use our gas price forecast as the 
fuel costs for these avoided resources. According to GPC 2016 IRP, the only potential generation 
resource slated for installment over the next ten years is NGCTs (GPC, 2016).16 GPC’s average 
fuel costs for purchased generation over the past four years is 5.4 c/kWh. How these hours are 
determined is subject to Georgia Power’s classification of off-peak generation. Georgia Power 
                                                
16 GPC does not specify when these plants will be installed just that NGCTs are proposed 
generation source to meet capacity.  
SERC	E	
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defines peak hours as occurring from 2pm – 7pm on weekdays, June through September, 
excluding holidays.  
 I match the average marginal prices of power during peak hours (2pm – 7pm on 
weekdays, June- September) and off-peak hours and weight the value of solar generation 
accordingly. I estimate that 38% of distributed solar produces during peak hours and 62% 
produces in non-peak hours. We calculate the avoided energy costs, AE, as: 
Equation 2.1 Avoided Energy  
AE= !"*"$%&"*"'
(()*
+,	   
!  =total number of hours, 8760  
Np= % non-peak hours corresponding with solar generation profile  
Op= %peak hours corresponding with solar generation profile 
!"   =30-year, levelized price of natural gas 
!"   =historical purchased-power price 
!" 	≡ 11 + ' = )*+,-./0	'102	 
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Table 2.5 summarizes the resulting 30-year levelized avoided energy costs for distributed solar in 
GPC’s service territory under various discount rates.  
 













September) and Gas Prices 
(October-May) 4.4 4.1 4.2 
5% 
Purchase Power (June-
September) and Gas Prices 
(October-May) 3.8 3.5 3.5 
8% 
Purchase Power (June-
September) and Gas Prices 
(October-May) 3.2 3.0 3.0 
 
Recognizing that our estimates of avoided energy are sensitive to forecasts of natural gas 
prices, we examine the impacts under a 25% and 50% increase in natural gas prices over the next 
30 years. Figure 2.5 and Table 2.6. presents the results of our sensitivity analysis. Under a 3% 
discount rate, assuming a 50% increase in natural gas prices, the value that DGPV could provide 
in terms of avoided energy costs can range as high as 5.95 c/kWh.  
 70 
 




































and Gas Prices 




and Gas Prices 




and Gas Prices 
(October-May) 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.7 4.35 
 
2.7.2 System Capacity (Capacity & Variable O&M)  
Distributed solar has the unique value of scalability and quick development, and at large 
levels of penetration can avoid the need for supply-side resources and increased capacity. To 
determine a value for displaced capacity I examined total new capacity plans for GPC. GPC has 
no short-term peaking capacity resources slated for construction over the next five years (GPC, 
2016). To calculate the capacity value of distributed solar, a conservative estimate for the 
levelized fixed cost of natural gas combustion turbines, using the current average capacity factors 
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and operations and maintenance factors for natural gas combustion turbines currently operated in 
the region. I assumed an overnight capital cost of 910 $/kW (EIA, 2016b) with a fixed operations 
and maintenance cost of $7.21 $/kW (EIA, 2016b) and a variable operations and maintenance of 
15.81$/MWh.  The levelized NGCT fixed costs are multiplied by an effective load carrying 
capacity (ELCC) of PV generation. Currently there are no reports documenting the empirical 
ELCC for solar in Georgia. However, our comparison between our baseline GPC hourly 
generation profile and DGPV profile revealed that under peak hours of GPC, from June through 
September for the hours of 2:00 PM through 7:00 PM, that on average distributed solar has a 
50% ELCC. Figure 2.6 presents the average hourly baseline generation profile for GPC against 
the average daily DGPV profile in August.  
 




Table 2-7 Estimated Avoided Capacity Costs 
 
Recognizing that our system capacity values are heavily determined by the ELCC, I 
follow Norris (2014) and run sensitivity analysis assuming a 25% ELCC and a 5% ELCC. Table 
2.8 presents the results of our sensitivity analysis. Under an 8% discount rate and 5% ELCC our 
estimates for the value that DGPV can provide in terms of avoided system capacity costs can 
drop to .39c/kWh.  
 
LCOE Component     
 
Overnight Capital ($/kw) 664   
 
Fixed O&M ($/kw) 7.04   
 
Variable O&M ($/kwh) .01   
Discount 
Rate LCOE of NGCT 
 
ELCC Levelized c/kWh 
3% LCOE of NGCT 7.7 50% 3.85 
5% LCOE of NGCT 9.1 50% 4.5 
8% LCOE of NGCT 11.6 50% 5.8 
 74 
Table 2-8 Avoided Capacity Costs under decreased in ELCC 
Discount 









a 5% ELCC) 
3% LCOE of NGCT 7.7 50% 3.85 1.9 0.39 
5% LCOE of NGCT 9.1 50% 4.5 2.3 .45 
8% LCOE of NGCT 11.6 50% 5.8 2.9 .58 
 
2.7.3 Ancillary Services and Capacity Reserves 
SERC reliability standards require control area operators to maintain operating reserves 
(spinning and non-spinning) of 2000 MW (NERC, 2015). When assessed against GPC total 
portfolio of 15,454 MWs, this accounts for 13% of the load served by thermal generation. Load 
reductions from DG will reduce GPC’s need for operating reserves. Additionally, GPC has 
maintained a capacity reserve margin of 14.5% (GPC, 2016). This means that each kW reduction 
in GPC’s peak demand from DG will reduce the utility’s capacity requirements by 1.145 kW. To 
estimate avoided ancillary service and capacity reserve requirements I calculate 13% of the 





Equation 2.2 Avoided Ancillary Costs  
A = 13% ∙ %& + 14.5% ∙ %+  
!" = $%&'()(	)+),-.	/&010 
 
!" = $%&'()(	+),)-$.'&,	/&0.0 
 
 






Discount Rate Avoided Costs 13% 14.5%  Levelized c/kWh 
3% 
Ancillary Services + 
Capacity Reserve  4.2 3.8 1.09 
5% 
Ancillary Services + 
Capacity Reserve 3.5 4.5 1.1 
8% 
Ancillary Services + 
Capacity Reserve 3 5.8 1.2 
 
Given that my estimates of avoided ancillary costs are tied to avoided energy and 
capacity costs, I run our estimates against the sensitivity analysis for both variables. Table 2.9 
provides the range of estimates for avoided ancillary costs based on variations in our estimates of 
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avoided energy and avoided generation capacity. The range of value for avoided ancillary 
services is .44c/kWh-1.6c/kWh. These estimates are in line with the literature (See Table 2.1.).  















































Reserve .94 1.3 1.4 0.81 0.7 0.9 0.57 .99 0.64 
 
2.7.4 Transmission System & Distribution Avoided Losses and Potential Integration Costs  
The impact of DGPV on the transmission and distribution system is at the center of many 
policy and regulatory debates regarding NEM and VOS. Utilities argue that DGPV incurs a cost 
to the T&D system because it is a variable resource that, if not controlled, can result in additional 
management and potentially capital costs to the utility (Ackerman and Martini, 2013). These 
costs are often referred to as ‘integration costs.’ However, DGPV has also been proven to 
provide direct value to the management of the distribution system in the form of load relief and 
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voltage control. Additionally, given that DG solar primarily serves on-site loads, it has the 
benefit of reducing loads on the transmission and distribution system and avoiding capacity 
costs, including lines or infrastructure. However, determining the exact value of T&D impacts is 
a function of the amount of distributed generation, the distance of generating source to end-use 
loads, the capacity of the distribution load, and the dynamics of load on the local substation. To 
truly understand the full costs and benefits of DGPV to the T&D system, power flow modeling 
of the deployed resources would be needed, which is outside the scope of this study. Instead, I 
focused on two components; average avoided line losses, integration costs, and average T&D 
operation costs. 
2.7.5 Average Line Losses 
Because DGPV is located at load, as a generation resource it does not require the use of 
the transmission system and therefore reduces line losses. The benefit that distributed solar 
brings to the grid’s transmission loss can range greatly. Other VOS studies have shown a range 
from 0.2 c/kWh to 9 c/kWh (EPRI, 2015). The higher range is often reflective of an optimized 
placement of load, i.e placing distributed solar in areas where it can be load supporting. I 
estimate transmission impacts utilizing publicly available, actual observed loss impacts, positive 
or negative. Avoided T&D costs are calculated using average line losses of 7%. Average line 
losses of power lines in Georgia are reported by the EIA.  Transmission line losses are not 
associated with a specific technology but rather with the amount of power on the system at any 
given time of the day. Because this analysis is modeling a behind-the-meter generation scenario, 
it is assumed that all DG solar generation that is not used on-site will be exported to the nearest 
neighboring demand site. As such, the solar transmission loss is effectively zero, meaning that 
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the value of line losses for DG solar equates to marginal value of line losses for Georgia. To 
estimate the avoided costs associated with line losses, LL, I calculate 7% of the avoided energy 
costs and 7% of the avoided generation capacity and avoided energy costs. Table 2.11 provides 
my estimates. 
Equation 2.3Line Losses  
LL = 7% ∙ $%, $'  
Table 2-11-Estimates of Avoided Costs due to reduced Line Losses 





Discount Rate Avoided Costs 7% 7%  Levelized c/kWh 
3% Line Losses  4.2 3.85 0.56 
5% Line Losses 3.5 4.5 0.56 
8% Line Losses 3 5.8 0.61 
 
Again, recognizing that my estimates of avoided line losses are tied to avoided energy 
and capacity costs, we run our estimates against the sensitivity analysis for both variables. Table 
2.12 provides the range of estimates for line losses costs based on variations in our estimates of 
avoided energy and avoided generation capacity. The range of value of for line losses is 
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.24c/kWh-.83c/kWh. These estimates are below the average for found in the literature (see Table 
1) but still within range.  































Losses 0.56 0.62 0.69 0.42 0.32 0.49 0.39 0.55 0.44 
5% 
Line 
Losses 0.56 0.62 0.67 0.41 0.28 0.48 0.34 0.51 0.39 
8% 
Line 
Losses 0.61 0.65 0.71 0.41 0.25 0.46 0.29 0.5 0.34 
 
2.7.6 Integration Costs 
 DGPV’s impact on the management and operations of the T&D system and the potential 
the increase in operating costs due to uncertainty and variability in DGPV output (primarily 
balancing load flows and managing potential voltage fluctuations) is commonly referred to as the 
‘integration costs’ of solar. These integration costs are also a major component of utilities’ 
arguments against retail-rate NEM, claiming that DGPV incurs a cost on the system that is not 
accounted for and therefore must be subsidized by other, non-solar customers. While very few 
utilities have performed the necessary advanced power flow modeling necessary to assess the 
integration costs of solar, there have been dozens of attempts to assess a fixed charge to DGPV 
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customers’ rates in order to recoup any integration costs (NC Clean Energy Technology Center, 
2016).  
 It should be noted that DGPV has been shown to provide value to the distribution system 
(Cohen, 2015), and that research has shown that in low penetration levels, DGPV’s impact on 
T&D is minimal. Without the capacity of power flow modeling, we assume a static value for the 
potential costs that DGPV could incur on the T&D. Using reported GPC expenditure filings in 
FERC Form 1, I estimate the average combined T&D operations and maintenance expenses from 
2012-2015 per MWh of generation on the GPC.  
Equation 2.4 Transmission and Distribution  
                                                          ("# +	&#	)#( /*#	 ∙ ,# 	                                               
where  
Ti= O&M cost of the transmission system in year i 
Di= O&M cost of the distribution system in year i 
Gi=total generation from the baseline portfolio in year i 
 
The result was an estimated cost of $.42 c/kWh. To put this cost into perspective with 
other fixed charges that have been proposed throughout the country; if every kW of solar 
produces 1,145 kWh annually and the average residential DGPV system is 4 kW, the integration 
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costs associated with an individual DGPV system can be estimated at $24 a year, or $2 a month. 
In contrast, many utilities have proposed fixed fees ranging from $12-$40 a month, in Nevada, 
and as high as $100 a month, Appalachian Power, to account for the integration costs of solar 
(Main, 2014). We discounted this cost accordingly over 30 years under each discount rate but 
also recognize that this number can go up or down according to penetration rates of solar. 
However, in order to truly gain insight on the potential integration costs of DGPV, advanced 
power flow modeling is necessary- which is outside the scope of this research. My analysis here 
is by no means an acceptable determinant for calculating these highly complex questions. If 
anything, my analysis serves to illustrate how rather cursory calculations can be used to satisfy 
what is ultimately rigorous engineering in a VOS methodology.   







3% Integration -0.22 
5% Integration -0.15 






2.7.7 Common Pollutant Impacts  
Distributed solar is emission free and when integrated into Georgia Power’s system 
results in reduced emissions of SO2, VOCs, NOx, PM2.5, PM10 and NH317.  A substantial body of 
research has gone into determining cost impacts of these common pollutants. These costs are 
external to the costs borne by Georgia Power to achieve the level of compliance required.  The 
externality costs associated with these emissions are primarily related to health effects and 
monetary damages associated with public exposure to common air pollutants. Externality costs 
are chiefly driven by adverse effects on human health, but also include some other values like 
reduced yields of agricultural crops and timber and damages due to lost recreational services.  
To determine the value of reduced common pollutants, I utilize the Air Pollution 
Emission Experiments and Policy (AP2) model (Muller and Mendhelsohn, 2007), coupled with 
emissions data from EPA’s AMPD database as well as the National Emissions Inventory, and 
integrate the outputs into our baseline generation profile. The AP2 model provides estimates of 
damage impacts in $/ton. This was converted into a rate of tons/MWH for each generating unit 
on the GPC based on gross generation data provided by the AMPD database and the EPA’s 
National Emissions Inventory Database.  These estimates were then assigned as a marginal 
emission impact for SOx, NOx, VOC, PM 2.5, and NH3 for each generating unit in baseline 
year, 2015. 
Equation 2.5 Marginal Impact Common Pollutants 
                                                
17 SO2 – Sulfur Dioxide; VOC – Volatile Organic Compound; NOx – Nitrogen Oxide; PM2.5 – 







!",$   = Emissions in tons, per pollutant n in year i 
!",$   = Cost in $, per pollutant n in year i 
!",$   = Total generation of generating unit g in year i 
!"#,%,&   =Marginal impact from common pollutant n for each generating unit g in year i.  
Table 2.14 is a breakdown of the per ton common pollutant damage, for Georgia Power’s 
system, in 2015-$. The AP2 model is a standard integrated assessment model that connects 
emissions to monetary damages through six modules: emissions, air quality modeling, 
concentrations, exposures, physical effects, and valuation. (For a complete description of the 
AP2 model see Muller, 2011). The primary benefit of the AP2 model is its spatial detail and that 
it is calibrated to compute marginal damages. When valuing the impacts on goods traded in 
markets (crops, for example), AP2 uses market prices. The AP2 model provides estimated 
impacts based on height of emissions source. In my assessment, we used cost estimates based on 
emissions sources greater than 500 ft (or the highest available altitude), corresponding to 
thermoelectric power plants. When valuing changes in health, the model uses the Value of a 
Statistical Life (VSL) approach (Viscusi, Aldy, 2003). AP2 is calibrated to use a VSL of $6 
million. (USEPA, 2016; Fann et al., 2012). Currently, the AP2 model can compute marginal 
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damages for the five pollutants over four data years at nearly 10,000 individual and grouped 
sources in the contiguous U.S. There is no discount rate applied to common pollutants, as the 
impacts of common pollutants are direct, meaning that the surrounding community feels the 
physical impacts of exposure to pollutants immediately.   
Table 2-14-Damage Cost of Common Pollutants in Georgia Power’s region 
Pollutant  Damage (2015-$)* 
PM 2.5 6,450 – 9,940 
SO2 5,550 – 6,360 
NOx 715 – 769 
NH3 6,240 – 10,600 
VOC 614 – 910 
PM 10 185 - 360 
   *Range of damage due to variations in stack height and location 
2.7.8 Carbon Impacts 
Unlike conventional generating sources, distributed solar emits no carbon during 
generation. To determine the amount of reduced carbon generation, I evaluate the amount of 
carbon (in tons) displaced for every MWh of solar generation. Following the same methodology 
for common pollutants, we utilize EPA’s Air Markets Program Data (AMPD, 2016) to calculate 
tons of carbon emitted from each generating unit corresponding to my baseline generation profile 
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to determine a marginal cost in $/ton. We use the central estimate of the social cost of carbon 
(SCC), an estimate of the monetized damages associated with an incremental increase in carbon 
emissions per ton.  
 






!",$   = Carbon Emissions in tons per generating unit g in year i 
SCC= Social Cost of Carbon in $/ton 
!",$   = Total generation of generating unit g in year i 
!	 ≡ 11 + & = ()*+,-./	&0/1 
 
!"#,%   =Marginal impact from carbon for each generating unit g in year i.  
The SCC includes (but is not limited to) changes in net agricultural productivity, human 
health, property damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services due to 
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climate change. The current central value for the SCC reported by the Interagency Working 
Group of the federal government is $39 per ton (2009-$) in 2015 (Interagency Working Group 
on Social Cost of Carbon, 2015); this value increases year-to-year as damage from the marginal 
ton of CO2 is anticipated to increase over time. Following precedence set by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB Circular A-4) on evaluating carbon impacts, a discount rate of 
3% was applied over the modeling horizon, resulting in a value of 2.2c/kWh.18  
2.7.9 Environmental Market Value 
Distributed solar is an emission-free, clean resource.  As such, it provides additional 
value in existing markets that is not present with traditional fossil fuel assets, and which is not 
therefore captured through deferred asset valuation. This additional market value can be 
represented with a renewable energy credit (REC). REC prices depend upon the technology 
source, the vintage, the purchase volume, the generation region, whether state policies deem 
them eligible for certification, and whether the RECs are bought for compliance obligations or to 
serve voluntary retail consumers. Solar renewable energy credits (SRECs) are RECs specific to 
solar generation.  
Often RECs are used to comply with Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio 
Standard (REPS) and the value of RECs are based on the cost of a utility’s compliance. 
Currently, Georgia does not have a RPS, and it is questionable whether it will in future years. 
Thus, there is no data to measure the value of REPS compliance by purchasing an unbundled 
                                                
18
 Three percent values an environmental cost or benefit occurring 25 years in the future at about half as much as the same benefit today. See: 
W.D. Nordhaus, Managing the Global Commons: The Economics of Climate Change (MIT Press 1994) 
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REC, if DG solar RECs were not available. Open SREC markets are different from compliance 
REC markets. Compliance RECs generally must be sourced from within some geographic region 
to be eligible for RPS compliance. Since no such market exists in Georgia, the only proxy 
estimate is a voluntary REC market price. Voluntary RECs can be sourced either regionally or 
nationally. It should be noted that in voluntary markets, RECs may sell at a premium if they are 
competing with RECs used for RPS demand, or are from regions with limited renewable 
resources. To proxy the value of RECs in GPC, we use low estimates from voluntary REC 
markets, which we estimated at 1c/kWh.  REC prices have varied dramatically over the past few 
years; however, values have been relatively stable since early 2014. The value chosen represents 
the low-end of the REC and SREC values. The low-end SREC value is reflective of the current 
market for all RECs, including wind and other renewable sources (Flett Exchange, 2016). The 
REC values were discounted accordingly under the three different discount rates over 30-years.  





3% SREC 0.55 
5% SREC 0.31 





When accounting for all of the components in our VOS methodology, under three 
different discount rates (3%, 5%, 8%) I find that the value of DGPV in Georgia ranges from 
13.58 c/kWh to 14.4 c/kWh. When accounting for sensitivity analysis around projected fuel 
prices and the ELCC of DGPV, for all three components our estimates range from 7.59 c/kWh to 
17.2 c/kWh.  If I only include costs and benefits to the utility, our estimates drop to 4 c/kWh to 
13.64 c/kWh. Comparatively, my numbers are similar to other studies conducted in the region 
including Synapse (2015) and Crossboarder (2013), with a respective 12.5-22 c/kWh and 10.4 – 
11.3 c/kWh for residential customers. However, my estimates are much lower than other studies, 









Table 2-16-Components of Value of Solar and Associated Benefits 












































3% 4.2 3.8 1.09 0.56 0.55 -0.22 2.2 1.4 13.58 
5% 3.5 4.5 1.1 0.56 0.31 -0.15     13.42 
8% 3.0 5.8 1.2 0.61 0.27 -0.08     14.4 




I also estimated the impacts of decreasing the levelized period from 30 to 20 years. 
Decreasing the time-period, effectively increases the estimates by an average of 2.8%, as it 
reduces the expected energy cost savings by an average of 14% but increases the expected 
capacity value by an average 12%.  
While I attempted to model the variations in VOST estimates, there are a number of 
variables that we did not provide sensitivity analysis around that could impacts our results, 
including the heat rate of the natural gas combustion turbine utilized to estimate energy and 
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capacity values, the estimates of line losses, and the generation source used to estimate energy 
and capacity values. Changes to any of these would also impact the results. Moreover, I do not 
make any assumptions on how greater penetration rates of DGPV on the system may shift 
values, including the ELCC and the integration costs. A more thorough analysis under different 
penetration rates would help to better understanding the changing nature of DGPV’s value.  
2.9 Conclusions 
In order to transition the United States away from fossil fuels and towards more 
sustainable sources of electricity production, there must be a fundamental shift in the regulation 
of the incumbent utilities and pathways for facilitating technological innovations. Throughout the 
country PUCs, as gatekeepers of the regime business model, are increasingly tasked with 
dictating the mechanisms and pace of transition. These dynamics are ever apparent in the growth 
of DGPV and policies identified to foster adoption. Historically, rapid diffusion of the NEM 
policies served to grow the niche innovation. Now as the adoption of DGPV has accelerated, the 
technology challenges the incumbent regime and the policy structures that support its 
dominance.  
Against these sociotechnical dynamics, the use of a VOST is growing as a potential 
policy tool for incorporating DGPV into the regime. Given the weight that a VOST may hold for 
the future of DGPV and other technological innovations, more research is needed on the 
dynamics and implications of this complex policy tool. In this chapter, a VOS evaluation for 
distributed solar in Georgia Power Company’s territory was conducted, under various 
methodological scenarios, producing a range in value of solar of 7.59c/kWh-17.2c/kWh. My 
estimates included the costs of integrating distributed generation, as well as the benefits from 
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avoided energy, avoided generation capacity, avoided ancillary costs, avoided line losses, SREC 
sales, avoided carbon emissions, and avoided common pollutants. There were a number of 
components, particularly those specific to the transmission and distribution system, that we were 
unable to estimate. Moving forward, greater information on Georgia Power’s grid will improve 
upon the VOS evaluation, particularly in terms of determining a potential locational value of 
solar for capacity deferral.  
The case study highlights that the methods and estimates employed to value DGPV will 
greatly impact the ultimate results. Likely the two greatest variables impacting the overall value 
of DGPV, for this study, are the projections of natural gas prices and the ELCC applied to 
DGPV. For stakeholders, this highlights the need for empirical studies on the ELCC of DGPV 
before engaging in VOS methodologies. Moreover, the orientation of the solar array will also 
impact the ELCC and potential the avoided energy costs associated with DGPV. This means that 
ELCC studies should include analysis with different DGPV system orientations. Similarly, 
recognizing the variability in natural gas prices, stakeholders should conduct multiple sensitivity 
analyses around the forecasted costs. Another interesting finding is that our lowest estimate of 
DGPV’s value to the grid is equivalent to the current export rate for GPC, suggesting that GPC is 
greatly undervaluing DGPV, and that our average estimate is comparable to retail-rate NEM for 
residential customers, at 12.4c/kWh. This suggests that NEM may be an adequate and 
compromise measure for estimating the current value of DGPV.  
As the process of assigning a market valuation to DGPV spreads across jurisdictions, it is 
critical that policymakers and engaged stakeholders begin to work towards a uniform framework 
for VOS studies. Determining what cost and benefit categories should be included, the 
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underlying data and the calculation methods that should be employed, as well as the timeline 
framework of the study are critical to establishing a process that is ultimately repeatable by 
multiple parties. What policy makers have learned from NEM is that ascribing value to exported 
solar energy equivalent to retail rate will spur the market for adoption. Implementing a VOST 
can potentially improve or damper the adoption rates, depending on the calculated value.  
When determining the applicable discount rates, particularly with environmental and 
societal components, policy makers must again determine the value of a resource to future 
generations. Additionally, policymakers must determine how to handle critical and sensitive 
inputs such as fuel price projections and ELCC.  Ideally, with more research and publicly 
available data, variables such as ELCC and distribution capacity value can be determined with 
empirical analysis. For other sensitive variables, such as projected fuel costs, there must be 
agreement on a reasonable projection that balances risk to both the utility and the customer. 
Moving forward less emphasis should be placed on the differences in the VOST estimates, and 
more emphasis should be placed on the implications of the framework and the methods that 
dictate the VOST.  
Moreover, regulators and stakeholders must recognize the implications of establishing a 
VOST, the precedence it may set, and that the methods employed in a VOS methodology will 
shape the market for DGPV and reflect the residing policy and societal priorities. Determining 
which cost and benefit components to include ultimately define the future market for DGPV.  
Moving forward, PUCs must decide whether the value that one technology provides to society 
should be dictated by the cost structure of another market player or what the appropriate bounds 
of comparison might be. These decisions will hold weight for the future market of electricity 
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2.11 Appendix  
Table 2-17 A.1 Summary of data sources used for VOS methodology 
2015 January February March April May June July August September October November December 
1 9620.279 9047.643 7959.945 7594.394 8189.938 9605.12 9972.301 9838.722 8613.836 7622.771 8058.907 9015.152 
2 9556.321 8972.428 7853.914 7424.303 7934.03 9224.213 9593.474 9502.285 8362.791 7478.742 7954.32 8887.185 
3 9602.893 9026.634 7872.777 7397.943 7830.056 9033.077 9394.643 9338.689 8255.945 7464.068 7948.942 8878.67 
4 9824.983 9250.07 8099.108 7585.162 7945.631 9072.592 9428.836 9428.782 8378.149 7655.603 8120.516 9033.366 
5 10348.71 9808.193 8676.793 8109.311 8352.288 9354.46 9698.883 9860.144 8850.872 8192.984 8573.25 9456.254 
6 11225.98 10750.65 9497.378 8718.989 8853.506 9757.615 10071.21 10378.31 9417.887 8882.907 9293.256 10169.1 
7 11768.65 11243.47 9903.143 9065.242 9287.636 10343.88 10575.7 10786.51 9774.743 9267.352 9735.199 10713.22 
8 11834.85 11284.57 9968.869 9333.324 9780.847 11119.5 11338.58 11378.73 10169.17 9437.398 9918.019 10875.63 
9 11726.89 11169.57 10026.37 9604.407 10305.06 11964.41 12204.62 12120.64 10722.14 9676.406 10009.35 10895.44 
10 11572.99 11031.66 10070.13 9815.321 10803.04 12797.28 13085.29 12894.63 11286.78 9872.963 9947.023 10808.51 
11 11315.82 10777.83 9996.694 9962.794 11222.64 13529.27 13835.41 13587.46 11794.48 10001.19 9861.921 10624.36 
12 11048.17 10537.86 9934.067 10085.99 11579.64 14092.11 14432.45 14166.04 12247.83 10099.15 9727.457 10393.86 
13 10804.26 10325.94 9869.45 10193.46 11884.59 14520.8 14845.26 14596.32 12607.49 10177.87 9264.749 10199.59 
14 10568.98 10128.49 9789.443 10256.91 12101.55 14797.18 15089.05 14881.8 12858.63 10247.3 9505.374 10022.56 
15 10412.7 9977.622 9716.978 10341.67 12267.91 14983.92 15259.72 15057.17 13035.88 10202.9 9406.795 9901.87 




 Table 2-17 (Continued) 
17 10739.68 10041.33 9596.263 10166.27 12015.15 14622.07 14876.34 14687.46 12690.18 10014.61 9638.033 10352.52 
18 11452.94 10605.82 9697.956 10007.95 11700.46 14206.28 14451.8 14280.76 12342.15 10072.9 10074.56 10856.41 
19 11573.31 10944.09 10015.35 10044.69 11440.89 13749.79 13977.07 13915.75 12186.9 10245.83 10110.25 10991.54 
20 11490.58 10865.71 10111.82 10125.8 11291.51 13372.18 13618.65 13607.92 11949.08 10025.13 9947.645 10875.01 
21 11192.51 10568.97 9747.709 9741.452 10881.39 12910.82 13142.45 12962.36 11250.37 9524.58 9628.06 10635.7 
22 10723.66 10092.73 9188.765 9073.998 10081.18 11968.2 12253.37 11999.11 10397.55 8913.642 9183.774 10210.65 
23 10229.94 9582.965 8619.04 8402.243 9268.516 10995.58 11313.37 11067.7 9599.532 8327.307 8705.526 9704.88 
24 9860.298 9204.553 8192.002 7913.833 8642.038 10202.4 10534.27 10331.5 8981.49 7894.056 8322.219 9269.139 
The data provided in Table A.1 is pulled from FERC form 714 which provides hourly demand 
profiles for balancing authorities.  
 
Table 2-18 Estimated Baseload, Peak and Purchase Emission Estimates 
2016
BASELOAD GPC Characteristics NH3 PM25 NOX SO2 VOC PM10 CO2 Sum Value
MEAN MARGINAL DAMAGE (2009-$/Ton) 5654.0 5848.5 647.8 5031.6 556.5 168.1 36.68
Tons Emitted 0 1910 38245 109907 548 3532 40275376
Net Generation 0 61010000 61010000 61010000 61010000 61010000 61010000
Tons/MWh 1.51472E-05 3.13062E-05 0.000626868 0.001801459 8.98973E-06 5.78883E-05 0.660143851
Damage ($)/MWh 0.09 0.18 0.41 9.06 0.01 0.01 24.22 33.97
NON-BASELOAD GPC Characteristics NH3 PM25 NOX SO2 VOC PM10 CO2 Sum Value
MEAN MARGINAL DAMAGE (2009-$/Ton) 9,565.00            9,015.39           697.59              5,763.82           824.84              326.67              36.68
Tons Emitted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Generation -                     -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                     
Tons/MWh 7.4192E-07 8.26125E-07 0.003091196 1.99391E-05 3.68716E-07 1.00178E-06 0.024393035
Damage ($)/MWh 0.01 0.01 2.16 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.89 3.18  
Purchased GPC Characteristics* NH3 PM25 NOX SO2 VOC PM10 CO2 Sum Value
MEAN MARGINAL DAMAGE (2009-$/Ton) 6,436.17            6,481.85           657.76              5,178.08           610.16              199.79              36.68
Tons/MWh 1.22661E-05 2.52102E-05 0.00 0.00 7.26553E-06 4.6511E-05 0.60
Damage ($)/MWh 0.08 0.16 0.29 1.67 0.00 0.01 21.92
24.14  
The data provided in Table AI.2 is pulled from Energy Information Administration, Forms 923 
and 860, and the Environmental Protection Agency National Emissions Inventory and is 
calculated based upon the methodology outlined in chapter IV. For purchased power estimates, 
the SERC average was used, provide by the EI 
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Table 2-19 Generation Purchases for 2016 
2016 Purchased J F M A M J J A S O N D 
0 3376 2803 1716 1350 1946 3361 3728 3595 2370 1379 1815 2771 
1 3312 2728 1610 1180 1690 2980 3349 3258 2119 1235 1710 2643 
2 3359 2782 1629 1154 1586 2789 3150 3094 2012 1220 1705 2634 
3 3581 3006 1855 1341 1701 2828 3185 3185 2134 1411 1876 2789 
4 4105 3564 2433 1865 2108 3110 3455 3616 2607 1949 2329 3212 
5 4982 4506 3253 2475 2609 3513 3827 4134 3174 2639 3049 3925 
6 5524 4999 3659 2821 3043 4100 4331 4542 3531 3023 3491 4469 
7 5591 5040 3725 3089 3537 4875 5094 5135 3925 3193 3674 4631 
8 5483 4925 3782 3360 4061 5720 5960 5876 4478 3432 3765 4651 
9 5329 4787 3826 3571 4559 6553 6841 6650 5043 3629 3703 4564 
10 5072 4534 3752 3719 4978 7285 7591 7343 5550 3757 3618 4380 
11 4804 4294 3690 3842 5335 7848 8188 7922 6004 3855 3483 4150 
12 4560 4082 3625 3949 5640 8277 8601 8352 6363 3934 3021 3955 
13 4325 3884 3545 4013 5857 8553 8845 8638 6614 4003 3261 3778 
14 4168 3733 3473 4097 6024 8740 9016 8813 6792 3959 3163 3658 
15 4183 3698 3410 4039 5966 8636 8898 8700 6704 3903 3144 3696 
16 4495 3797 3352 3922 5771 8378 8632 8443 6446 3770 3394 4108 
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Table A-3 (Continued) 
18 5329 4700 3771 3800 5197 7506 7733 7672 5943 4002 3866 4747 
19 5246 4622 3868 3882 5047 7128 7374 7364 5705 3781 3703 4631 
20 4948 4325 3504 3497 4637 6667 6898 6718 5006 3280 3384 4391 
21 4479 3849 2945 2830 3837 5724 6009 5755 4153 2669 2940 3966 
22 3986 3339 2375 2158 3024 4751 5069 4824 3355 2083 2461 3461 
23 3616 2960 1948 1670 2398 3958 4290 4087 2737 1650 2078 3025 
SUM (MWh) 109062 95321 74197 71387 96009 141242 148274 145753 108861 71584 72462 92850 
 
The data provided in Table AIII.3 was calculated by the methodology provided in Chapter IV. 
The data is the estimated average hourly purchased power by GPC for each month in 2016 after 
accounting for estimated baseload and peak production. The sum of these estimates are checked 










Table 2-20  Estimated Available Hourly Generation for Baseload and Peak 
2016 Baseload (MWh) Peak (MWh) 
January 6076.60 167.60 
February 6076.60 158.71 
March 6076.60 145.04 
April 6076.60 143.22 
May 6076.60 159.15 
June 6076.60 188.43 
July 6076.60 192.98 
August 6076.60 191.35 
September 6076.60 167.47 
October 6076.60 143.34 
November 6076.60 143.91 
December 6076.60 157.11 
 
The data provided in Table A.4 is the estimated baseload and peak generation determined by the 
methodology explained in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 3. ASSESSING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE COST SHIFT: 
EVALUATING THE IMPACTS OF A VALUE OF SOLAR TARIFF AND 
NET ENERGY METERING ON SOLAR-PARTICIPANTS AND NON-
PARTICIPANTS  
3.1 Introduction 
As a developing niche technology, DGPV is feasible and in many cases at or near the 
cost of regime technologies, namely fossil-fuel generation. In many areas of the United States, 
DGPV is now competing as a mainstream resource for electricity generation. For example, in 
many states throughout the country DGPV has hit grid parity (Greentech media, 2017).  
Incumbent utilities have become alarmed at the growth of potential for DGPV to undermine their 
current business model and stronghold on the electricity market and have mobilized to slow it. 
Utilities have used several strategies to resist the growth of DGPV.  Publicly, utilities voice 
concerns about the threat to jobs in fossil-fuel industries, the high cost of renewable energy, and 
the technical problems of managing an electricity grid based on intermittent energy sources 
(Hess, 2015). 
One of the biggest arguments made by utilities against DGPV, which is often in toe with 
arguments made about NEM, is that the expansion of DGPV will result in revenue erosion and 
inadequate cost recovery for the utility, resulting in a shift of costs to non-solar customers. Some 
utilities argue that any policies or programs that incentivize the growth of DGPV and provide 
compensation above the avoided cost of generation will result in a cross-subsidization between 
non-solar and solar customers. Other utilities argue that just the adoption of DGPV generally, 
without any compensation for exported power, will reduce utilities ability to recover costs and 
earn a rate of return guaranteed by the PUC. As a result, the utility must maintain that revenue 
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and guaranteed profits by increasing costs on other customers (Borlick and Wood, 2014; Brown 
and Lund; 2013, Brown et al, 2015). DGPV advocates argue that DGPV provides multiple 
benefits to the grid above the avoided cost of generation and that any potential impact of reduced 
revenues should be weighed against the benefits of DGPV for both solar and non-solar 
customers. This argument is most frequently referred to as the ‘cost shift’ argument.  
Despite the growth in NEM and the growing number of VOS studies, few examine the 
potential for a ‘cost shift’ and address the concerns consistently voiced by utilities. The transition 
studies literature recognizes that incumbent organizations will try to capture multiple strategies 
to capture the policy process and turn it to their favor (Voß et al., 2009), which have variable 
rates of success. The few academic pursuits in this field have recognized that the fears over 
DGPV adoption voiced by the incumbent utility are likely exaggerated (Johnson, et al, 2017). As 
Hess (2015) points out, more analysis is needed to evaluate the legitimacy of these strategies 
used by regime actors to inhibit niche growth.  
In this chapter I build on the work by Hess (2015) and Johnson et al (2017) an examine 
the legitimacy of the largest argument made by the incumbent utilities against the growth of 
DGPV- the ‘cost shift.’ I expand on the work conducted in Chapter 3 by assessing the 
implications of implementing the estimated VOST in Georgia. I utilize GT-DSM to estimate the 
impact of a VOST for DGPV exports on the residential customer classes, with the specific goal 
of discerning how an increased export rate for residential solar customers impacts the rates of 
non-solar customers.  
 Before moving on to outline my research questions, the purpose of this research needs to 
be clearly stated. The incumbent utility business model, which has been established and iterated 
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on through various policy actions (legal, regulatory, and otherwise) over the past century, is 
inherently threatened by the growth of DGPV (Hess, 2015). However, the concern for those 
seeking to transition the electricity system away from fossil fuels and towards renewable 
resources, is an issue of time. As many have recognized (Hess, 2015; Geels, 2014; Geels et al, 
2014) in order to facilitate the technological innovation necessary for transition, the utility 
business model, and the regulations which support it, must adapt. Slowing that adaptation is the 
power of incumbency and an industry-wide disinterest in innovation, as shown by low 
investments in research and development and the multiple strategies and arguments employed by 
the beneficiaries of the status quo. This research analyzes these strategies to assess their technical 
merit and political purpose, especially with regard to claims that state DGPV establishes cross-
subsidization of one customer over another, referred to as 'cost-shifting'. If there is truth in the 
‘cost shift’ argument, then policymakers, in as much as they are concerned with transitioning the 
electricity system, must decide how to adapt the incumbent utility business model (which will 
undoubtedly take years) while simultaneously ensuring the growth of niche innovations, like 
DGPV. Can regulators continue to support niche innovations and give themselves enough time to 
qualitatively change the policies that guide the regime? This research aims to begin assessing this 
critical policy question for the sustainable transition of our energy system.  
3.2 Research Questions  
This chapter seeks to answer two three questions.  
Q1. How would the implementation of different VOSTs and NEM policies impact the market for 
residential solar in Georgia?  
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Q2. How would the implementation of a VOST or NEM impact the rates and bills of non-solar 
customers, i.e. what is the cost shift?  
Q3. What do the results of this case study mean for the greater research on niche-regime 
dynamics and regulation in a sustainable transition? 
To answer these questions, we first estimate the impact of three VOST estimates — 7.59c/kWh, 
14.4 c/kWh, 17.2 c/kWh — and NEM on the residential solar market in Georgia. To do so we 
calculate a historical price elasticity of demand for residential DGPV and estimate how the 
implementation of each VOST and NEM impact the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for BTM 
DGPV and market adoption rates. We use GT-DSM to estimate the impact of a VOST and NEM 
for DGPV exports on all residential customers, paying particular attention to the impact on rates 
and bills of non-solar customers. We compare the results of our VOS analysis with the 
implementation of NEM and the continued use of the current export rate for DGPV in Georgia, 
set at the avoided cost of energy. We then discuss the policy implications of both a VOST, NEM, 
and GPC’s current export rate. 
3.3 Description of GT-DSM 
The Georgia Tech Demand Side Management (GT-DSM) is designed to analyze the 
impacts of policy or utility actions such as energy efficiency, demand response, and/or renewable 
energy development on the utility companies’ financial status as well as the rates and bills faced 
by rate classes (both participants and non-participants). It was initially developed by Brown et al. 
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(2015) to examine alternative business models for energy efficiency in the Southeast. 19 I subsequently 
revised and expanded GT-DSM for the purposes of this dissertation. 
GT-DSM integrates utility scale financial modeling with customer financial analysis 
capability. On the utility side, GT-DSM performs an aggregated utility-level analysis of the 
proposed portfolio by unpacking the change in fixed and variable costs to operate electricity 
generating assets and the resulting impact on return on equity and revenues. It does so by using 
historical chained CPI and historical annual operating costs, maintenance costs, and generation 
broken down by technology type to produce a historical breakdown of inflation-adjusted O&M 
costs per MWh by generating technology type. With the inputs of several years’ values of the 
above-mentioned categories and a projected generation distribution among technologies for the 
future time series, the model can produce estimated total O&M and fixed costs for each 
technology type. When new capacity is added or additions are avoided, a capital investment or 
deferred capacity investment will be also calculated.  
On the customer side, GT-DSM includes a characterization of the utility’s current and 
future projected customer base, including both the residential sector and the commercial and 
industrial sector, in terms of number of customers, rates, and sectoral annual demand for 
electricity. Based on the energy savings and peak demand reduction, the module solves for the 
rate and bill impacts for multiple classes of ratepayers, calculates costs required to operate the 
portfolio and its associated impact on utility revenue. The module is also capable of computing 
the levelized cost of the portfolio, annual program cost recovery and revenue recovery, as 
necessary.  
                                                
19 https://cepl.gatech.edu/projects/mecp/modeling 
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First, the module solves for the impacts of the portfolio on customers, particularly the 
impacts on their bills and on their rates. It can show the trajectory of the impact year by year, as 
well as the total impact over time, and can compare the impact of expanded energy efficiency 
programs to a base case. It is capable of showing impacts by customer class and can assess how 
impacts differ between participants in programs and non-participants. Second, GT-DSM includes 
a comparison of benefits to costs of the programs, based on the tests described in the California 
Standard Practice Manual: Participant Test, Ratepayer Impact Measure Test, Total Resource 
Cost Test (with the variant known as the Societal Cost Test), and Program Administrator Cost 
Test (also known as the Utility Cost Test).  
Third, GT-DSM is capable of describing the impacts of the energy efficiency investments 
on the utility, particularly the impacts on earnings and Return on Equity. Its outputs allow 
assessment of the impacts on earnings and ROE of various approaches to compensation of the 
utility for the investments in energy efficiency. Last, GT-DSM computes the costs of the 
portfolio for the purpose of comparison to supply side alternatives, presented as levelized cost 
per kWh of energy saved or other measure of the cost of saved energy.  
Data input for GT-DSM relies primarily on SNL, an industry intelligence service, 
through subscription only. SNL compiles the data mainly from the following sources: utility 
company financial filings, EIA Form 826, 906, 923, 412 (pre-2004), FERC Form 1, RUS 12, 
RUS 7, and EPA Clean Air Market Database.  
3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 Establishing a Growth Rate for DGPV in Georgia under VOST and NEM  
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To determine the expected growth in customer-sited DGPV from 2017-2020, we first 
established a historical price elasticity of demand for residential solar. Historical data on 
residential solar installations is limited to system size and total capacity. We were unable to 
retrieve any historical pricing data for residential solar. Because the focus of our research is on 
the implication of NEM and VOST, we needed to assess a price elasticity of demand based not 
just on the installation cost of solar but on the levelized cost of energy (LCOE), so as to include 
the value of export compensation. The LCOE identifies an average unit cost per kWh that 
aggregates the life cycle cost of all assets and resources associated with the electricity generation 
facility. For our analysis, we build on Comello and Reichelstein (2016), thus for distributed 
solar, the LCOE can be expressed as:  
Equation 3.1 Levelized Cost of Energy 
!"#$ = & + ( + ) ∙ ∆ + $, 
 
!  = unit variable cost in year i  
!  = fixed operating cost in year i 




!" = 	compensation	for	the	exported	energy	to	the	grid 
 
For solar photovoltaic power, since there is no associated furl cost, there is no variable operating 
cost, meaning that w=0. The only tangible operating costs will be the expected operations and 
maintenance of the solar system over its useful life. We estimate the life-cycle cost of a solar 
facility by the following parameters:  
!" = $%$&'(	*+$&,--,&*.+	/.$&	*+	0.--,1$	2'1	34 
 
!" # = %&'&%(#)	+&%#,-	&#	#(./	0	(1	#ℎ/	+(-3#	)/&- 
 
T = useful life on the system 
!	 ≡ 11 + & = ()*+,-./	01+/,&	21*3(	,.	+14)/15	& 
 
!"-1 = &'()'&*+",-	)*+'	,/	+ℎ'	121+'3	"34*5+"-(	*--6*7	+,+*7	,6+46+ 
 
!"  = fixed operating cost in year i 
We assume that the solar system generates power continuously for 8,760 hours. We assume that 
each subsequent year of installation, the solar system’s efficiency degrades at a rate equal to 
!"-1.	  At time t in year i, the capacity factor therefore is !"-1  · !" #   , with 1 ≤ t ≤ 8, 760. By using 
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an LCOE calculation, we ignore any intertemporal variations in the capacity available during any 
given year and considers only the average capacity factor, CF, given by: 
Equation 3.2 Capacity Factor 





m ≡ 8, 760 
At time t in year i, for residential solar in Georgia we assume an average capacity factor is 15% 
with 1 ≤ t ≤ 8, 760 (NREL, 2016). To obtain the levelized capacity cost per kWh, and the 
levelized fixed operating costs, we divide the total installation price of the system as well as the 
total operations and maintenance of the system by the discounted total number of kilowatt hours 
that can be obtained from an installation of one kilowatt of power: 






( ∙ *# ∙ +%-'	$%&' ∙ .%
 
 
Currently there is no database that tracks the historical install costs of residential solar 
systems in Georgia from 2008-2016. Thus, we utilized regional average numbers from NRELs 
‘Tracking the Sun’ database (NREL, 2016). We assume that the solar system generates power 
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continuously for 8,760 hours, with a system life of 30 years. For residential solar, the only fixed 
operating costs are the costs associated with advanced metering, and the occasional O&M costs. 
To determine estimates of the O&M costs with residential solar we contacted local solar 
developers, our conversations resulted in an estimate of $80/kW (Moreland, 2016). For estimates 
on advanced metering infrastructure, we used costs from GPC recent ASI and SPI programs. I 
estimated $120 annually for metering infrastructure costs. 
 The next component of the LCOE is the tax factor, ∆. Since we are focusing only on 
residential solar, the only relevant tax impact is federal investment tax credits, which is currently 
set at 30% of the installed capital costs. 20 There are currently no state tax credits in Georgia. 
However, from 2008- 2014 Georgia did offer a tax credit of 35% of the cost of the system, these 
tax breaks were incorporated in the historical costs of the solar systems.  
The final component of the LCOE is the EV, which I denote as the revenue generated 
from the exported energy. In our analysis, we assume that households pay a retail rate for 
electricity and are not on time-varying rates. I denote this rate by p. Under a feed-in-tariff (i.e, a 
VOST or an RNR tariff,) the solar electricity sold back to utility is credited at a specific rate of e 
per kWh, or the export rate. Meaning that any generation that exceeds demand in a given hour is 
sold at e per kWh. In the case of net metering, e = p. Our analysis assumes that the consumption 
of electricity by the household is unaffected by the decision to invest in a solar.  
Therefore, the revenue generated from exporting electricity to the utility, at any point in 
time is equal to the feed-in-tariff rate e multiplied by the number of kilowatts eligible for rate e. 




Assuming a load profile of L(t), in our analysis we estimate a z(k), which the percentage of all 
kilowatt hours generated by the solar system of size k that is eligible for the rate, e. We denote 
z(k) as: 
Equation 3.3 Percentage of kWh generated by Solar 
zi(t|k) = min{L(t), CF(t) · k · x i−1}, 
z(k)≡ "#∙%&∙' ()-+)∙-./)0+ ∙ [ 23
4




.<"   
Thus, I estimate that for each system, size k, the estimated EV is equal to:  
Equation 3.4 Revenue Generated from Exported Energy 
!" = $ % ∙ ' 
 
When determining EV, I recognized the connection between the system size and the 
compensation structure. With very low compensation for the export of solar power, system sizes 
will be scaled to avoid exporting power back to the grid. This concept is often referred to as 
‘right-sizing.’ However, under favorable compensation, customers will size systems to take 
advantage of the potential revenue. Figures 10 and 11 represent the difference between a right-
sized residential solar system and system sized to take advantage of favorable export 
compensation. The blue curve in Figures 10 and 11 represents the average electricity 
consumption of a typical household in Atlanta, GA on February 2 and August 5. In Figure 10 
most of the electricity generated will be valued at the going retail rate, as household consumption 
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exceeds production of the solar system. By comparison, Figure 11 depicts a larger solar 
installation and now a greater portion of the generation is valued at the export compensation rate.  
 
Figure 3-1a-Residential Demand with a Right-Sized Solar System 
 
Figure 3-2b-Residential Demand with a Right-Sized Solar System 
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Figure 3-2a Residential Demand with a Large Solar System 
 
 
Figure 3-3b Residential Demand with a Large Solar System 
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To determine how residential customers have historically sized solar systems, and thus 
the total z(k), I spoke with local residential solar developers (Moreland, 2016). Our research 
found that historically many customers have not applied for the RNR program as the potential 
value generated from exporting, EV, is not greater than the cost of the advanced metering 
necessary to enroll. However, even the customers that do apply for RNR are not doing so with 
the expectation that RNR will be a major source of revenue and do not factor in any type of EV 
with their financial planning. The biggest determinants for sizing a residential system are roof 
space and shading (typically from nearby tree cover).  Developers in the residential space 
estimate that on average, 15% of the generation from a solar system is exported to the grid, 
primarily during the week due to low demand (Moreland, 2016). To understand how the size of a 
solar system may increase under favorable compensation, I examined installation sizes in 
California, Massachusetts, and Arizona — the leading states for residential solar (EIA, 2016). 
Our review concluded that the average residential system exports 25%-30% of total system 
output to the grid. In my analysis, we assume that 15% of all generation under RNR will be 
exported to the grid and that under a VOST or NEM, 27% of all residential solar generation is 
exported. 
Determining how to capture the value of export compensation was critical for estimating 
the price elasticity of demand in Georgia. For two years, GPC offered solar customers favorable 
export compensation under the SP-1 and SP-2 programs. A review of the historical installation 
data revealed that under the SP-1 and SP-2 programs total capacity increased substantially, 
compared to years when only the RNR program was offered.   As such we assumed that 
historically, the sizing of residential systems would respond to the favorable export 
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compensation. Meaning that under years when only RNR is offered, only 15% of total system 
output is valued at an RNR rate of e= $4c/kWh. For historical years when SP-1 and SP-2 were 
offered, we assume that installation sizes are larger and that 27% of total solar generation is 
exported to the grid.  For forecasting impacts under NEM or VOST, we also assume that 30% of 
total solar generation is exported to the grid.  For VOST, this means that 27% of total system 
generation is compensated at a rate of e= 7.59c/kWh, 14.4 c/kWh, 17.59 c/kWh. Under NEM, 
EV is compensated at a rate equivalent to the projected retail rate. Table 20 provides GT-DSM’s 
estimates GPC’s residential retail rate over the next ten years. 
Table 3-1 GT-DSM’s Estimates of Projected Retail Rates for GPC 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 
12.27 12.27 12.27 13.12 13.12 13.12 14.92 14.92 14.92 16.85 16.85 
 
Table 3.2 provides the estimates for the LCOE for residential solar from 2010-2026 under 
and RNR rate, a NEM rate, and a VOST. For years 2016-2026 we assume a continued price 
decline of 10% annually in solar installation costs but make no adjustments to the average O&M 
costs.  Once producing historical estimates for the LCOE (where e= 4 c/kWh and z(k)= 15%), we 
combined our calculations with total historical capacity numbers from 2008-2016, provided from 
the Southface Energy Institute’s Georgia Solar Energy Dashboard (Southface, 2016). While 
changes in subsidies for solar lead to significant year to year variation in installations, an average 
price elasticity of demand for residential solar over this period was estimated at -0.95. Under an 
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RNR tariff, the LCOE of solar is not equivalent to (or achieve grid parity) to current average 
GPC residential retail rate of 12.27 c/kWh until 2019. Under NEM or a VOST, the LCOE of 
solar hits grid parity in 2017.   


















2016 $           2.79 16.4 10.02 11.89 9.33 8.08 
2017 $           2.51 14.9 8.55 10.55 7.99 6.73 
2018 $           2.26 13.6 7.34 9.34 6.78 5.53 
2019 $           2.03 12.03 6.05 8.25 5.70 4.44 
2020 $           1.83 11.3 6.46 8.89 6.34 5.08 
2021 $           1.95 11.9 5.18 7.85 5.29 4.04 
2022 $           1.76 10.9 3.99 6.91 4.36 3.10 
2023 $           1.58 9.9 2.87 6.07 3.51 2.26 
2024 $           1.42 9 1.82 5.31 2.76 1.50 
2025 $           1.28 8.3 0.94 4.63 2.07 0.82 
2026 $           1.15 7.6 .20 4.01 1.46 0.20 
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$/W LCOE c/kWh Export Compensation 
2009 7.06 39.2 RNR 
2010 6.19 34.2 RNR 
2011 4.37 19.2 SP-1 
2012 3.82 16.3 Sp-2 
2013 3.36 19.4 RNR 
2014 3.11 18.1 RNR 
2015 2.93 17.1 RNR 
2016 2.79 16.4 RNR 
 
After determining a price elasticity of demand, we turned to projecting future capacity 
additions for residential solar under the current RNR, NEM, and a VOST. Figure 3a shows the 
projected capacity additions and participation growth of residential solar under the three potential 
export compensation mechanisms. If GPC continues to offer only RNR as a compensation 
mechanism for exported solar energy, we estimate that the adoption of solar will grow minimally 
at an average rate of 22% each year. However, by 2026, residential solar will only account for 
1.5 MWs, which is less than 1% of the distributed residential solar potential in Georgia (Burr, 
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Hallock and Sargent 2015). The introduction of NEM or VOST introduces a value to the 
customer that decreases the LCOE, thus increasing the expected adoption. Under NEM, we 
estimate the capacity of the residential solar market at 13.3 MW by 2026. Under a 17.2 c/kWh 
VOST, we estimate the capacity of the residential solar market at 13.7 MW by 2026. The growth 
rates begin to converge in 2026 as the expected retail rate for GPC and the VOST of 17.2 c/kWh 
begin to converge, with a retail rate estimated at 16.9 c/kWh.  
 
 
Figure 3-4 Expected Capacity Growth under different Compensation Mechanisms 
 
Before determining the impact of RNR, NEM or a VOST on the rates and bill impacts of 
GPC customers, we first needed to determine how many participants would enroll in each 
program. To do so, we needed to estimate the average system size for residential customers. In 
terms of system size assumptions, the historical average installed capacity per system of a 
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residential solar system in Georgia is 4 kW, with a historical average, annual load of 13,000 
kWh. However, recognizing the potential that system sizes could increase under a VOST or 
NEM program, as customers are less financially motivated to ‘right-size’ their system, we 
assume an average residential system size of 4.75 kW, with no change to annual load.  
3.5 Determining the Impact of a RNR, NEM and VOST tariff on Customer Bills and 
Rates  
Given the low export rate under the RNR tariff, as well as limitations of systems sizes 
established by the Co-Gen Act, the majority of customer-owned DGPV in Georgia is 
predominantly BTM and designed either to generate up to the point where a host load is exactly 
equal to generation when summed over a typical billing period. While these systems, summed 
over the billing cycle, do not produce any net excess generation, they can produce excess 
generation during some hours of the day and do.  
To date, only Minnesota and Austin, Texas have conducted a VOS methodology, with 
Austin being the only jurisdiction to have implemented a VOST over net metering.  While any 
jurisdiction looking to implement a VOST has a variety of choices regarding several technical 
issues, that may have important impacts on costs to ratepayers, for the purpose of our analysis we 
model the implementation of a VOST to reflect the current established program in Austin.  
We assume that the VOST will be established as a behind the meter program, meaning 
that customers only sell exported energy at the VOST and all demand not met by DGPV is 
purchased at the full retail rate. We also assume that all base charges implemented by GPC 
cannot be off-set by the VOST. For each billing month, the DGPV customer receives credit 
equal to the metered kilowatt-hour output of the customer's PV system multiplied by the VOST 
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plus any carry-over credit from the previous billing month. Any remaining amount of credit(s) 
are carried forward and applied to the customer's next electric service bill. We also assume that 
all credits are only applicable to the usage where the on-site solar photovoltaic system is 
interconnected, meaning there is no virtual-metering. Finally, we assume that the VOST and 
NEM is established in August of 2016 and we model additions to the VOST program until 2026, 
but provide financial impacts until 2031.  
The evaluation of bill and rate impacts for solar and non-solar customers as well as 
estimates of DG expansion were conducted under the following parameters and with the 
following assumptions. In all scenarios, we assume residential customers are on a time invariant 
rate structure, and that the export rates for each program are fixed over the modeling horizon.  In 
the analysis of rate and bill impacts, the cost of the installed solar system is not included because 
these costs bear no impact on the utility financials. Additionally, the analysis assumes that all 
credits established under a NEM program are lost after 12-month cycle.  
The GT-DSM model developed by Georgia Tech was used to evaluate the bill and rate 
impacts for residential solar-customers and non-solar customers, under a RNR, NEM, and a 
VOST export rate that compensates solar customers at the value of solar calculated above. To 
answer these questions, we use GT-DSM to determine how both the lost revenues because of 
residential solar as well as the compensation paid for exported solar, under each compensation 
mechanism, impact bills and rates for both solar and non-solar customers.  
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3.5.1 Variables for Estimating the Impact of Distributed Solar on Utility Financials, Rates, and 
Bills 
GT-DSM uses four primary variables for estimating the impact of any utility program on 
rates and bills. The first is total capacity of energy savings, the second is the total number of 
participants. The third is each program’s contribution to peak reduction. Peak reduction is 
estimated as a benefit to the utility and a mechanism for reducing overall system costs. To 
estimate the peak capacity reductions provided by residential solar, we generated hourly profile 
curves for each modeled year and matched the generation profiles to GPC’s peak demand from 
2015. Figure 13 provides the estimated peak reductions from distributed solar under the 
modeling horizon. By 2025, a 17.2 c/kWh VOST program can produce 11.1 MWs of peak 
capacity reductions.  The final variable is the total cost of the program, which is equivalent to the 
EV paid under each compensation mechanism plus the cost of program administration, which we 
estimated at .5 c/kWh. Under a NEM program we assumed that there was no program cost to the 
utility, since there is no payout to the customer. All exported capacity is estimated as lost sales 




Figure 3-5 Estimate Peak Reductions from Residential Solar under different Compensation 
Mechanisms 
Using the GT-DSM model, total net impact to the utility financials is a function of the 
total amount of solar generation; the rate base per customer class; the rate of return per customer 
class; the amount of solar exported the grid; the export compensation price; and the peak 
reduction provided from residential solar. Given that solar generation is often coincident with 
peak demand, any peak capacity reduction associated with solar output is considered a benefit to 
the utility and is translated into a variable cost savings.  
3.6 Results: Expected Rate and Bill Impacts 
In this section, expected rate and bill impacts for solar and non-solar customers under 
each compensation mechanism are evaluated. As noted, in this analysis the cost of the solar 
procurement is not included in expected participant bill impacts. Under all three VOST 
estimates, NEM, and RNR we observe no meaningful impacts on residential rates or non-solar 
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bills. We present the findings for a 17.2 c/kWh VOST, NEM, and the continued RNR rate. All 
outputs are presented in the Appendix.  
 Under NEM or any VOST, average residential rates are essentially unchanged and the 
upward pressure on residential rates is unnoticeable. Under a NEM, average residential rates 
would increase by an average of 0.10%, or 0.0013 cents between 2016 and 2030, with a 
maximum increase of 0.25% or 0.0033 cents in 2030. Under a 17.2 c/kWh VOST, average 
residential rates would increase by an average 0.11%, or 0.0014 cents between 2016 and 2030, 
with a maximum increase of 0.23% or 0.0031 cents in 2030. Under a continued RNR, average 
residential rates would increase by an average of 0.07%, or 0.0009 cents between 2016 and 2030, 
with a maximum increase of 0.17% or 0.002 cents in 2030. The reason why the VOST actually 
results in a lower maximum bill increase, when compared to NEM, is because of the driving 
reduction in peak demand which limits even the marginal rate increase.  
Despite the above retail rate payout from the VOST, there is almost no upward pressure 
on rates. This is in large part because solar reduces the variable cost of power for GPC at peak, 
the costliest time to generate power. Under a 17.2 c/kWh VOST, residential solar eliminates 192 
MW of peak capacity through 2030, and results in a savings in the variable cost of production for 
GPC of $107 million. Under NEM solar eliminates 148 MW of peak capacity through 2030, 
corresponding to a savings in the variable cost of production for GPC of $106 million. The 
driving reason for NEM producing proportionately higher benefits than a VOST, is that under a 
NEM, there is no additional program cost for the exported energy only additional lost revenues. 
Under a continued RNR schedule, residential solar eliminates 132 MW of peak capacity, 
corresponding to a variable cost savings of $ 84 million. However, under the RNR tariff, the total 
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compensation provided by GPC through 2030 is estimated at $130,423, suggesting that in fact it 
is the solar customers that are providing the subsidy to GPC.  
 
 
  Figure 3-6 Impact of VOST at 17.2 c/kWh on Residential Rates, 2016-2030 
 131 
 
Figure 3-7 Impact of NEM on Residential Rates, 2016-2030 
 
 
Figure 3-8 Impact of RNR on Residential Rates, 2016-2030 
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GT-DSM is also used to estimate the expected bill impacts for RNR, NEM, and VOST 
solar participants and non-solar participants with the implementation of each compensation 
mechanism. Under all three VOST estimates, NEM, and RNR we observe no meaningful 
impacts on non-solar residential bills. Under a NEM, average non-solar residential rates would 
increase by an average of 0.07%, between 2016 and 2030, with a maximum increase of 0.21% or 
in 2030. Under a VOST, average non-solar residential rates would increase by an average 0.09%, 
or between 2016 and 2030, with a maximum increase of 0.23% in 2030. Under a continued 
RNR, average non-solar residential bills would increase by an average of 0.05% between 2016 
and 2030, with a maximum increase of 0.33% in 2030. The reason why the VOST actually 
results in a lower maximum bill increase compared to RNR is because of the driving reduction in 
peak demand which limits even the marginal rate increase.  
Under a 17.2 c/kWh VOST, solar participants’ bills are reduced by an average of 66% 
with an average monthly bill paid of $49. Under a NEM program, solar participants’ bills are 
reduced by an average of 62% with an average monthly billed paid of $57. Under a continued 
RNR program, solar participants’ bills are reduced by an average of 56% with an average 
monthly billed paid of $69. 
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Figure 3-9 Impact of VOST at 17.2 c/kWh on Residential Customer Bills, 2016-2030 
 
Figure 3-10 Impact of NEM on Residential Customer Bills, 2016-2030 
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Figure 3-11 Impact of RNR on Residential Customer Bills, 2016-2030 
 
Overall, when compared across all residential customer bills, our analysis shows that the 
impacts of the VOST and NEM programs result in an overall reduction in average customer bills.  
3.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we built on the research conducted in Chapter 2, which established a 
range of VOST for distributed solar in Georgia Power Company’s territory and estimated the 
potential cost shift of three VOST estimates — 7.5c/kWh, 14.4 c/kWh, and 17.2 c/kWh — as 
well as NEM and a continued RNR tariff. GT-DSM was used to evaluate the impacts of each of 
these compensation mechanisms, specifically on rate and bill impacts.  
Throughout the country regulators are faced with the task of transitioning the electricity 
system, determining the best policies to grow technological innovations, and transition the 
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incumbent utility’s business model. DGPV is one niche technology that represents a pathway for 
sustainable transition and the policies of NEM and increasingly VOST are being used to develop 
DGPV. As the adoption of DGPV grows, incumbent utilities have used many strategies to slow 
the growth, as proliferation of DGPV fundamentally challenges the utility business model- one 
which is currently locked-in with regulatory policies.  Incumbent utilities argue that any 
compensation for exported distributed energy will inevitably produce a cost shift from solar 
customers to non-solar customers. Despite such consistent claims, very few studies have 
examined the legitimacy of the cost-shift argument.  
 From our analysis, it is clear that under the current business model, growth in DGPV 
results in lost revenues to the utility and to recover those lost revenues (and maintain their 
guaranteed profit margin) utilities will increase costs on non-solar customers. However, it is also 
clear that under reasonable market conditions, the margin of cost increase on non-solar 
customers from the use of VOST and NEM is small, less than 1% of the average customer’s bill, 
in terms of monetary impact. If Georgia regulators were to adopt a VOST above retail rate or 
NEM, growth in the state’s DGPV market would increase substantially over the next ten years. 
Moreover, despite this growth, the analysis found that the monetary impact to non-solar 
customers was negligible. Additionally, under NEM and all estimates of VOST, GPC will 
witness sizable savings from reduced variable production costs. Even under an above retail-rate 
VOST has minimal impacts on non-participants and would be indiscernible in the year-to-year 
variation in electricity prices. However, these calculations were done to examine an impact when 
the total capacity of the DGPV market remained under 12 MW. While this may be a large 
expansion from the current residential Georgia market, it is still less than 1% of GPC’s total 
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generation portfolio. If DGPV were to grow to meet a sizable portion of Georgia’s demand, 
under the current regulatory structure, the impact on non-solar customers could be far more 
substantial. However, even a recent study by Johnson et al (2017) showed that DGPV could 
grow to be 5% of generation in New Jersey and non-participant bills would increase by 2% or 
less.  
This underscores the need for more analysis on the impacts of niche policies on the 
incumbent regimes and society at large. There is no consensus within the policy literature, or 
among policymakers, as to what is a reasonable impact of policies which support the adoption of 
renewable energy. Federal investments into the research and development of renewable 
technologies are supported by tax-payer dollars and justified as an investment in energy security. 
However, whether society should pay for the advancement of niche technologies through taxes 
or through other market mechanisms, such as NEM or VOST, is a question the policy literatures 
have not tackled. Understanding what is a reasonable cost to transition our energy system, must 
also be paired with a deeper understanding of the benefits. More analytical work is needed to 
truly understand the actual impacts of niche policies and separate legitimate concerns from the 
political strategies of the incumbent regime. By building the analytical literature, policy makers 
can begin to form hypotheses on what types of market mechanisms will best facilitate the 
sustainable transition.  
Returning to my analysis of GPC, this research also underscores the need for regulators 
to assess the legitimacy of utility’s resistance strategies for their technical merit. From my 
analysis, it is clear that Georgia regulators could institute NEM or VOST policies with the goal 
of growing the DGPV market without burdening non-solar customers. Meaning that these 
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policies could both simultaneously grow the adoption of niche innovations while giving 
regulators the runway necessary to transition the incumbent utility business model that inherently 
clashes with the growth of DGPV.  
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3.9 Appendix  
3.9.1 GT-DSM Outputs for VOST-7.5 c/kWh 
 
Figure 3-12 Rate Impacts of a 7.5c/kWh VOST 
 
 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3-14 Rate Impacts of a 14.4 c/kWh VOST 
 
 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3-11 Utility Impacts of a 14.4c/kWh VOST 













































































































































































































3.9.2 GT-DSM Outputs for VOST-17.2 c/kWh 
 
Figure 3-16 Rate Impacts of a 17.2 c/kWh VOST 
 
 
















































































































































































































Table 3-13 Customer Impacts of a 17.2 c/kWh VOST 
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3.9.3 GT-DSM Outputs for RNR-4 c/kWh 
 
 
Figure 3-18 Rate Impacts of a RNR 
 
 






Table 3-16 Customer Impacts of RNR 








































































































































































































Table 3-17 Utility Impacts of RNR 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































3.9.4 GT-DSM Outputs for NEM 
 
 
Figure 3-20 Rate Impacts of a NEM 
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Table 3-19 Customer Impacts of NEM 









































































































































































































Table 3-20 Utility Impacts of NEM 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 4. INNOVATIONS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE- THE 
EVOLVING ROLE OF THIRD-SECTOR ACTORS IN MUNICIPAL 
ENERGY POLICY  
4.1 Introduction 
 Since the 1990s, there has been a substantial growth in the innovation and variation of 
local and regional policy responses to the issues of climate change, clean energy development, 
and greater sustainability goals (Broto and Bulkeley, 2013). In the United States, the 
inconsistency in a federal energy policy and a continued trend of devolution has pushed cities to 
the forefront space of leading the country towards a sustainable transition of its energy system. 
While the transition literature has historically overlooked the role of cities, there is a growing 
recognition of the need to examine cities and regions as important arenas to understand the 
struggles of developing sociotechnical regimes, the agency of actors, and how cities collectively 
at the national and international level can transcend the established levels of governance and 
create additional arenas to challenge the incumbent regime (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005).  
While it is unlikely that the actions of a single city can produce an energy system 
transition, it may be that in concert with other cities there is a great opportunity to develop and 
transition niche innovations. One way in which cities are increasingly networked is through the 
strategic engagement of ‘third- sector institutions’. According to Clark (2017) third-sector 
institutions are non- governmental organizations or intermediaries that are “operating within 
private market spaces to expand the provisioning of public services and collective goods or 
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enhance the efficient delivery of new or existing services beyond the boundaries of local 
government (pg. 812).” 
Increasingly, third-sector institutions include a network of national or international 
intermediaries with the specific purpose of influencing the policies of local government. Through 
a practice that Clark (2017) refers to as ‘strategic capacity seeding’ the large Intermediaries 
utilize philanthropic funding to seed new capacity into local cities through providing technical 
assistance and at times placing professional staff in city governments. These investments while 
not explicitly attached to a specific policy agenda, are deeply connected to the development of 
niche technologies and innovations through market- driven approaches, with the goal of 
achieving a shared vision of the new energy regime- such as improved resilience, sustainability, 
and efficiency.  
From a sociotechnical perspective, these third-sector institutions can be viewed as both 
niche actors and intermediary actors. Niche actors are individual and collective participants 
that are engaging in purposive actions in an attempt to prevent or generate change (Bos, 
2013). According to Geels (2012), niche actors create a starting point for a systemic change and 
facilitate sustainable transitions, therefore greater attention needs to be given to the actions of 
niche actors as the choices and decisions of niche actors will ultimately shape the political 
contours of the next regime. Foxon (2010) finds that niche actors work on radical innovations 
and are involved in several processes, such as knowledge development and diffusion, articulation 
of visions, entrepreneurial activities, market formation, guidance of search activities, 
mobilization of resources, creation of legitimacy and the overcoming of resistance to change. 
However, a number of authors have argued that a condition for a successful niche transition 
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depends on changes in government policy and support (Hielscher et al, 2011; Geels, 2012). 
Arguably, this underscores niche actors’ dependency on decisions made by policymakers and the 
government but it doesn’t limit the contours of policy innovation coming from niche actors to the 
existing public services model. 
Intermediaries are actors that often work at all levels and can work irrespective of 
government policy or support (Fischer, 2016). In the context of sustainable energy transitions. 
intermediaries are organizations and networks that build links between specific community 
energy groups, and which exist to share experience, good practice, expertise and advice. In some 
cases, intermediaries also act as a voice for community energy by providing evidence and 
advocacy to policy-makers. In many ways intermediaries are akin to policy entrepreneurs which 
serve to negotiate the translation between niche and regime (Smith, 2005). 
As the instances of third-sector institutions’ seeding’ the city- scale adoption of energy 
policies grows, it is important to understand how and where these actors are shaping the policy 
process, as the actions they take, and the institutions they form will have implications for energy 
transitions at the national level. In this chapter, I build on the work done by Clark (2017) an 
explore an instance of ‘strategic seeding in cities.’ First, I use the MLP framework as a heuristic 
to organize the niche-regime relationship of the current energy regime, identify the niche 
innovation that third-sector intermediary actors are working to develop, and the sociotechnical 
landscape that impacts the dynamics of transition. My focus in this chapter is on the strategies 
and impacts of intermediary actors in sustainable transitions in networked cities. After 
characterizing where these third-sector actors fit within the sociotechnical landscape, I turn to 
understanding the impacts of ‘strategic seeding’ on the institutions of local governments and the 
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role of the public in these third-sector actors led movements toward sustainable transition. I build 
my hypotheses on the impacts of strategic seeding in cities from multiple literatures examining 
the innovation in policy at the city-level and the role of Intermediaries in the policy process.  I 
then test these hypotheses with a case study on the City Energy Project in Atlanta, GA. 
The ability for a single city’s to qualitatively change the national energy regime is 
unlikely. However, to the degree that third-sector actors are systematically changing the behavior 
and capacity of the institutions in cities throughout the country and building momentum and 
support for regime change, strategic capacity seeding represents a new avenue for sustainable 
transition and one in which researchers attempting to understand the dynamics of sociotechnical 
transitions need to account for. Of course, it could also be the case that strategic seeding is not 
fundamentally changing the institutions of the regime but merely producing incremental change. 
In my conclusion, I reflect on these sentiments and use the case study of Atlanta to draw some 
inferences on the potential for strategic seeding to produce a regime change and where the 
research needs to head in the future.  
4.2 Analytical Framework: Defining the Regime, Niche, Sociotechnical Landscape, and 
understanding Third-Sectors Actors’ within the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP)  
The MLP framework serves as a heuristic to diagram the social, technical, economic, 
environmental, and political dynamics of a sustainable transition. The MLP framework 
distinguishes between three analytical levels with increasing temporal stability. The first is the 
niche. The niche is the level at which innovation occurs and is characterized by a flexibility 
and uncertainty.  The regime is the presiding stable set of practices, technologies or rules that 
have been legitimized through institutional and technological lock-in. The sociotechnical 
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landscape contains the slow-moving societal processes that provide the context for regime 
stability or change. Transitions, defined as regime change, occur through the interplay 
between niche innovation, internal regime change and landscape factors. It is important to 
recognize that these levels themselves do not have agency, rather, actors working in each 
level (either to support or change the regime) are the agents of change.   
Applying the MLP to the electricity system in the United States, the regime consists of 
three interlinked dimensions (Geels, 2005 ): (a) network of actors and social groups; in the 
electricity regime important actors are utilities, regulatory and legislative policy actors, large 
commercial and industrial users, and households; (b) formal, normative and cognitive rules that 
guide the activities of actors; examples include  regulations, building code standards, utility 
business models, and user laws; examples of cognitive rules are belief systems, problem 
agenda’s, and guiding (often economic) principles; examples of normative rules are role 
relationships and  behavioral norms, (c) material and technical elements; in the case of 
electricity, these include resources, grid investments, power plants, etc.  
According to Verbong and Geels (2007) electricity regimes are characterized by path 
dependence, resulting from stabilizing mechanisms on the three dimensions (a) incumbent actors 
(utilities or large resource suppliers and users)have vested interests and supportive social 
networks (b) while regulations and standards stabilize regimes (i.e low electricity rates for high 
consumers of energy) , the cognitive routines of users blind actors to developments outside their 
focus (i.e people don’t realize or care their appliances are wasting electricity) ; (c) existing 
machines and infrastructures (i.e power plants) stabilize regimes through sunk investments and 
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technical complementarities between components (Unruh, 2000) For a further explanation in the 
current U.S electricity regime see Chapter 2. 
The niche is the micro level where innovations emerge. These can be small market niches 
or technological innovations. In the context of the electricity system, niche innovations include 
everything from technological innovations such as distributed solar photovoltaics, to carbon 
markets, to LED light bulbs. A key challenge in enabling sustainable transitions towards new 
forms of decarbonized and highly energy-efficient consumption is determining how to change 
current energy-intensive and fossil fuel-based consumption patterns.  Niche actors work to 
develop innovations and change the behaviors of users through multiple policy spaces so 
technological innovations can to be incorporated or overthrow the regime. Unlike the regime, 
there are few if any formal rules to niche level, rather the niche is characterized by 
experimentation. Compared with regimes, the actors in niches are few, and their interrelations 
sparse. In order for niches to transition, actors must develop supportive networks and policies for 
promotion. For the purpose of this research, the niche innovation is energy efficiency and the 
supporting actors are third-sector actors working to establish policies in cities that support the 
greater adoption of energy efficient buildings.   
The socio-technical landscape then represents the socio-economic, cultural, and 
environmental context in which actors at the niche and regime level are acting. In the context of 
our energy system, the landscape represents the national and international trends, macro-
economic patterns, the totality of infrastructure, and political cultures that are even beyond the 
direct control of the regime and niche (Grin et al. 2010). Such examples include concerns over 
climate change, energy access, resource scarcity, migration, wars, and economic development 
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patterns. The dynamics of the landscape level, shape the dominant economic and political 
discourses, and influence the patterns of behavior actors within the regime and outside the 







Electricity  System: 
Characterized by investment in large generation resources
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Figure 4-1 The multi-level perspective (landscape, regime, niche) and corresponding 
dynamics in the context of the U.S Energy System 
 
Sustainable transitions are large in scale and long in term and constitute shifts from 
one socio-technical regime and system to another. These shifts involve interactions between 
landscapes, regimes and niche dynamics. In the MLP framework, transitions can be 
conceptualized as a sequence of three phases: 
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• Start-up. The internal problems of the regime are magnified by landscape pressure, 
creating opportunities for innovation that, for the time being, emerge and mature in 
niches. 
• Acceleration. Niche innovations enter the mainstream market and start to compete with 
the incumbent regime. The increasing diffusion is accompanied by redefinition of rule 
sets, and thus also of user needs, resulting in a collective learning processes and 
eventually, if successful, new stable rule sets. 
• Stabilization. As the niche's actors grow in number, and niche technologies mature 
alongside a stable rules and institutions, the (now former) niche gradually establishes 
itself as a new regime. Thus, facilitating an increase in adoption as the regime now 
facilitates and substantiates new behavioral patterns. 
 Understanding where actors fit within the MLP framework and how they foster 
transition along these three stages is a growing segment of the transition literature.  Under the 
MLP framework, governance is understood as public decision-making beyond, but also 
including, the state. While not a rigid characterization, actors who participate in governance 
are commonly divided into state (government), private sector (business) and civil society 
actors (Grin et al 2010; Loorbach, 2007) and resigned to specific levels with the MLP, i.e 
niche, regime, or landscape.  
Smith et al. (2005) suggests that understanding whether actors are “inside” or 
“outside” of the incumbent regime is essential in understanding their behavior, and therefore, 
their options in influencing transitions. The literature also finds that to respond to pressures 
from niches (bottom-up) or the landscape (top-down), regime actors must find ways to 
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respond to pressure within existing institutions or integrate niche innovations (Smith, 2005). 
As such, there is a tendency for regime actors to become transition opponents, as “incumbent 
regime actors initially tend to downplay the need for transformation” (Rock et al., 2009, p. 
244). This results in tension between members of the incumbent regime and those striving to 
create regime change through network or coalition resource flow (Smith, 2005).  
One evolving area of the transition literature is understanding the role of intermediary 
actors, which transcend spatial and societal scales. The characterization of intermediary actors 
in the MLP framework is analogous to that of Clark’s (2017) of third-sector actors. 
Intermediary actors can include very different types of organizations, such as non-government or 
semi-government agencies working at different scales (Dewald and Truffer, 2012)  
A recent review by Fisher (2016) finds that a number of transition scholars believe 
intermediaries can play a special role as mediators by providing and distributing necessary 
information in a transition, ie between the niche and the acceleration phase (Dewald and Truffer, 
2012) and between the different applications in creating a vision for niche innovation (Hodson 
and Marvin, 2007). There is also a great variety in the services intermediaries can provide, such 
as the provision of energy advice and advice centers; project initiation, management and 
coordination; consultancy activities; lobbying; education; training and courses; and network 
building (Hodson and Marvin, 2007). McCauley and Stephens (2012) see the role of 
intermediaries in the MLP as “connecting niche-level activities with regime level institutions 
(pg. 213)” as well as diffusing new technology and practices through the regional level 
(McCauley and Stephens, 2012). Taken together, it is clear that intermediaries serve several roles 
at every stage of the transition process. What is less clear is the strategies which intermediaries 
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employ to facilitate transition from the start-up phase through the acceleration phase and 
ultimately to stabilization.  
4.3 Third-Sector Intermediaries, Strategic Capacity Seeding, and the City 
The role of third-sector intermediaries at the city-level, has historically been characterized as 
enabling, provisional, and partnership (Fischer and Newgi, 2016). Clark (2017) identifies four 
types of policy spaces for intermediary actors, including the provision of new services through 
the diffusion of technology, the provision of old services through new models, the provision of 
services to new populations, and the establishment of new forms for civic engagement.  
In the United States, there are many examples of third-sector intermediaries, increasingly 
these actors are focusing on energy policy and utilizing the strategy of local level capacity 
seeding. Examples include the Clinton Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Bloomberg 
Foundation, the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives-Local Governments 
for Sustainability, the Sierra Club, and the Natural Resource Defense Council. The national 
intermediaries’ presence is often not focused on a single city but rather a network of cities. For 
example, C40 provides cities with peer-to-peer networks, in addition to providing cities with 
program design. Localities leverage private foundation funding and these intermediaries’ 
expertise to provide the capacity, direction, and the network to achieve local policy objectives 
(See Mims et al, 2016).  In return, the localities commit to the process and goals established by 
the intermediary and pursue the suggested program design.   
While the practice of strategic capacity seeding is growing among third-sector 
intermediaries, there is little empirical analysis on the impacts of the approach.  In this chapter I 
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focus on understanding the local impacts of this growing trend in intermediary actors of strategic 
capacity seeding and diffusing specific city-level policies for the support of niche innovation 
within the electricity system.  
4.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This research is guided by the presupposition that through systematic and qualitative 
change in the institutions of cities, sustainable transitions are possible and that the 
transformations made at the city level will be reflected in any national regime change.  
Therefore, understanding if and how the strategies of emerging actors are altering the institutions 
of cities is critical in understanding the contours of national sustainable transitions. With this 
research, I seek to four questions.  
Research Questions:  
RQ 1:  What motivates localities to pursue third-sector intermediaries and strategic capacity 
seeding? 
RQ 2: Does strategic capacity seeding by third-sector intermediaries change the capacity or the 
behavior of existing institutions towards further development of niche innovations?  
RQ3: Does strategic capacity seeding by third-sector intermediaries improve the role of the 
public in sustainable transitions?  
RQ4: Overarching question: Are third-sector intermediaries just one of many actors within the 




Building from multiple theoretical literatures, I hypothesize that, 
H1: Localities are motivated by a lack of capacity and expertise to pursue third-sector 
intermediaries and strategic capacity seeding. 
H2: Strategic capacity seeding will change the capacity and the behavior of existing institutions 
towards further development of niche innovations  
H3: Strategic capacity seeding by third-sector intermediaries will decrease the role of the public 
in the sustainable transitions.  
4.5 Methodology  
4.5.1 Approach 
To test the above hypotheses, I conduct a case study on the City Energy Project (CEP) in 
Atlanta, GA. The CEP is an active example of a third-sector intermediary engaging at the city 
level with the approach of strategy capacity seeding. Specifically, CEP is focused on establish a 
handful of local policies through the city council that improve the energy efficiency in 
commercial buildings.  
4.5.2 Data Sources  
The paper employed primarily qualitative data from both primary and secondary sources. 
The primary data sources used were in-depth qualitative interviews. I also used a wide range of 
secondary data sources including: project reports, policy documents, project proposals, and 
workshop proceedings I studied Atlanta’s participation in the City Energy Project for 20 months. 
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In my research, I conducted several in-depth interviews, attended City Council meetings, 
reviewed CEP documents, and attended CEP stakeholder workshops. An outline of all the 
interviews conducted, materials reviewed, and meetings attended is outlined in the Appendix. 
4.6 Literature Review  
Generally, the term capacity refers to “the ability to perform functions, solve problems 
and set and achieve objectives” (Fukuda-Parr & al., 2002). The institutional capacity of a local 
government to achieve a specific energy policy goal refers to the ability of the locality to meet 
policy goals and objectives. A clear definition of capacity is difficult to find. Chaskin (2001) 
identified four factors that many definitions hold in common: (1) the existence of resources 
(from individual skills to access to financial capital); (2) networks of relationships; (3) 
leadership; and (4) support for collective action and problem solving mechanisms or processes. 
Capacity building refers to the process of acquiring and managing the resources necessary to 
achieve policy goals and objectives. Capacity building emphasizes the need to systematically 
develop political support, financial resources, technologies, and managerial execution in building 
organizational capacity for policy change (Horton et al. 2003). Recently, capacity has been 
linked to local governments’ involvement in climate-protecting activities (Krause 2011b).  
In the United States the movement towards neoliberalism at the national scale in the 70’s 
and 80’s led to waves of privatization of public services and the devolution of those services to 
state, provincial, and local actors (Peck and Theodore, 2015). Local governments, tasked with 
providing the increasing services but without increasing capacity, responded by contracting 
services to private market actors (Warner and Gerbasi, 2004). As Clark (2017) notes, on the one 
hand, “national- scale neo- liberal project championed devolution and deregulation ostensibly to 
 166 
‘empower’ localities and promote flexible forms of regional governance (p. 814).” In reality, 
however, the result was not a complete replication of neoliberal reforms at the local level but a 
subsequent declined in services, resulting in a policy failure and a gap unevenly addressed by 
private market actors (Ashton et al., 2016). The response was a varied space for institutions to 
develop innovative models for mediating these gaps, i.e strategic capacity seeding by third-sector 
intermediaries (Clark, 821).  
In concert with the devolution of public services by the State, the history of of U.S. 
energy policy has developed with an inherent tension over the notion over whether the provision 
of electricity is a marketable public good or a private good. For example, while wholesale 
electricity markets are increasingly driven by the rules of competition, recent concerns over the 
environmental damages of electricity generation and threats to security of supply suggest that 
citizens are increasingly seeing electricity as a public good.  
 Sociotechnical landscape pressures such as concerns over climate change and economic 
development, coupled with the devolution of energy policy in the United States has put pressure 
on local governments in the United States to implement energy policies with the purpose of 
improving sustainability (Saha and Paterson 2008). While these landscape pressures may propel 
a local government to pursue energy policies, institutional capacity will ultimately influence the 
locality’s ability to pass and implement new policies. The idea of capacity building then assumes 
that there is a required level of institutional capacity for a locality to carry out its policy goals. 
Though there are multiple forms of institutional capacity, when examining the impact 
intermediaries on the capacity of, I am most interested in the dynamics between financial, 
technical capacity, and political capacity.   
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Financial capacity is an organization's ability to assemble financial resources to support 
its operations and missions, most typically with access to human capital. Without the financial 
capacity to hire staff, manage a policy process, and ultimately implement (then manage) a policy, 
localities are often reluctant to engage in policy change. The literature shows that localities that 
have staff dedicated to sustainability issues tend to have broader and more expansive 
sustainability efforts in place (Homsy and Warner, 2015; Krause, 2012a; Levesque, et al; 2016). 
While financial resources alone cannot develop a niche innovation, the literature shows that 
inconsistent financial support and spending reductions can destabilize policy implementation 
efforts (Vig and Kraft, 2006). As such, it is critical for localities to develop and institutionalize 
funding mechanisms for local policy goals, particularly in the area of sustainability 
(Salamon, 2002).  
Technical capacity refers to an organization's ability to understand the technical aspects 
of a specific goal and use the technologies required to achieve the goal. Many sustainability 
practices involve the understanding of technical concepts or the use of the latest technologies, for 
example, in areas such as alternative energy, energy efficiency, pollution control and monitoring, 
and natural resource management. It is necessary to acquire technical savvy and expertise in 
order to make informed decisions. Developing human capital through internal 
professionalization as well as establishing complementary ties to external technical resources is 
fundamental for credibility, for strengthening social norms, and for institutionalizing change 
(Lubell, Leach, and Sabatier 2009). 
Political capacity is the level of support obtained from elected officials, the community, 
and other stakeholders in implementing supportive policies or practices for sustainable transition. 
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Support from citizens increases the legitimacy and thus the feasibility of achieving a specific 
policy goal. Support from elected officials forecloses back channels, legitimates change, and can 
often help secure financial capacity. Additionally, support from the business and nonprofit 
community is consistent with the collective action efforts that are germane to building social 
capital and to comprehensively tackling complex issues such as energy policy through the 
governance of public and private partnerships (Lubell, Leach, and Sabatier, 2009). 
While it is clear that there is a necessity for financial, technical, and political capacity, 
building these types of capacity is often challenging, particularly in the realm of sustainable 
transitions. Local sustainability initiatives compete with other spending programs and often lack 
the immediate benefits those local officials and median voters require for support (Hawkins and 
Wang 2012; Sharp, Daley, and Lynch 2011), making financial capacity a critical condition for 
implementing energy policy (Wang et al. 2012). What is still unclear is why some localities 
commit the financial and human resources and build the institutional capacity for energy, 
climate, and broader sustainability transitions (Feiock et al., 2014; Portney, 2013). Hawkins 
(2012) finds that when the citizens consider sustainability a city priority, the city puts greater 
effort towards the provision of human resources and when cities work closely with other cities or 
regions, commitment towards human resources tends to increase. However, even when 
sustainability is a priority, cities can still pursue initiatives in a piecemeal, ad-hoc manner (Saha, 
2008). 
A recent report conducted by the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, Unlocking 
Climate Action in Megacities, found that the key barriers to effective city action on climate 
change identified in are: 
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● A lack of co-ordination between city, regional and national governments; 
● Green projects falling through the cracks between different arms of city government; 
● Collecting, accessing, analyzing and presenting information about the benefits of action 
on climate change; 
● Communicating benefits of green initiatives with citizens and other key stakeholders; 
● Failure to work effectively with the private sector; and 
● Securing funding for projects in cities. 
Additionally, the report found that where cities have the institutional capacity to act, they report 
taking 30 percent more action than those without, reaffirming they are more likely to implement 
solutions that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Wang et al (2015) sampled 264 cities and found that 71% of the cities utilized grant 
applications to finance sustainability initiatives, suggesting a potential limit to local institutional 
capacity, specifically financial capacity for pursuing sustainability initiatives as well as a threat 
for continuation of projects that often require consistent funding support.  However, Wang et al 
(2015) also found that community engagement had positive and significant influences on the 
institutional capacity of cities to maintain sustainability initiatives long-term. If the authority for 
addressing environmental, economic and social issues is largely held within local governments, 
and the outcomes associated with different levels of resource commitment have important 
implications for how localities can advance their agendas, then it is important to also understand 
how the type of funding may impact the policy process. Additionally, it is important to 
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understand the role of community engagement towards the long-term ‘financing’ of the local 
energy agenda.  
From the literature, it is clear that localities pull from multiple channels to achieve the 
institutional capacity necessary to pursue its goals, and there is a relationship between a 
locality’s institutional capacity and their ability to pursue local policy.  It is reasonable to assume 
that many localities desire to implement local energy policies and support niche innovations, but 
are unable to do so because of resource constraints. From that logic, we see that sustainability 
and the development of niche innovations tracks in parallel with the greater devolution of public 
services to localities and the need to outsource capacity. Third-sector intermediaries then 
provides the localities with capacity-technical, fiscal capacity as well as a social- to provide these 
services.   
H1: City officials are motivated by a lack of capacity and expertise to pursue third-sector 
intermediaries and strategic capacity seeding. 
Large in response to this capacity gap and the opportunity to shape local policy agendas, 
the third-sector intermediary landscape has developed dramatically in scale and profile. 
Intermediaries are bigger, more numerous and sophisticated, and have raised more funding than 
ever before (AbouAssi, 2012, Africa, 2013, Brautigam and Segarra, 2007, Brown et al., 2007b, 
Clarke, 1998, Fisher, 1997 and Thomas, 2008). 
 There is great debate within the public administration literature on the benefits and 
tradeoffs on relying on intermediaries. For the sake of this review, I am focused on third-sector 
intermediaries, which are typically characterized as NGOs in the administration literature, and 
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their specific goal of filling the gaps in local service. From the literature examining the role of 
NGO’s in providing aide and infrastructure support, there is evidence that while NGO’s may do 
well to serve an immediate need, when the local government is deficient, long-term reliance on 
NGO’s can stunt the local institutional development and inhibit local participation in the 
governance process (Hulme & Edwards, 1996; Banks & Hulme, 2012).  
Inherent in the examination of intermediaries’ impact on the policy process is the recognition 
that there is a difference between short-term and long-term institutional capacity. Kaplan (2000) 
identified that while governments can obtain short-term capacity infusions- such as increase in 
monetary incentives or introducing a new information system, without long-term support by a 
sustained resource and political commitment there will be very little impact on institutional 
capacity. Kaplan, argues that for intermediaries to be effective facilitators of capacity building 
they must participate in organizational capacity, including: 
● Developing a conceptual framework 
● Establishing an organizational attitude 
● Developing a vision and strategy 
● Developing an organizational structure 
● Developing political support 
● Developing community support 
● Acquiring skills and resources 
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Kaplan’s (2000) distinction between short and long-term capacity and what is needed to 
build long-term capacity is critical when understanding the goals and strategies of third-sector 
intermediaries. The function of the strategic capacity seeding, as it is practiced currently, is to 
provide localities with a limited infusion of institutional capacity, to achieve specific policy 
goals. This is akin to what Kaplan sees as short-term capacity building. However, it is unclear 
whether this strategy is capable of building long-term capacity and, more importantly, if the 
presence of the intermediary may inhibit a locality from building long-term capacity and local 
institutional development.  
Bano, (2008; 2012) found that donor financing actually breaks down the institutions for 
collective action by eroding the attributes and characteristics that generate membership and 
support for the organizations. Bano argues that in their quest to strengthen civil society 
organizations, donors have used incorrect assumptions about why people choose to cooperate in 
groups, intentions, motivations, and commitments to the cause. There are also arguments against 
the intermediary’s ability to be long-term partners or managers of a local objective, particularly 
if the local residents’ need change and the intermediary is forced to diverge or advance from the 
initial goal. Andres (2014) found that when tensions arose between the priorities of donors and 
locals, Intermediaries were forced to drop their support role as a result of donor pressures to keep 
programs aligned with their priorities.  In fact, there is a strong argument that the focus of donors 
on measurable results has pushed Intermediaries away from developing local capacity (Chang, 
2011). Rather, some third-sector intermediaries have been incentivized to pursue their objectives 
at the expense of their civil society functions. Given their dependence on donor funds 
increasingly demanding measurable ‘results’, intermediaries must prioritize their functional 
 173 
accountability to donors (in terms of targets and outputs) over their broader goals of local 
empowerment to overcome the systems, processes, and institutions that are barriers in the first 
place (Atack, 1999, Lewis, 2013, Mitlin et al., 2007 and Power et al., 2002).  
Such ‘professionalization’ has led to multiple undesirable consequences, most notably the 
erosion of participatory approaches, as intermediaries become the implementers of donor policy 
rather than independent actors (Elbers & Arts, 2011). The great paradox is that the 
intermediary’s capacity to engage in the wicked policy problems and to reach the levels of 
success desired by donors actually draws them away from establishing the local capacities they 
need for successful operations on the ground (Balboa, 2014).  
However, there are also arguments for the benefits of intermediaries on governance 
(Boulding, 2010, Fearon et al., 2011 and Moehler, 2010). This stream of literature argues that 
despite the difficulties Intermediaries face in terms of civil society, they can and do can act as 
‘schools of democracy’ by providing resources and opportunities for collective action, expanding 
political participation and public awareness, mitigating societal conflicts, and providing channels 
of interest representation (Boulding, 2010, Fearon et al., 2011, Heinrich, 2001 and Moehler, 
2010). The argument here is that Intermediaries have the ability to bring attention to an issue, 
objective, or failing on the part of the local government. And by doing so the intermediary 
creates a channel for participation and ultimately local capacity building (Heinrich, 2001, 
Mercer, 2002 and Thomas, 2008). Recent studies have provided evidence that intermediaries can 
promote democracy through increasing community-level interactions, and promoting social 
capital (Boulding and Gibson, 2009).  
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Still, the theoretical and empirical research suggests that a critical element for successful 
plan development and project implementation is the collaboration and participation by the local 
community and stakeholders in the policy process (Brody, 2003a; Portney, 2005, 2009). This is 
especially true for local efforts. As Portney and Berry recognize, “unlike national politics, with 
its reliance on representative government, urban policy making can offer opportunities for direct 
citizen involvement and even face-to-face democracy at the neighborhood.” The presumption is 
that broader levels of community participation will be linked to greater responsiveness by city 
governments. And for decades the literature has recognized this idea that without real “buy in” 
from citizens, any broad initiative faces a perilous route to enactment (Brugman, 1997; Portney 
and Berry, 2010). If a locality is to develop and implement a climate change, energy 
management, or broader sustainability initiative, the confidence and cooperation of its residents 
is critical (Brugman, 1997). As Zachary (1995, 30) states, “community involvement can be a key 
factor in developing tools for moving toward a more sustainable community.”  
There are several rationales for why public participation is necessary, ranging from the 
observation that establishing significant participatory deliberative democracy platforms (through 
which residents can achieve some degree of consensus on the idea that sustainability) is a 
desirable community good will insure that sustainability becomes a staple of the community and 
not a policy agenda of the few (Baber and Bartlett 2005; Miller and Buys 2008), to the idea that 
when cities participate in the public policy-making process, widespread public support could 
provide countervailing power against business interests antagonistic to particular proposals 
(O’Connell 2009). Kobler (2009) found Seattle’s decision to build local community support for 
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its sustainability efforts ultimately provided the city government with greater capacity to achieve 
sustainability goals.  
Of course, there are also debates over the effectiveness of wide-spread public 
engagement in sustainability pursuits, including the potential for strong opposition against 
sustainability (Groc, 2007). Berry (1999) recognized that often, public participation on 
sustainability efforts are correlated with elite social groups. But as Portney and Berry (2010) 
point out, effective public engagement may actually succeed in broadening participation beyond 
the “usual suspects.” 
Under a strategic capacity seeding model, the locality locality achieves instant access to 
capacity support, from the third-sector intermediary to achieve a policy goal. While the NGO 
literature is mixed on the implications of utilizing third-sector actors towards achieving local 
policy objectives, the historical and political context at play will shape every outcome and the 
mechanisms through which policies are promoted and achieved. But the literature does suggest 
that the presence of a national or international third-sector actor in local policy making could 
have both positive and negative effects on local institutions. On the one hand, intermediaries can 
bring attention to local policy concerns and provide the support necessary to create the 
institutional capacity necessary for policy change.  On the other hand, intermediaries could 
sideline the political capacity necessary to establish the institutions and long-term institutional 
capacity necessary for true sustainable transitions. The inclusion of the public and community 
support is critical to building long-term institutional capacity for local policy efforts and the 
presence of a third-sector actors with a focus on immediate results and not long-term institutions 
may undermine the role of the public.  
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H2: Strategic capacity seeding will change the capacity and the behavior of existing institutions 
towards further development of niche innovations  
H3: Strategic capacity seeding by third-sector intermediaries will decrease the role of the public 
in the sustainable transitions.  
4.7 Case Study on Atlanta and the City Energy Project  
The City Energy Project (CEP) is a national initiative supported by the Natural Resource 
Defense Council (NRDC) and the Institute Market for Transformation (IMT) and funded by 
Bloomberg Philanthropies, The Kresge Foundation, and the Doris Duke Charitable Foundation. 
The purpose of the CEP is to improve the energy efficiency of existing buildings in major 
American cities. The CEP is an active example of a third-sector intermediary engaging in 
strategic capacity seeding in networked localities with the goal of producing national transition 
in the energy system, specifically energy efficient buildings.  
In the first round of CEP, ten cities were chosen to participate in a network of cities that 
would work to improve energy efficiency in buildings. These cities were: Boston, Philadelphia, 
Atlanta, Orlando, Chicago, Kansas City, Houston, Denver, Salt Lake City and Los Angeles. The 
CEP provides each participating city with funds to hire a full-time advisor for three years. The 
CEP advisor is responsible for passing and implementing a customized energy efficiency goal of 
reducing energy use in buildings. CEP also provides funds to local partners to support the 
localities’ pursuits. To achieve the goals of CEP, NRDC and IMT (hub staff) have a set of 
energy efficiency policies that each city pulls from and tailors to its local market. The primary 
policies that the CEP focuses on are energy benchmarking and disclosure (also called reporting 
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or transparency). CEP hub staff also work to maintain a network between the participating cities 
and facilitates interaction between cities to share best practices and experiences. 
Cities are chosen based on a number of factors, including the political feasibility of 
passing the CEP policies. However, cities acceptance into CEP is not contingent on the 
localities’ historical energy policy. Rather there are some cities with relatively strong energy 
policy portfolios going into their participation in CEP while others have very few policies on the 
books. Additionally, the institutions of each participating locality are very different. Some cities 
have multiple people working in their respective energy or sustainability departments while some 
cities have only one or two people on staff; some cities have very energy-oriented city agendas 
while others do not; and some cities have very supportive local and state legislation, while other 
cities have strong political opposition. Largely the consistency between the cities is in the 
barriers to passing energy policies targeted at commercial building management. All cities have 
faced similar opposition from a single, national trade group- Building Owners Management 
Association (BOMA)- as well as a variant opposition from city legislatures, state legislatures, 
and local trade groups. From a sociotechnical perspective, these actors represent regime actors 
that are resistant to the niche innovation of energy efficient buildings or the governments 
mandate of energy efficient buildings. By creating a mix of cities, facing different challenges, 
there is room for both shared learning between the cities and between the hub CEP staff and the 
city representatives.  
While each city CEP representative is funded by the CEP project, it is up to the 
participating City whether the representative is treated as a city employee or as an outside 
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consultant. The representative is funded for three years, at which the locality must choose to 
either support the ongoing position or end the employment.  
City representatives have a limited timeline and funding to accomplish the CEP goals of 
passing local energy efficiency policies. However, the hub staff understands that many of the 
participating cities will not pass energy policies within the timeframe. As Kimi Nartia, the 
Deputy Director for CEP stated, “we all understand the politics of policy and that some cities 
will take longer than three years, but our goal is to have those cities set up for success.” 
Additionally, CEP cities continue to have access to the hub staff resources and advice even after 
the three-year timeline is over.   
 Atlanta is the capital of and the most populous city in the state of Georgia, with an 
estimated 2015 population of 463,878. Atlanta’s metropolitan area is home to 5,522,942 people 
and is the ninth largest metropolitan area in the United States. Atlanta is traditionally a strong-
mayor-council with considerable power resting in the hands of the mayor.  
As part of its CEP participation, Atlanta chose to pursue three energy efficiency policies: 
Benchmarking, Reporting, and Audits. Atlanta passed its ordinance in May of 2015. Atlanta was 
the first of the CEP cities to pass its proposed legislation. Table 5 provides the specifics of the 











 Benchmarking Atlanta’s ordinance states that benchmarking (as well as 
reporting) of energy and water data be phased in by 
building ownership, type, & size, as follows: 
City Buildings >10,000 sqft, Non-City Buildings 
>50,000 sq. ft. 
▪ Buildings are currently reporting previous-year data   
Buildings >25,000 sq. ft. 
▪ By June of 2017, previous-year data must be 
reported  
Reporting Requires building owners to submit a benchmarking 
summary of their covered properties to the City system 
using Energy Star Portfolio Manager. 
Audits Atlanta’s ordinance requires covered properties to 
undergo audits every ten years. While audits identify 
cost-effective measures, the proposal does not mandate 
that any of the measures are implemented 
 
 The potential benefits from passing these three policies are substantial. Recent research 
on Atlanta’s ordinance found that the combination of benchmarking, reporting, and audits could 
result in an energy savings of 858,248 MWh through 2020, growing to 1.7 billion MWh by 2030. 
Cumulatively, the proposed policies could result in $291 million in energy bill savings through 
2020, growing to $1.9 billion in 2030, with annual job growth ranging from 1,470 to 1,870 jobs 
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per year. Finally, Atlanta’s ordinance could result in 139 billion gallons of water saved, while 
CO2 savings could exceed 5 million metric tons, or about 29% of commercial sector emissions 
in 2013 (Cox and Golin, 2015). Needless to say, the passing of these three policies would mark a 
substantial movement towards the transition of energy efficient buildings    
4.7.1 Motivation for Atlanta’s participation in the City Energy Project 
Atlanta had multiple motivations for participating in CEP. The first was attaining the 
institutional capacity necessary to achieve previously established policy goals. Prior to pursuing 
the CEP, Atlanta had independently engaged in a Power to Change sustainability plan.  The 
Power to Change process included several hundred stakeholders to determine which areas of 
Atlanta the Mayor’s Office should target for improvement. The result of the stakeholder 
engagement was a commitment to reduce energy and water consumption in the City. When the 
City was contacted about the CEP, participation provided a pathway to pursue their previous 
motivations.  
More importantly, when Atlanta first considered becoming part of CEP, the sustainability 
office, which is the office that would ultimately apply for CEP participation, was not on the 
City’s general fund. The funding that Atlanta would receive from CEP was more than half the 
total annual budget for the City’s Sustainability department, at the time. Denise Quarles was the 
Director of Sustainability when the Office of Sustainability decided to pursue CEP. Quarles 
stated, “CEP provided [the City] with the money and the knowhow to reduce our energy use… it 
also guided us through the process. I was familiar with benchmarking and retrofitting, but I knew 
that we had made it a goal to reduce our energy use.” 
 181 
Additionally, the Mayor was interested in becoming part of an exclusive premier set of 
10 cities participating in a national initiative. Participation in CEP would give Atlanta high 
visibility on the national stage for energy initiatives. However, despite the motivations to be 
recognized in a select group, there was very little public promotion of Atlanta’s pursuit and 
ultimately acceptance in to the CEP. Matt Cox was hired as Atlanta’s CEP representative. Cox 
stated, “Participation in CEP was politically contentious and not anything that the City wanted to 
promote politically. In large part, this was because CEP necessitated pursuing legislation that 
would undoubtedly receive resistance from a portion of the building owner and development 
community- which is a very strong economic driver in Atlanta. Instead, the City promoted 
initiatives such as volunteer programs, like the Better Buildings Challenge, and the City’s push 
to put solar on municipal buildings…. in terms of total energy savings, these smaller initiatives 
have a minimal impact compared to the potential energy savings from passing the CEP 
ordinances. But the volunteer programs were discussed much more publically because it was 
more well received from a political standpoint.” 
In contrast, on the National stage, Atlanta consistently promoted its participation in CEP. 
Once part of CEP, Atlanta was the first city to pass its ordinance. In doing so, it became the first 
city in the south to pass such legislation, raising the city’s profile. The increased recognition was 
made evident by the fact that the Mayor was asked to speak at higher profile, energy-related, 
events, including the Climate Talks in Paris. Despite downplaying the notorious local press, the 
City encouraged recognition on the national stage. 
Finally, the ability to learn from other cities was a major motivator for participating in 
CEP. Quarles stated, “Our office was small and we needed to lean on other offices to really 
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understand not only what we wanted to do but the impacts of what we were doing. Getting to see 
how different policies played out in other cities was very helpful.” Referring to our framework, 
the ‘other cities’ referred to by Quarles, is comprised of the city network that was managed 
collectively by the centralized NGO, CEP. Quarles, who as Sustainability Director, was also part 
of other city networks, found that the city network platform established by CEP provided an 
additional benefit because the conversations and idea sharing was narrowed to the passage of a 
specific policy or type of policy. In other networks, such as the Urban Sustainability Directors 
Network, there is a broad arrange of conversation that may or may not be relevant.   
Atlanta’s motivations were similar to other CEP participating cities. Kimi Narita is the 
Deputy Director for City Energy Project and works for NRDC. Narita works closely with every 
city participating in CEP and directs the political strategy that every city takes when pursuing 
local policies. Narita stated, “[cities] just need a jump start to pursue these policies… cities don’t 
know how or if they can reduce their energy use and they don’t have the money to figure it out, 
[CEP] is the jump start.” 
Consistent with the policy literature, Atlanta had limited financial and technical capacity 
to pursue local energy policies, particularly ones that would regulate the actions of a specific 
group of people. CEP provided the financial and technical capacity needed. When Quarles and 
Cox were asked if Atlanta would have pursued the policies of benchmarking, transparency, or 
audits irrespective of participation in CEP, both said no. Cox stated, “I presented my research to 
the City years before CEP and told them they should pursue these policies, but there wasn’t the 
ability or understanding. Maybe eventually Atlanta would have done this but I highly doubt it.” 
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In terms of political capacity, Atlanta had the full support of Mayor Kasim Reed before 
deciding to participate in CEP. Cox stated, “If Kasim Reed hadn’t supported participation we 
would have never engaged.” However, there was not wide-spread support throughout Atlanta. In 
large part, the reason why Atlanta would not have been able to pass and implement the CEP 
policies was directly related to the amount of resistance the City expected to receive from regime 
actors, specifically the building-owner community. As Quarles stated, “its takes a lot of time and 
effort and intelligence to pass these types of policies when there is a large, connected, and 
wealthy group of people who don’t want be told they have to do something.” However, the 
strong opposition that was posed by the building-owner community was not the only stakeholder 
considered before Atlanta decided to participate in CEP. There were several local niche actors 
(users and intermediaries) that supported Atlanta’s pursuit. Before agreeing to participate in 
CEP, Quarles outlined the local actors that would be eventual allies in any political struggle.  
The stakeholder with the greatest support for Atlanta’s participation in CEP was 
Southface Energy Institute. Southface, once a volunteer organization, is an Atlanta-based NGO 
that focuses on sustainable development through education, research, advocacy and technical 
assistance. Southface received funding from CEP to support Atlanta in its efforts. Robert Reed is 
the Director of Sustainable Communities for Southface and was the primary person at Southface 
who worked with the City to pass the ordinance. Once the ordinance was passed, Juliette 
Apicella, the Program Manager for the Atlanta Better Buildings Challenge, was very involved 
with developing the implementation plan.  Southface’s primary role in assisting Atlanta was to 
help provide stakeholder support for the ordinance. This involved organizing supporters of the 
ordinance to testify in front of City Counsel in support of the ordinance and provide policy 
 184 
advice to Atlanta during the process. From a sociotechnical perspective, Southface exists as a 
niche intermediary, as one of the local stakeholders that help support and facilitate sustainability 
and energy policy goals, but not one that engages in strategic capacity seeding.  
What Quarles did not do, nor did Cox, was examine what role the general public would 
play in pursuing the CEP policies. Receiving the financial capacity that would have provided 
Atlanta with a platform for engaging the public was not a motivator for participating in CEP. As 
explored later, this was not a priority either for the City or CEP. The focus really remained on 
combating opposition and organizing stakeholder support.  
Participation in CEP provided Atlanta with the financial and technical resources 
necessary to implement policies that may have otherwise been too politically difficult to achieve. 
However, it is important to recognize that the political opposition was not from the Mayor but 
from the local building community that would ultimately be subject to the new regulations. 
Atlanta generally had the political capital, related to elected officials, that it needed to pass the 
CEP policies due to Mayor Kasim Reed’s strong support. The City was aware but unsure about 
the strength of the political opposition of building-owner community before participating in 
CEP. Regarding CEP, the City was not focused on the opinion of the general public. Acceptance 
into CEP meant that Atlanta would have the financial, technical and at least portions of the 
political capacity necessary to achieve energy policy objectives.  
4.7.2 Influence of a Strategic Capacity Seeding on Institutional Capacity 
Once accepted into the CEP, Atlanta was given a budget by CEP to hire staff for the CEP 
as well as a budget for engagement. Additionally, CEP provided funds for an independent 
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consultant to work with the City and funds to a local partner organization - Southface Energy 
Institute- to support the process. Atlanta hired Matt Cox, a recent graduate of Georgia Tech with 
a PhD in public policy to manage all of its CEP efforts. Despite a deep understanding of energy 
efficiency, Cox did not receive any training from the City or CEP staff. Before Cox was hired, 
Quarles had already decided on which policies the City would pursue - benchmarking, and 
transparency. The original plan for Atlanta did not include audits or retrocommissioning, but was 
added later on the guidance of Cox. While CEP staff provided guidance, the City was 
responsible for creating their own internal documents to determine what and how the City would 
pursue certain policies, and how the City would measure progress. However, every City 
participating in CEP was strongly encouraged to pursue the core policies of benchmarking and 
transparency of commercial buildings. Upon arrival, Cox was handed a folder of documents that 
detailed the policies the Office of Sustainability wanted to pursue, the timeline of pursuit, and the 
resources available. The CEP staff, based on the documents compiled by Quarles, would review 
Atlanta monthly. It should be noted though that no city entered into a binding contract with CEP 
that exchanged funds for passing a certain law.  
Once hired, Cox was immediately placed into the network of ten cities’ representatives as 
well as the CEP Hub Staff - comprised of NRDC and IMT staff. Atlanta had scheduled weekly 
engagement to review strategy and approach with the CEP staff. The CEP staff largely divided in 
to topic areas, with NRDC taking the political lead and IMT advising on technical questions. 
Every two weeks, all ten cities were required to participate in a webinar or conference call, with 
the goal of learning from each other on how to handle political obstacles. However, despite the 
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scheduled interaction, according to Cox most exchanges with hub staff were unplanned and 
focused on political guidance.  
Compared to other cities, Atlanta received substantial technical understanding as a result 
of hiring Cox. Where Atlanta needed guidance from hub staff was in political strategy. Atlanta, 
experienced substantial pushback from three primary groups - the Building Owners and 
Managers Association (BOMA), Commercial Board of Realtors (CBR), and the Atlanta 
Apartment Association (AAA). There was also some resistance from the Georgia Hotels and 
Lodging Association. BOMA, an international organization, actually fought against all of the 
CEP cities attempt to pass the energy efficiency ordinances. Despite each city having similar 
oppositions, Atlanta did not go to the other cities for political guidance, but turned to CEP staff.  
From Atlanta’s perspective, the CEP staff was more knowledgeable about political strategy then 
other cities. During the process of designing and passing ordinance - at least daily, often multiple 
times a day - Cox was in conversation with CEP staff. Hub staff also provided guidance on other 
concerns such as assistance on how to best design a flyer or how to best communicate a message, 
and more importantly how to write the ordinance.  CEP staff was specific on the type of 
language that the cities needed to use in their engagements.  
 There were several times throughout the process, where CEP hub staff became critical to 
Atlanta’s pursuits. Relative to other cities, Atlanta moved very quickly in the process. Cox 
independently conducted an impact study on the benefits of the ordinance- in terms of energy 
saving, energy expenditures, health saving, carbon savings, and job growth potential.  In the first 
meeting with Mayor Kasim Reed, presenting the ordinance and the impact study, Cox said that 
the Mayor read the study and said “give me a bill to sign within two months.” The Office of 
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Sustainability, Cox, Quarles, the local partners, or CEP Hub Staff, did not expect this type of 
aggressiveness. Given that Atlanta’s Mayor was eager to pass the CEP ordinance, Atlanta’s 
timeline was accelerated and in fact, CEP staff had not written a draft template ordinance prior to 
Atlanta beginning the legislation process. As a result, Atlanta (unlike other CEP cities) was in 
constant conversation with CEP staff, specifically related to language of the ordinance, how to 
engage adversarial parties, and how to develop a context so that Atlanta could garner national, 
state, local support for its efforts. Due to the compressed timeline, CEP hub staff became critical 
in assisting with political strategy, crafting a successful letter of support, developing public-
facing information on the ordinance, and acquiring key political support from specific 
organizations or people.  
A prime example of CEP hub staffs’ importance actually occurred after the ordinance 
passed. Six months after the City passed its final CEP legislation, there was an attempt to 
undermine the ordinance at the State level. Backed by the Council for Quality Growth, 
legislation was introduced to ban the City from passing any mandated transparency laws related 
to energy consumption. The CEP hub staff became extremely involved in coordinating local 
players to help stay the bill, going as far to hire a local lobbyist. Ultimately the state legislation 
never made it out of committee and the CEP ordinance was upheld. These two examples 
highlight how the third-sector intermediary utilizes the strategy of capacity seeding to 
strategically interact directly in the policy process, and difference with other observed third-
sector relationships. As opposed to other arrangements where the locality may receive funding or 
just technical support from a third-sector actor, under a strategic capacity seeding model the 
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third-sector actor becomes an active player in defining, crafting, and implementing the local 
policies and engaging in any local political barriers. 
However, for as much effort as the CEP hub staff put towards the political preservation of 
the ordinance, the greatest political capital came from the Mayor. In both the passing of the 
ordinance and its later defense, the Mayor took a strong stance in support. The Mayor’s support 
was invaluable in both. So, while the CEP hub staff provided the resources and the ground game 
for passing and defending the CEP policies, ultimately it was still the Mayor whose influence 
was greatest. Had CEP not had the Mayor’s unwavering support, it is unlikely the City would 
have ever pursued legislation, passed legislation, or defended it post.  From a sociotechnical 
perspective, we see that while the third-sector intermediary is extremely influential, it is balanced 
with the existing political structure and must work in concert with the local authorities.  
4.7.3 CEP Influence on Institutional Capacity and Local Institutions 
 As outlined previously, the involvement of third-sector intermediaries in the local policy 
process can impact the local institutions, both positively and negatively. Participation in CEP 
meant that Atlanta received technical support, funds for the employment of a CEP manager as 
well as funds to help support local coalition building, awareness, and education. However, by 
receiving the CEP funds, Atlanta committed to the CEP approach to the policy process, which 
did not include a strategy for public engagement, outside of a limited stakeholder group. In this 
section I examine how Atlanta’s participation in CEP impacted the City’s institutional capacity 
for enacting policy change. Additionally, I examine whether participation in CEP limited the role 
of public participation in the policy process.    
 189 
Participating in CEP provided Atlanta with immediate access to technical resources, 
funding for a fulltime employee, funding for an outside consultant, funding for the local partner 
organization, and funding for general outreach and education. As noted, the amount of funding 
that the Office of Sustainability received for CEP was roughly one-third of the entire 
Department’s annual budget. Access to resources that otherwise would have been fiscally 
prohibitive meant the City could take on initiatives that would be politically prohibitive. 
However, it is important to recognize that the expansion of institutional capacity does not 
guarantee a policy change. Despite the expanded capacity to pursue its policy goals, ultimately 
the City’s passing of the ordinance hinged on the Mayor’s support. Many other cities engaged in 
CEP were not able to achieve any policies related to energy efficiency. As Cox stated, “The 
ordinance wouldn’t have passed with the Mayor using his political capital to push it through and 
honestly Atlanta would have never even applied for the CEP without having his support in the 
first place.”  
Shortly after the ordinance passed, Cox resigned as CEP representative and was replaced 
by Megan O’Neil. O’Neil’s primary role was to manage the implementation of the ordinance and 
to develop a water audit standard that would support the water audit component of the ordinance. 
While Megan was initially hired on using CEP funds, she has recently accepted a position at the 
City using the City’s general fund, not with grant money. O’Neil’s position remains to maintain 
the implementation of the ordinance and work on any additional energy policy efforts related to 
energy efficiency. Undoubtedly this position would have never existed had Atlanta not 
participated in CEP. O’Neil also serves as a bridge between Atlanta and other CEP cities, and 
maintaining that network is one resource that is valuable to Atlanta. O’Neil stated, “I’m in fairly 
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constant connection with the other CEP cities and Hub staff and I think that will remain even 
after Atlanta’s participation in CEP is over.” 
However, after the CEP ordinance passed, the number of people dedicated to energy 
related policy efforts actually reduced. When Atlanta first received the CEP funds there were 
seven people at the City working on energy related matters. Within three months after the 
ordinance passed, there were only two people working at the City dedicated to energy policy 
efforts, reducing the human and technical capacity to work on energy efforts. In large part, the 
retraction in focus on developing the specific niche innovation of energy efficient buildings was 
a result of the change in leadership at the Sustainability Department.  
Immediately after the ordinance passed, the Sustainability Office received a new director, 
Stephanie Stucky Benfield, whose focus was not on energy efficiency. As a result, the 
institutional capacity dedicated to energy efficiency, and energy policy more broadly, was 
reduced. Here again we see that the existing leadership remaining the dominant influence. While 
CEP provided an infusion of short-term institutional capacity to achieve a policy goal, once that 
goal was achieved, the institutional capacity dedicated towards energy policy reverted to pre-
CEP levels or less. However, both Cox and O’Neil confirmed that the retraction does not imply 
that the City wouldn’t dedicate more time and resources in the future to local energy policy 
efforts. Cox stated, “the Office is focused on getting grants. If a grant came along that was 
focused on [energy policy] then they would pursue it. But right now, they are not going to 
independently pursue any [energy policy] efforts.” Meaning that despite the infusion of capacity 
to achieve energy efficiency policies, the City was not motivated to independently pursue 
developing that niche without third-sector intermediaries. 
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Despite a change in leadership, participation in CEP did result in the creation of a few 
new institutions that could be beneficial in the sustainable transition. The two major institutions 
that developed as a result of Atlanta’s involvement in CEP, and the passing of the ordinance, are 
a standardized water audit for the City and Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) financing. 
The ordinance required commercial buildings to conduct a water audit. However, when the 
ordinance passed there was no national, commercial water audit standard. As a result, Atlanta 
began developing the first commercial water audit standard. This meant that the Sustainability 
Department would need to work with the Department of Watershed Management, locally, as 
well as with other national experts in the field. This created a closer relationship between the two 
departments, as well as more engagement from the Department of Watershed in energy related 
matters. Additionally, in pursuit of creating a water audit, Atlanta reached out to experts all over 
the country.  O’Neil stated, “creating the water audit was something [the Office of Sustainability] 
had to do from scratch. We held working groups, flew in experts, researched other cities and 
learned a lot in the process.” The water audit was finalized in November of 2016 and marks the 
first of its kind.  
In addition to the creation of a standard water audit, participation in CEP assisted in 
Atlanta’s passing of PACE financing.  PACE financing was a policy that Atlanta was pursuing 
before participation in CEP. Before passing the ordinance, the City encountered substantial 
objection over the potential cost of retro commissioning, a component of the original ordinance 
that was ultimately dropped due to pushback. PACE financing would have allowed building 
owners to perform retrocommissioning through PACE finance rather than direct capital. Both 
Cox and O’Neil felt that retrocomissioning might have stayed as part of the ordinance had PACE 
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been available. Following the passage on the CEP ordinance, O’Neil and Benfieled worked to 
get PACE passed in Atlanta.  
CEP’s impact on the City’s institutional capacity and institutions for energy policy have 
been mixed. Certainly, participation in CEP resulted in short-term capacity increases. 
Participation in CEP meant a short-term infusion of financial and technical resources, with the 
purpose of pursuing specific policies outlined by the CEP. In terms of long-term institutional 
capacity, the impacts are less clear. On the one hand, participation in CEP resulted in the full-
time employment of Megan O’Neil and the ongoing efforts to manage the ordinance. O’Neil 
maintains the network established with participation in CEP- with other cities and with hub staff- 
and intends to even after CEP funding runs out.  However, once the ordinance was passed the 
efforts towards local energy policy contracted. As Cox stated, “It wasn’t a situation where 
[Atlanta] participated in CEP and then the Sustainability Office decided to keep pushing for 
more energy management or local policies. We passed the ordinance… the leadership changed, 
and energy efficiency wasn’t the focus anymore.” Despite the contraction in dedicated 
institutional capacity, participation in CEP did result in the creation or establishment of two 
institutions that will undoubtedly support the City in any future policy efforts- a standardized 
water audit and PACE financing.  
4.7.4 The Role of Public Participation in CEP  
The literature has repeatedly recognized the importance of public participation and 
building community engagement in the local policy process. As participants in CEP, and 
throughout the policy process, Atlanta’s approach to public engagement was primarily focused 
on special interest and mitigating opposition. Cox and Quarles conducted over 150 meetings with 
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relevant stakeholders, including the primary opponents to the ordinance and the key business or 
institutions that would lend support for the ordinance. However, there were no attempts made by 
the City to gain widespread community support or educate the general public on the purpose or 
the potential for the ordinance or the benefits of energy efficiency more broadly. As Cox stated, 
“CEP, in general, is more focused on overcoming any opposition then it is on building extensive 
public support.”  While hub staff did not prevent Atlanta from engaging with the public, there 
was no CEP plan for public engagement nor was Atlanta encouraged by CEP to build local 
support. Rather the focus was on ensuring political support through relevant stakeholders to 
overcome any political opposition. Cox stated, “hub staff would say that you have to have public 
engagement, and meetings with the right people. However, that does not amount to widespread 
public engagement. And in all fairness, Atlanta generally don’t pursue that general public 
approach.” 
To that end, hub staff was extremely influential in guiding Cox, Quarles, and later O’Neil 
in pursuing what hub staff felt, at the time, to be the most effective strategies for engaging with 
opponents to the ordinance. As noted, Atlanta’s pursuit of the ordinance was not without 
opposition. The vast majority of Quarles and Cox’s public engagement was focused on assuaging 
the regime opposition to BOMA, CBR, and AAA. This meant negotiating on several aspects of 
the original ordinance and ultimately the removal of retrocommissioning. At one point in the 
process, Quarles and Cox posted the ordinance on the City’s website with all of the comments 
made by the opposing parties and all of the concessions made by the City, in an effort to publicly 
showcase both how accommodating the City had been and how difficult the opposition had been.   
While ultimately all political strategies and decisions were made by the City, given that Atlanta 
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was the first CEP to pass an ordinance, and both Quarles and Cox had limited experience, 
everyone involved in Atlanta was, as O’Neil stated, “just figuring it out.” 
The limited timeframe that cities have to pursue CEP policies presents a barrier to 
widespread massive engagement. But it is unclear whether Atlanta would have pursued greater 
community involvement if the Cox states, “In three years, there really is only so much a City can 
do…the City had developed the Sustainability Plan with public participation, so our job was to 
take those goals and turn them in to policy. Did we pass an ordinance that we knew the general 
public wanted? We couldn’t say that. What we can say is that the general public wanted cleaner 
energy- CEP checks that box.”  
When asked whether not including the public in the policy process was a mistake, 
O’Neil, Reed, Quarles, and Cox gave mixed responses. Quarles largely did not expect the type of 
opposition the City received and really felt there was not enough time to engage the public and 
manage the opposition. Reed would have liked to engage more of the public but that was not the 
focus of his position. Cox an O’Neil both felt that the public should have been included. Cox 
stated, “I think if we would have gained public support we could have kept retrocommissioning 
and we would have had a stronger ordinance.” O’Neil also thought that not including community 
building in the policy process and not engaging the public in the crafting and support for the 
ordinance was an oversight made by the CEP staff. O’Neil stated, “No one really knew what to 
do, and neither [Quarles] nor [Cox] had any experience with this type of process, so [Atlanta] 
looked to hub staff, but even this was new for them, Atlanta was the first City to do this under 
CEP. “O’Neil also noted that the omission of building institutional capacity in the form of 
community support was something CEP has recognized. O’Neil stated, “[Hub staff] weren’t 
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always correct. And I actually think they learned from it. I think CEP realized they needed to 
have the public support. In fact, L.A just hired a community engagement person to help with 
their efforts.” 
Atlanta’s participation in CEP did not focus on building local community support for the 
ordinance specifically, or energy policy more broadly. However, it is unclear whether building 
that type of institutional capacity would have directly impacted the ordinance passed under CEP 
or if CEP had not been involved if the public would have been engaged much past the initial 
stakeholder meetings. It is possible that even with broad public support, the ordinance would 
have passed in the same timeframe with the same components.  
What is clear, however, is that the focus of CEP hub staff was not on qualitatively 
changing the behaviors or values of city residents, or developing the community support for 
niche innovations. Furthermore, the financial and technical support provided by CEP was 
narrowly focused on achieving a specific policy objective and not focused on changing the 
subsystems that guide electricity use. Similarly, the policy advice and political capacity provided 
by CEP was also focused on short-term opposition and not on building long-term institutional 
support for energy efficiency. However, none of the parties interviewed felt that CEP had 
undermined the inclusion of the public in the policy process in Atlanta, rather it was a missed 
opportunity that hopefully CEP participants in the future would learn from.  
4.8 Discussion  
There are clear benefits of the third-sector intermediary, strategic capacity seeding model. 
In the case of Atlanta’s participation in CEP, passing the recommended energy efficiency 
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policies of the will result in substantial gains towards sustainable transition goals and develop the 
niche of energy efficiency by broadening the user base throughout the City. Atlanta’s 
participation in CEP provides the financial and technical capacity necessary to niche 
development in a way that may have otherwise been out of reach for the locality and also 
resulted in the creation of new institutions and efforts which may in time prove fruitful for the 
sustainable transition. However, there are tradeoffs. As part of the CEP, Atlanta relied on CEP to 
finance and direct the cities’ pursuits. Additionally, at no point did Atlanta or CEP hub staff 
engage the general public in the policy process or work to build long-term institutional capacity 
to support future energy policy initiatives.  
Atlanta’s participation in the CEP is only one example of a locality utilizing a the third-
sector intermediary and the strategic capacity seeding model to develop a niche innovation. 
While Atlanta’s experience cannot define the future of this approach or dictate how cities 
collectively adopting this model will contribute to a national transition, it does identify a number 
of the dynamics that should be considered when looking at localities as ‘test-beds’ for national 
transitions. Specifically, that the consequences of third-sector intermediaries’ involvement in the 
policy process as well as locality’s consistent reliance on external funding to achieve policy 
goals. My research was driven by recognition that in some cases there is an inherent tradeoff that 
exists in new governance arrangements between acquiring the capacity to achieve energy policy 
goals with equity in the policy process and the sustainability of the approach for policy making.  
By reducing the participatory element of energy policy making, localities may indirectly 
reinforce the need to rely on third-sector actors to support its efforts. 
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The literature is consistent that localities are often strapped for resources and a major 
motivation for engaging Intermediaries is the need for additional capacity. Our research 
presented here supports the idea that Atlanta was both motivated by a resource need and that 
CEP did provide the capacity necessary to pass a local energy policy agenda. In Atlanta’s case, 
the building ordinance was passed quickly and the City was able to avoid the regime pushback 
from the State. All of the staff members agreed that without involvement of CEP, the building 
ordinance would not have even been pursued, let alone passed. It is clear that the strategic 
capacity seeding arrangement provided Atlanta with the capacity it needed to pursue its local 
energy policy goal. However, in Atlanta’s case, the increased capacity did not include 
strengthening public participation.  
From the transition literature, we see that the involvement of the public and users is 
beneficial, and potentially critical, to the longevity of local policy initiatives. As Schot et al (206) 
recognizes, achieving a transition towards an energy-efficient system, goes beyond individual 
consumer choice and puts shared routines at the center of system change. To accomplish a 
sustainable transition, users who are important stakeholders in the innovation process and shape 
the new routines of system change must be at the center of building the sustainable institutions.  
What could be a potential danger of the strategic capacity seeding arrangement, in this 
case and in other similar programmatic and policy network designs, is the potential to subvert the 
public interest and engage the user in the sustainable transition. The concern around the public 
interest arises in that while Atlanta made no effort under CEP to engage the public, it is not 
necessarily the case that it would do so outside of CEP, and with certain policy preferences from 
the third-sector intermediary, may not even be preferable. Many policies become law and retain 
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their form despite public values being aligned against them; such governance structures would 
not be immune from mobilizing a set of cities to pursue policy goals that were opposed by the 
local citizenry without establishing specific checks and balances. Such checks and balances do 
not appear present in existing capacity seeding strategies; practitioners need to focus on creating 
such guiderails and evaluation metrics to ensure that the public interest is protected and 
promoted instead of ignored or even harmed by these governing frameworks. With the addition 
of those guides, third-sector intermediaries can leverage the power of cities to institute 
sustainable change and protect against anti-democratic abuses of power simultaneously.   
Whether or not strategic capacity seeding by third-sector intermediaries becomes the 
‘norm’ for localities to develop niche innovations and pursue sustainable transitions in the 
energy systems will likely rest in how localities’ respond to the “jump start” provided by the 
intermediary and the expectations of the intermediary. If CEP, and similar structures, serve only 
to provide the upfront resources necessary to educate and motivate cities to commit the internal 
resources necessary to change or develop institutions towards a sustainable transition, then it is 
possible that the seeding strategy could include the elements of public participation and local 
community capacity building that the sustainability literature has recognized as so critical. If, 
however, localities come to rely on third-sectors to finance its energy efforts, intermediaries 
continue to focus on short-term policy wins over long-term capacity building, and city 
employees are left to essentially fundraise for their purpose in the City, it is reasonable to assume 
that the policy process will be held accountable not to local constituents but to the third-sector 
actors whose resources are being leveraged. This does not, of course, mean that the 
intermediaries, such as NRDC and IMT, do not value local input, but rather that in the 
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complexity that is energy policy, creating a platform for local voices may not be a top priority. 
At the individual, local level, this strategy may result in ‘fast policy’ wins (Peck and Theodore, 
2015) but as a national strategy for sustainable transitions, the idea of undermining or ignoring 
the role of the public and users may be a non-starter. As the literature repeatedly recognizes, 
without public support and long-term institutional capacity, the process for achieving sustainable 
transition can remain perpetually at the niche level.  
4.9 Conclusions 
 Over the past decade, there has been a substantial growth in the role of third-sector 
intermediaries paired and the use of strategic capacity seeding to facilitate sustainability 
transitions and achieve specific energy policy agendas. However, there is little research 
exploring the dynamics and implications of these arrangements.  In this research, I use the MLP 
framework to organize the role of third-party intermediaries in sustainable transitions and build 
on the work by Clark (2017) to examine how the strategy of strategic capacity seeding is 
influencing the governance process towards sustainable transitions in cities. I then explore the 
dynamics and implications of the third-sector intermediary, strategic capacity seeding strategy on 
the local institutions and institutional capacity of cities.  
This research examined Atlanta’s participation in the City Energy Project as a means to 
understanding the motivations behind the use third-sector intermediary, strategic capacity 
seeding, the impacts of capacity seeding on short and long-term institutional capacity as well as 
local institutions, and the role of public participation in a third-sector intermediary led approach. 
Atlanta’s experience in CEP highlights the benefits of strategic capacity seeding. Localities are 
often under resourced and unequipped to engage in local policies, particularly those that require 
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regulations. The results of my research suggest strong support for my first hypotheses, and mixed 
support for my second two hypotheses. In answering my first question, I find strong support for 
our hypothesis that localities are motivated by a lack of capacity to achieve local energy policy 
objectives. This is consistent with the literature. I find mixed support for my second hypothesis 
that engagement with third-sector intermediaries will result in a gain to the localities’ capacity to 
achieve local policy goals, at least in the short-run. This suggests that the arrangement can be an 
effective tool at achieving explicit and targeted policy goals, which also may be an improvement 
upon other governance designs, like city networks, which have received mixed results in the 
literature. Atlanta’s participation in the CEP did result in some long-term institutional gain, as 
shown by the establishment of the Water Audit and the full-time employment of Megan O’Neil 
as a city employee. However, the City also witnessed a contraction in efforts dedicated to energy 
policy after the Energy Efficiency Ordinance passed. This may suggest that the capacity seeding 
strategy, while effective in achieving short-term goals, is not the driving force in building the 
long-term capacity or institutional change necessary to build a sustainable transition. It is still an 
open question whether the institutional change occurred was qualitative or just incremental. 
 Moreover, while I find support for my fourth hypothesis that engagement in third-sector 
intermediary led, strategic capacity seeding arrangements diminishes the role of the public, it is 
not clear as to whether the City would have engaged the public if CEP wasn’t involved. While 
CEP did not promote the involvement of the public, neither did the City or the local stakeholders. 
The bigger question is whether involvement of the public would have resulted in a different 
ordinance or a different policy process, to which we find no definitive answers. What we do see 
is that CEP did not initially recognize the importance of public engagement but may be taking 
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steps to improve this. Here we see our case study again reflecting the literature and the mixed 
support for the inclusion of the public in the policy process. 
In Atlanta’s case, the presence of CEP, and the accompanying resources, facilitated 
Atlanta’s ability to pursue and pass the building energy efficiency ordinance. Without CEP, it is 
unlikely this policy would have ever been passed, suggesting that CEP has a stronger role than 
other local niche actors, such as Southface. However, it is not clear that NRDC or IMT played a 
stronger role in achieving the policy goal than the support of Atlanta’s Mayor. On the one hand, 
CEP was influential in navigating any political barriers to the ordinance as well as establishing 
the political support necessary. On the other hand, the most influential voice in the policy 
process was still the Mayor- a dynamic that existed before the presence of CEP. Our research, 
while limited to one case study, suggests that the presence of the third-sector intermediary may 
be more influential in achieving a specific policy goal when compared to local niche actors, but 
it does not suggest that the intermediary’s presence displaces any of the previously established 
power structures. Which in terms of building a national sustainable transition, may be a limiting 
factor.   
4.10 Limitations and Future Research  
 When research on the CEP commenced, the initial goal was to understand the role, 
strategy, and impacts of the third-sector intermediaries in sustainable transitions. As the project 
progressed, it became clear that the arrangement established by the CEP was new in the space of 
third-sector actors, specifically the strategy of capacity seeding and narrowed policy agenda 
focus. This recognition provided the motivation to do an in-depth case study. However, this one 
case study can be representative of all instances. What is needed is greater attention to the third-
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sector intermediaries and the strategic capacity seeding model specifically as it relates to using 
networked cities as a means to pursue national sustainable transitions.  
 Future research should expand the scope of research to multiple localities, with different 
power structures and political dynamics, that are engaging in third-sector intermediary, strategic 
capacity seeding arrangements in order to both challenge the existing regime and collectively 
push for sustainable transition. Moving forward the focus should be on comparing and 
contrasting how institutions are changed under these arrangements and whether these changes 
local begin to pressure of national institutions. Additionally, the research should focus on 
understanding how intermediaries are influencing and shaping the policy process for localities 
under different power dynamic, i.e strong-mayor and weak-mayor systems, and, to what degree 
localities are increasingly looking towards national and international intermediaries for policy 
direction and capacity support as opposed to State or Federal agencies to develop niche 
innovations. Future research should also explore the tradeoffs between the large, centralized 
third-sector intermediary in the local policy process against the use of smaller, local third-sector 
actors. Additionally, more is needed in understanding many of the questions presented in this 
paper, specifically what these arrangements and strategies means for public participation in the 
policy process, locally and globally.  
 Additionally, within the City Energy Project, more research is needed. Ten cities engaged 
in the first round of the CEP and round two is slated to begin in 2017 with ten additional cities. 
Studying how the capacity seeding strategy plays out in these difference local contexts will 
strengthen the understanding of which dynamics within the governance structure are driving the 
policy process.  
 203 
Moving forward, I aim to continue the research and evaluate how other cities’ 
involvement in the CEP has shaped local institutions and the process of developing niche 
innovations.  From a collective view, the implications may be very different for the potential of 
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Table 4-2 Summary of Semi-Structured Interviews 
Interviewee Affiliation Number of Interviews 
Matt Cox City Energy Project-Atlanta 5 
Denise Quarles City Energy Project-Atlanta 2 
Megan O’Neil City Energy Project-Atlanta 1 
Kimi Narita City Energy Project-NRDC 1 
Robert Reed Southface-Atlanta 1 
Sarah Boren USGBC- Orlando 1 
Chris Castro City Energy Project-Orlando Staff 2 
Shelby Busso Central Atlanta Progress 3 
Britany Sellars City Energy Project-Orlando Staff 2 
Lauren Zullo City Energy Project-NRDC 1 






Table 4-3 Summary of Attended Meeting 
Meeting Location 
City Council Meeting to Discuss EE Ordinance City Hall-Atlanta 
City Council Meeting to Discuss EE Ordinance City Hall-Atlanta 
City Council Meeting to Discuss EE Ordinance City Hall-Atlanta 
CEP Meeting to Discuss Research 
Opportunities 
Web Meeting 
CEP Meeting to Discuss Research 
Opportunities 
Web Meeting 






CHAPTER 5. NICHE POLICY INNOVATIONS IN LARGE-SCALE 
WATER RESOURCE PLANNING: THE ROLE OF NICHE ACTORS AND 
LEGAL LOCK-IN  
5.1 Introduction 
Water systems, throughout the world, are facing major challenges due to increasing 
uncertainties caused by climate change, expanding population growth, and growing competition 
over scarce resources. To respond to these growing pressures, water resource management must 
transition from the current regimes to more sustainable regimes. This implies a paradigm shift in 
water management from command and control to a management regime that accounts for the 
environmental, economic, institutional and cultural characteristics of river basins and seeks to 
include stakeholders at all levels into the management of river basins (Hollings, 1998; Lee, 1993; 
Pahl-Wostl, 2016).   
Throughout the world there are thriving examples of water resource management moving 
away from a technocratic, agency-driven and top-down policy approach to a more collaborative, 
adaptive, and bottom-up approach that includes the input of multiple stakeholders (Sabatier, 
2005). In fact, the social science literature is now populated with hundreds of case studies on 
water resource management regimes that are actively seeking collaboration between diverse 
stakeholders and striving for greater incorporation of democratic-decision making. From the 
literature, several themes have emerged, some of which the majority of scholars are in agreement 
on, while others remain debated. The first is the assessment that a collaborative, democratic 
process to policy making will be more successful than a process dominated by a single 
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government agency with little or no room for public engagement (Sabatier, 2008). The second is 
the assessment that a localized approach to resource management that facilitates a bottom-up 
process will create a more successful and sustainable process compared to a top-down approach 
(Ostrom, 2009; Sabatier, 2005; Norton, 2015). The third is a recognition that the variable of 
scale, both geographically and politically, plays a major role in shaping resource governance. 
(Layzer, 2008; Ostrom, 2009; Norton, 2015). It still remains a question among the major thought 
leaders in the space as to whether a bottom-up and collaborative approach can be effective when 
the natural resource in question crosses multiple geographic and political boundaries. Some 
scholars even question whether collaboration and public participation at a large-scale setting is 
actually an improved approach to water resource management compared to traditional 
institutions (Layzer, 2008).  
However, if water systems are to respond to the growing economic, social, and ecological 
pressures of society, change cannot be isolated to small-scale resource management. As such 
there is a need in the literature to examine the dynamics of collaborative, more democratic 
approaches to large-scale resource management. Additionally, while the literature is full of case 
studies examining and testing theories on the institutional dynamics of successful local water 
resource management, very little attention has been paid to interstate water resource 
management, which institutional constructs may facilitate or inhibit a more democratic approach, 
and whether these institutions transfer across scales. As tensions over the sustainable transition 
of our water resources rise across the country and across the world, it is critical to understand 
how institutions frame the governance and management of stressed resources and how those 
institutions may support or inhibit a more democratic process. 
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Over the past forty years, the states of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida have been engulfed 
in a long-standing water resource management crisis over the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint 
(ACF) River basin. These tri-state ‘water wars’ have evolved into a complex multi-faceted 
interaction of political, economic, and social realities deeply enmeshed in the water system. The 
rapidly growing urban population in Atlanta, Ga coupled with agricultural, fishing, and 
recreational demands, as well as growing environmental concerns are putting massive pressure 
on the states’ ability to manage the water supply. Worsening the situation is the recurring and 
increasing periods of drought, which have severely impacted water supply and water quality on 
the ACF.  
However, in the face of mounting external pressures, the three states have not responded 
to the ongoing crisis with improved collaboration or democracy. Rather, the three states have 
clung to a centralized, highly political approach to water resource management, characterized by 
federal litigation and institutional lock-in. Where other river basin conflicts throughout the 
country have led to the development of new institutions for resource management, the tristate 
water-wars have largely been a story of state actors’ refusal to collaborate and reliance on the old 
regime.  Despite attempts at cooperation with a mandated river basin compact and calls from 
Georgia legislatures to develop a better framework for conflict management, the dependence on 
the courts and the legal battle endures. Now in its third decade of legal battles with little 
resolution.  
Over the last decade, amidst endless court cases that have restricted the influence of non-
privileged legal parties, there has been a growing desire by the public for greater collaboration 
and democratic decision-making for the management of the ACF. This sentiment is articulated 
 219 
by the establishment of the non-state actor, the ACF Stakeholders (ACFS).  The ACFS is a 
localized grassroots effort, motivated to incorporate collaboration and democratic decision- 
making into the management of the ACF. The ACFS was established in 2009, after the 
recognition that the years of legal battles and continued competition over resources, dominated 
by power-plays by the presiding states, would never result in a sustainable or equitable 
management strategy.  
Now, eight years later, the ACFS is still working to integrate local stakeholder views into 
the management plans of the basin, create a collaborative platform and long term management 
strategy, and generally change the governance regime of the ACF. Unlike most case studies of 
incorporation of local stakeholders, the ACFS is pursuing collaboration and public participation 
in a large-scale resource setting that crosses multiple political and geographic boundaries. 
Furthermore, unlike most case studies of collaboration in large-scale settings, the ACFS was not 
established by a State or Federal authority – it is truly a grassroots campaign.  Given the 
difference in scale, the institutions that support collaboration in large-scale settings may differ 
from their smaller-scale counterparts. Or, it may be that bottom-up in a large-scale setting 
doesn’t work if there isn’t support from the top-down. In nearly every case study of collaborative 
resource management arrangements at the large-scale, there is a top-down desire to integrate 
local and grassroots actors and facilitate collaboration. Without a top-down counterpart, it may 
be that grassroots actors are incapable of impacting the governance of large-scale resources. At 
minimum, one can expect that certain institutions must be present to facilitate such collective 
action in a policy process dominated by top-down, traditional institutions (Layzer, 2008). 
In this chapter, I employ the multi-level perspective (MLP) framework to analyze these 
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bottom-up and top-down dynamics and explore which institutional aspects are perpetuating the 
resource management regime of the ACF. I follow work done by Menarder (2011) and focus on 
the institutions that facilitate a bottom-up, niche innovation in a sustainable transition and the 
legal structures that sustain a continued top-down approach to resource management. Where in 
the other Chapters 2 and 3, I used the MLP framework to examine niche technological 
innovation and the co-evolutions which support them, in this chapter I extend the MLP 
framework to characterize the governance arrangement of incorporating local actors and public 
participation in large-scale water resource management as the niche innovation and the 
longstanding water resource management of the ACF as the regime. Focusing on the ACFS, this 
chapter explores niche actors struggle to incorporate local stakeholder involvement in large-scale 
water resource planning regime.  
To do this, I first utilize the MLP framework to identify and organize the regime, niche, 
and socio-technical landscape guiding the historical management of the ACF. While there are 
multiple economic, social, and technical aspects of the landscape, I focus on the political and 
legal dynamic of the current water system regime, to understand what barriers may exist to niche 
innovation. After characterizing the inclusion of democratic decision-making into the 
management of large-scale resources as the niche experiment I turn to understanding the 
subsystem institutions that facilitate niche innovation. To this end, I review various bodies of 
policy literature, focusing on: (i) collective action in common pool resource (CPR) settings, 
focusing specifically on grassroots actors (ii) policy entrepreneurs and social capital, (iii) 
participatory democracy, and (iv) the role of science and information in institutional formation, 
to gain insight into what institutional arrangements may be necessary to  the development of 
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collaborative, democratic, decision-making in large-scale resource governance. From the 
literature, I form my hypothesis and then test my hypothesis with a case study on the 
development of the ACFS.  
The research presented in this chapter is guided by two objectives. The first is to explore 
the institutional dynamics that facilitate collaboration and democracy in large-scale resource 
governance and compare this to the case of the ACFS. Here I focus on the following institutional 
elements: compromised resource, mutual trust between stakeholders, an established network and 
policy entrepreneur, early engagement, and the need for scientific knowledge. The second is to 
explore which institutional elements of the existing regime are inhibiting the niche innovation of 
collaboration and democratic decision-making in the governance and management of large-scale 
water resources.  
Unraveling the complexity of transitioning large-scale water resource management 
towards a sustainable state continues to the be the focus of multiple disciplines. The dynamics of 
the ACF ‘water-wars’ presents an interesting and timely case to explore the sustainable transition 
of our water resources and specifically the role of public participation in the process.  On the one 
hand, the resource literature argues that a more collaborative, decentralized, democratic approach 
to resource management should produce a more successful management process (Ostrom, 2009). 
And this niche approach has proven successful in small-scale water resource conflicts.  However, 
despite the calls for a more ‘democratic’ approach and attempts at alternative governance 
mechanisms, including: the establishment of an Interstate River Basin Compact and proposals 
for amendments to the prevailing legal framework that guides water resource management, the 
states have continued to seek a technocratic, lengthy, and costly federal litigation process as the 
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mechanism to resolve interstate conflicts. In short, the regime continues to function stably. In 
order for the niche governance platform of collaboration and democracy to be incorporated into 
the established regime, there must be opportunities within the socio-technical landscape to 
facilitate such innovation.  
5.2  Limitations of the Research 
The original goal of this research was to do a thorough investigation into the institutional 
dynamics that facilitate the governance innovation of collaboration and democracy in large-scale 
resource governance, the values and opinions of the emerging actors working to develop these 
innovations, and explore the dynamics of scale in sustainable transitions. My work on this goal 
to date has been limited. The politically sensitive nature of the ACF Water Wars caused the 
majority of my original interviewees to decline participating in the research and restricted the 
majority of my research.  
I also developed and implemented a survey instrument to understand whether the 
opinions of the ACFS members on what institutions constitute successful resource management 
at the large-scale are reflective of the institutions that have been observed in small-scale 
collaborative, success.  The survey consisted of three sections. The first section focuses on 
determining what institutional elements facilitate successful governance. Statements describing 
successful governance criteria items were developed from Ostrom’s eight principles and the 
literature. For the second portion of the survey, understanding the institutional barriers to 
successful management on the ACF, the same approach was used. However, while I 
administered the survey to over 300 recipients, due to the political nature of the topic, I only 
received 25 responses – 8 of which were complete.  
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However, from these few responses I did gain a few insights. Of Ostrom’s eight 
principles, the survey results find support for clearly defined boundaries, monitoring, and 
congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions (consistency in rules 
both legal and operational) as being critical aspects for successful collaborative governance. 
Survey respondents noted that the lack of a regional governing authority, and the continual 
reliance on the courts as major barriers to successful resource management. Combined these 
results suggest that there are large structural barriers, underscoring the ‘rules-in-use’ regarding 
water rights that are inhibiting successful collaboration. This is a concept I will explore in 
subsequent sections of this chapter.  
Interestingly, the survey respondents did not list a ‘lack of penalties for breaking water 
use rules’ as a major barrier. This suggests that penalties are less important in collaboration as 
consistency in the law structuring use. However, at least in so far as the initial responses show, 
the need for accurate scientific information seems to trump any need for sanctions and is more 
important than collective choice arrangements or monitoring.  This runs counter to what the 
literature states are the benefits of grassroots actors and potentially the benefits of including the 
ACFS in the governance process. This also suggests that while the ACFS members recognize the 
importance of including a diversity of stakeholders in the governance process, ultimately the 
most important foundation is accurate scientific information. This, however, is not that surprising 
given that largely the purpose of the ACFS is to develop and disseminate that scientific 
knowledge. I have attached a copy of the survey instrument and the results in the Appendix. 
5.3  Analytical Framework: Multi-level Perspective (MLP)  
The MLP framework is useful as both an organizational heuristic to show the dynamics 
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of sustainable transitions occur but also for its flexibility in analyzing why opportunities are 
created for emerging niche innovations to break through and, shape the socio-technical landscape 
and regime. The framework is most effective when the research integrates various theoretical 
strands to analyze change processes, detailing how niches and incumbent regimes are shaped by 
external behaviors, process, and institutions at the landscape level (Geels 2011).  
In this chapter, I utilize the MLP framework to organize my analysis on the ACF but 
integrate multiple theoretical literatures to examine which institutional dynamics may facilitate a 
niche innovation.  
In this chapter, the regime represents the prevailing water resource management regime 
of the ACF, characterized by centralized litigation and failed cooperative arrangements. The 
institutions, policies, and legal structures that have historically supported the regime are the 
subsystems in question. A governance regime that includes public participation, local 
stakeholders, and democratic decision making in the management is the niche innovation. At the 
niche level, the actors have the liberty to create radical change, with much less restriction from 
the regime or the landscape to address societal problems (Geels 2010). Following this logic, it 
makes sense that many successful case studies of cooperative water resource management exist 
on the local level, which could be viewed as the niche level, where grassroots innovation occurs 
and social coalitions have the ability to influence policy discourse and practices. However, when 
the niche innovation is transferred to large-scale--to a socio-technical landscape that includes the 
multiple and competing interests of state and national institutions--the niche actors struggles to 
influence the regime.  
The socio-technical landscape then represents the socio-economic, cultural, and 
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environmental context in which actors and institutions of the ACF management regime are 
situated. Management of the ACF is shaped by national trends, macro-economic patterns, and 
political cultures that are even beyond the direct control of the regime and niche (Grin et al. 
2010). At the landscape level, the agendas of federal institutions such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency, Army Corps Engineers, and the Department of Energy, coupled with 
growing societal and economic concerns over climate change and resource scarcity, shape the 
dominant economic and political discourses, and influence the patterns of behavior within the 
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Figure 5-1 The multi-level perspective (landscape, regime, niche) and corresponding 
dynamics. 
While the MLP has successfully been applied in historical and contemporary transition 
studies on water management and governance (Van der Brugge and Rotmans 2007), to my 
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knowledge this is the first study to expand the MLP framework with the treatment of public 
participation in large-scale resource management as the niche innovation. The chapter brings a 
novel perspective on sustainability transitions in water systems through the treatment of public 
participation and democratic decision making in the management of large-scale water resources.   
5.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This research is guided by the presupposition that the inclusion of democratic decision-
making is critical to the sustainable management of water resources (Norton, 2016). Therefore, 
understanding how local actors can emerge as influences in large-scale resource management 
decisions will have implications for more than just the future of the ACF but is relevant for the 
resource literatures more broadly. The motivation of this research is to understand how to 
effectively scale democratic decision-making in water resource management.  In my case study, I 
use the ACFS as a proxy to examining the inclusion of democratic decision-making into large-
scale resource management.  Specifically, with this research, I seek to answer one question.  
Research Question: What institutional arrangements facilitate the development of democratic-
decision making in large-scale resource management decisions? 
Building from multiple theoretical literatures, I hypothesize that, 
Hypothesis: The institutional elements of a compromised resource, mutual trust between 
stakeholders, an established network and policy entrepreneur, early engagement, and the need for 
scientific knowledge will facilitate democratic decision-making in large-scale resource 
management decisions.  
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5.5 Methodology  
5.5.1 Data Sources  
The paper employed primarily qualitative data from both primary and secondary sources. 
The primary data sources used were in-depth qualitative interviews to gain insight on the 
institutional arrangements that supported the evolution of the ACFS and its role in the 
collaborative governance process, as well as characterize the niche, regime, and landscape 
structures within the MLP framework. In my analysis of the ACFS, I attempted to conduct 
several interviews. However, I was limited by prevailing legal concerns.  
I also used a wide range of secondary data sources including: legal briefs, project reports, 
policy documents, annual reports, project proposals, workshop proceedings, and newspaper 
publications to characterize the behavioral dynamics of the ACF water system and explore the 
current socio-technical landscape and regime barriers to niche innovation. Through detailed 
analysis of these documents, I explore the political, economic, social, technical, and managerial 
features of the ACF and explore the historical trajectory of water management, looking at the 
challenges for incorporating local actors and democratic decision-making into governance of 
large-scale resources.  While the work presented is not conclusive, it does begin a much-needed 
dialogue on how to transition niche governance innovations across scales.  
5.6 The Establishment of the Current ACF Management Regime  
The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin spans 19,800 square miles 
between Georgia, southeastern Alabama, and northwestern Florida. The basin includes the 
drainages of the Chattahoochee River and the Flint River, which meet to form the Apalachicola 
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River. The largest metropolitan area in the basin is Atlanta, Georgia, located in the northern 
section. Progressing downstream are the Cities of Columbus, Georgia and Phoenix City, 
Alabama. Albany, Georgia is located in the eastern portion of the basin. At the Gulf of Mexico is 
the City of Apalachicola, Florida. Features are shown in Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5-2 Apalachicola Chattahoochee Flint Basin (Marella, et al, 1993). 
 
For over three decades, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida have been in an interstate conflict 
over the management and allocation of the ACF. The management of the ACF river basin has 
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been characterized by a regime of warring states that have favored the use of centralized 
litigation and power-plays to resolve resource conflict.  While there has never been a history of 
cooperative management on the ACF, the ensuing interstate conflict over the waters of the ACF 
Basin began in earnest in 1986 as a result of a drought, which spread across the entire southeast 
region of the U.S. (Erhardt 1992; Stephenson 2000; O'Day, Reece and Nackers 2009). The 1986 
drought was so severe that meteorologists accorded it the distinction of a 100-year drought, 
meaning that the recurrence interval of such an extreme drought was estimated to be between 
100 and 200 years (Cook, et al 1988). From a socio-technical perspective, the drought spurred 
landscape pressures, including environmental, economic, and societal concerns, on state leaders 
to determine a regional management strategy for the basin.  
A major impact of the 1986 drought was the reduction in Atlanta’s water supply which 
forced a decision by the U.S Army Corps of Engineers which reshaped the historical approach to 
water resource management on the basin. In 1989, in order to offset some of drought’s harmful 
effects on Atlanta, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) decided that a portion of storage 
capacity in Lake Lanier needed to be repurposed from hydroelectric production to meet the 
region’s projected water demands (Jordan 2006).  
The decision to redirect the use of Lake Lanier to meet Atlanta’s public water supply 
needs marks the beginning of a longstanding conflict between Alabama, Florida, Georgia and 
other stakeholders over the management of water resources in the ACF River Basin and the 
current water resource management regime. Whether intentional or not, the redirect created an 
inherent conflict for the management of Lake Lanier and the ACF waters between managing 
Lake Lanier with a priority of meeting public consumption (the argument made by Georgia for 
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sustaining Atlanta), against the historical management of Lake Lanier as primarily regulation of 
water ways and power production.  
There were three major adverse impacts as a result of the Corps’ change in reservoir 
operations. The first was that the temporary allocation became the de facto policy for 
management on the ACF and allocation of water. As a result, Atlanta did not seriously research 
alternative means of water supply and did not push for conservation despite its continued growth 
throughout the 80’s and 90’s. The second was that change in operations impacted the power 
generation schedule and generation amount from the Buford Dam. Since the Buford Dam sits at 
the top of a long line of Corps run dams, the impact was felt by the Southern Energy Power 
Administration (SEPA) which was holding the rights to sell the power generated by the releases 
from the Buford Dam as well as all the downstream dams.  
To meet Atlanta’s increased needs, the Corps continually allowed diversions from Lake 
Lanier and also increased the amount of water released on a continuous basis. The diversions, 
however, were withdrawn directly from Lake Lanier and bypassed the turbines. And the increase 
in continuous releases, while having the benefit of improving reliability and ensuring Atlanta’s 
demand was met, fundamentally changed the use of the Buford Dam from a peaking generation 
plant. Historically, SEPA had held long-term contracts with the Corps that gave them the right to 
market the power produced by the dam. Before the change in operations, Buford Dam only 
released a small portion of the water on a continuous basis, allowing the dam operators to shore-
up the reservoir and time the bulk releases to coincide with peak electricity demand. The basic 
idea was that by releasing during peak hours, SEPA could market the generation at higher rates. 
Unfortunately, as Atlanta’s needs increased, so did the loss of available peaking power. 
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However, SEPA is required to maintain all contracts, which forced SEPA to purchase power and 
pass those costs on to customers, namely the Southeast Federal Power Customers.  
The third major implication of the Corps’ operational changes was the adverse 
downstream effects and implications for Lake Lanier’s, as well as other reservoirs’, recreational 
value. The diminished flow down the Chattahoochee limited the use of major flatwater recreation 
areas and threatened the cooling water supply for power plants in Alabama. It also created issues 
for barge navigation in Alabama’s ports. The decreased and time-altered flows impacted the 
ecology of the estuary in Apalachicola, FL which hurt the local oystering and fisheries-based 
economies. Additionally, the changes in the pattern and timing of flows also threatened listed 
endangered species found in the lower reaches of the basin. Of course, all of these impacts were 
exacerbated by the series of droughts that plagued the southeast throughout the eighties, nineties, 
and into the early two-thousands, which introduced two other stakeholders into the debate- 
agriculture and electricity generation. Decreased flows meant less water for irrigation and 
cooling for thermoelectric power production. Additionally, decreased flow coupled with 
increased drought and warming temperatures, made it difficult to maintain the established 
discharge limits set by the EPD for point-source and thermal pollution.   
The decision to change the management of Buford Damn and Lake Lanier created 
conflict in the current management of the ACF and highlighted the deep social, economic, and 
political differences between users as well as the need for cooperative management of the ACF 
water system. However, instead of moving the regime towards a more equitable and sustainable 
governance platform, the regime resisted transition.  From the early 1990’s until today, the 
partisans on all sides have attempted a series of forums to resolve what had become an 
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unfavorable governance situation; however, all have continually returned to the federal court 
system to determine a water resource management plan. Each state continues to utilize power 
plays through the centralized legal structure of supreme court litigation to win control over the 
ACF. As explored in the next section, these entrenched power plays between the states and the 
Corps are supported by a legal system at the regime level that have created a lock-in by which 
states have become increasingly less open to collaboration and more focused on dominating the 
ACF through litigation (Masters, 2016).   
The one exception was in the late 1990’s when legal cases did not progress, and the states 
stayed their litigation in favor of negotiation by entering into a pair of interstate compacts, one 
each for the ACF and ACT. However, unlike other successful compacts in the U.S, there was no 
pre-negotiated allocation of the water; rather these two compacts were no more than an 
agreement to discuss water sharing plans.  The ACF Compact established the ACF Basin 
Commission and charged it with the daunting task of agreeing on an allocation formula. 
The goal of the compacts was to provide a comprehensive study as a guide, and facilitate 
negotiations between the states over a 5-year period. At the time, legal scholars hailed the ACF 
Compact as the best method of resolving the warring states. Unfortunately, the states were 
unable to reach an agreement, despite several deadline extensions. The two main points of 
disagreement were Florida’s refusal to accept an agreement that only guaranteed minimum flows 
and Georgia’s refusal to limit irrigated farm acreage and control reservoir levels, based on 
Florida’s advisement. 
Instead of embracing collaboration, in negotiations states attempted to alter or circumvent 
requirements of federal law because the states knew that the allocation formula agreed to under 
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the compact would become federal law (Priscoli, 2009). Furthermore, federal agencies and 
representatives were unwilling to be bound by the decisions of the states. However, without the 
implementation force of federal agreement, the allocation formula would be uncertain (Sherk, 
2005). Leitman (2005) argued that a lack of stakeholder involvement, a breakdown in trust, and 
an inadequate collaboration process were the main reasons for the failure of the ACF compact. 
Sherk (2005) concluded that the ACF and ACT compacts were doomed to fail because Congress 
was unable to act coherently and decisively to allocate interstate water resources. Mandarano 
(2008) notes, however, that the “experience of Congressional allocation and federal 
centralization of comprehensive water resources management has been problematic at best.”  
Feldman (2008) and Porzecanski et al (2012) concluded that the ACF compact failed 
because preconditions needed for adaptively managing the ACF basin were impeded by lack of a 
shared vision, conflicting demands, an unequal balance of authority, and separation of water 
quality and quantity regulations. In the end, despite six years of frustration and millions of 
dollars spent, the Commission never came to an agreement and the Compact expired on August 
31, 2003.In many ways, it is the failure of these policy instruments that has defined the 
regulatory frameworks for policy formulation and water resource planning, and conflict 
management on the ACF.   
Amidst the failed ACF Compact negotiations, Georgia, experienced its most severe 
drought to date and the warring factions returned to the court. At this point, levels at Lake Lanier 
fell to all-time lows and Georgia continued to petition the Corps to reallocate water from Lake 
Lanier for municipal uses in Atlanta. Frustrated by the failure of the ACF Compact and fearing 
substantial losses in revenues, the Southeastern Power Customers, Inc., filed its own suit against 
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the Corps in December 2000 in the District of Columbia. Then when the Corps did not respond 
to Georgia’s allocation request in 2001, Georgia filed suit against the Corps in the Northern 
District of Georgia, only to have Florida and Southeastern Power petition to intervene in the suit. 
Thus, despite attempts at innovation in the regime, ultimately the actors returned to litigation as 
the strategy for water resource management on the ACF. 
And this regime remained in place from 2002- 2009, when each State, the Army Corps, 
and the Southeastern Power Customers all engaged in legal gymnastics over the proper 
allocation and management of the ACF. Alabama, Florida and Southeastern Power argued that 
the Corps’ decision to allocate water to Atlanta was a fundamental operating change and 
undermined the Water Supply Act.21 Florida argued against the Corps, citing that decreased flow 
rates violated the Endangered Species Act. All of this took place against increasing drought 
which made it difficult for the Courts to separate what was a result of Corps operations and what 
a result of natural strain.  
Amidst the legal battles, each state also tried to engage in a series of political power-plays 
to gain control over the ACF. For example, in 2003 Georgia attempted to strike a separate 
agreement with the Corps of Engineers that allowed metro Atlanta 23% of the water in Lake 
Lanier, which at the time was a 65% increase. But the agreement never came into play because 
                                                
21 O.C.G.A. §§ 12-5-470 to 482. This Act gives the Department of Natural Resources the 
authority to build water supply reservoirs. It authorizes DNR to acquire property and contract 
with local governments to begin and maintain reservoir projects that will sell and distribute water 
supply to local counties and municipalities. The Act specifies the powers of DNR and the 
relationship with local governments. The Act makes it the duty of DNR to select the site for such 
projects but provides for checks on DNR powers. 
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Alabama and Florida again challenged it in court. The Corps attempted to implement an interim 
plan, now weighing the requests of all angered parties, which no party was satisfied with and 
again more litigation ensued. Secretary of Interior Kempthorne (a former governor familiar with 
water disputes) even personally conducted negotiations at which he tried to obtain a settlement 
but left his post when Georgia and Florida were unwilling to compromise. With each suit, the 
position of the opposing parties hardened, making resolution and compromise impossible.  
By 2007, Georgia’s drought was so severe that state water restrictions were declared, 
including a total ban on outdoor water use in 61 North Georgia counties and a mandated 10 
percent reduction in overall water use. Additionally, Georgia decided to sue the Corps of 
Engineers to reduce flows from the reservoir. Again, Congress intervened and Alabama, Florida 
and Georgia all agreed to a temporary reduction in the flow of the Chattahoochee River and to 
work out a long-term agreement for water sharing. However, ten years later no such long-term 
agreement has been reached.  The willingness to negotiate with each other that was at least 
present in 1997 with the signing of the ACF compact, was by 2009 completely gone. 
5.7 Characteristic Features of the ACF Water System Regime: The Legal Structures that 
contribute to decades of lock-in 
The historical conflicts over the management of the ACF water system represents a mix 
of technical, political, institutional, and socio-economic characteristics that interact at multiple 
levels to create a complex and dynamic system for water supply. The existing governance 
approach has inherently produced a state of legal competition between users that sees the waters 
of the ACF as a zero-sum game, inhibiting collaboration between stakeholders, and continues to 
rely on federal litigation to outline management strategies (Masters, 2016). Like many resource 
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concerns, the current management of the ACF is now dominated by asymmetrical power 
relationships and politics, deeply intertwined in the broader socio-political and economic 
context, which make water management inherently political and resistant to change (Mollinga, 
2008).  
While there are multiple subsystems and entrenched dynamics working to sustain the 
current regime, as well as multiple dynamics within the socio-technical landscape, in this 
research I focus on the legal structures at the regime level that have perpetuated the current 
regime of water resource management on the ACF. Specifically, I focus on the impacts of the 
riparian water laws employed throughout the Southeast. 
Understanding how the riparian water law and legal doctrines shape the development and 
capacity of water management regime of the ACF was one of the initial goals of this research. 
With a limited number of relevant scholars and experts who are willing to speak with me, I 
turned towards reviewing publicly available legal briefs to make some sense as to how the legal 
structure which underpins Georgia, Florida, and Alabama’s regime management is creating a 
lock-in approach to litigation and hindering collaboration between the warring states. For 
simplicity sake, I focus on water law in Georgia.  
The legal doctrines establishing water rights in Georgia are based on a common law, riparian 
system. Prior to the 1970’s, all water law was based on common law. However, recognizing the 
need to develop oversight (largely related to water quality) Georgia created state regulatory 
bodies to manage the permitting of water and to monitor water quality. While riparian law 
governs both ground and surface water, Georgia’s law distinguishes between surface water and 
groundwater as separate systems of which the allocation is governed separately. The use of a 
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riparian system and the separation of surface and ground water hold implications for both the 
development of water regulations and the allocation of water resources. 
Under riparian laws, landowners have the right to the water on and adjacent to their land. 
If the water is used for natural use, meaning private use with no commercial gains, there are 
typically no associated fees or payments for use.  However, if the water is used for commercial 
gains (i.e. agriculture or thermoelectric) permits and an associated fee may be required. The use 
of water under riparian law is essentially unlimited except when the water supply is deemed 
insufficient to satisfy the reasonable needs of all adjacent landowners. In such a case, landowners 
are supposed to reduce their use in proportion to their rights – sometimes based on the amount of 
adjacent land they own (CBO, 2006). The resulting incentive is to own more land; generally, the 
more land a party owns, the more that party has control over and access to available water 
resources. 
The Georgia law of riparian rights was well summarized in the case of Price v. High Shoals 
Manufacturing Co. The Price court stated, (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1915) “Every riparian 
owner is entitled to a reasonable use of the water. Every such proprietor is also entitled to have 
the stream pass over his land according to its natural flow, subject to such disturbances, 
interruptions, and diminutions as may be necessary and unavoidable on account of the reasonable 
and proper use of it by other riparian proprietors. Riparian proprietors have a common right in 
the waters of the stream, and the necessities of the business of one cannot be the standard of the 
rights of another; but each is entitled to a reasonable use of the water with respect to the rights of 
others. What is considered reasonable use is a question for the jury, in view of all the facts in the 
case, taking into consideration the nature and use of the machinery, the quantity of water used in 
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its operation, the use to which the stream can be applied, the velocity of its current, the character 
and size of the water course, and the varying circumstances of each case.” 
From early on, Georgia’s establishment of a riparian system recognized the courts' authority 
and precedent in determining ‘reasonable use.’ While there was less need for interstate legal 
disputes in the early 1900’s, the basic precedent of seeking the courts as the mechanism for 
handling water disputes has been set for some time. Until the mid 20th century, most issues (if 
any) regarding the management of water resources was left to the courts.  In 1964, the Georgia 
General Assembly established the Water Quality Protection Act to govern the use of surface 
water. In 1977, the Georgia General Assembly amended the Water Quality Protection Act of 
1964 (WQPA) and established a revocable permit system to govern large users of surface water. 
Since then, the WQPA has been amended a number of times but remains the primary legislation 
governing surface water allocation in the State today. The WQPA is enforced almost exclusively 
by the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (EPD).  
Under the WQPA, users withdrawing, diverting or impounding surface water in quantities 
greater than 100,000 gallons per day on a monthly average are required to obtain a permit from 
the EPD. The General Assembly has established a set of factors that EPD must consider in the 
evaluation of permit applications. These factors represent many of the same factors that courts 
previously considered in evaluating the claims of a riparian owner, essentially codifying the 
reasonable use doctrine established at common law.  
The WQPA distinguishes between farm and non-farm uses, and the nature of the use will 
determine both the scope and duration of the permit. All non-farm uses are subject to evaluation 
under reasonableness criteria established by EPD. The duration of permits for non-farm uses may 
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range from ten to fifty years. Non-farm permits may be suspended or modified if it is determined 
that the quantity of surface water allowed to be withdrawn under the permit is either (1) greater 
than needed for the use upon which the permit was based; or (2) interferes with the reasonable 
use of another applicant; (3) in violation of the law or with the health and safety of citizens. The 
WQPA also has a set of environmental regulations that comply with the Federal Clean Water 
Act. The two federal laws governing pollution are the Federal National Pollutant Discharge 
(NPS) control programs, which include the Nonpoint Source Management Program established 
by the 1987 Clean Water Act Amendments, and the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Program 
established by the 1990 Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments.  
During periods of extreme shortfalls, the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (EPD)  
may issue emergency orders, which modify the terms of existing permits. The WQPA requires 
EPD to make an effort to notify affected permittees in writing and provides those permittees five 
days to appear before EPD and object to the proposed action. During such emergency periods of 
water shortage, EPD must "give first priority to providing water for human consumption " (EPD, 
2012). 
One of the major issues that legal scholars raise with Georgians’ Common Law Riparian 
Water Rights Doctrine is the concern over the sale and use of water. Currently, under the Law, 
possessing a piece of land accompanies possession of all encompassed water sources. Under this 
system, landowners are prohibited from selling or transferring this water out of their watershed, 
unless with adjoining land. Unlike Western States that allow for the short-term transfer of water 
rights and permits, Georgia has no formal structure for allowing the sale or shift in water permits 
from one user to another without the sale of the land. This creates a very inflexible system and 
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one that makes it difficult for the EPD to encourage utilizing water for the most ‘necessary’ uses 
in time of water stress.  
Another major concern is the definition of ‘reasonableness.’ While the EPD may have 
limited authority on defining the reasonableness of use and the designation of a permit, it does 
not have clear authority on how that permit may change in future scenarios of resource scarcity. 
Essentially, what may be deemed reasonable in 2002 may not be reasonable in 2052. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that under a Riparian system the use of the water is not required to keep 
the right alive. New uses may be started at any time as long as the new use is a reasonable one. 
Because the right is attached to the riparian land, non-use does not extinguish the right. 
Georgia, like most riparian states, have enacted some form of a permit system, moving 
towards what has been described as a “regulated riparian” system. Regulated riparianism allows 
for a permit system to allocate water usage. Each state that uses a form of regulated riparianism 
has a central state agency with the control to say who may use the water, how much they can use, 
and when they can use it. However, unlike other states, Georgia still largely leans on common 
law when framing how to handle future water use. Under a fully regulated riparianism 
framework, and departing from common law riparianism, state authorities must examine the 
projected use before any water is ever actually used. A regulated riparian framework may use the 
same reasonable use criterion as with the common law but determine beforehand if the new use 
is reasonable. This allows the state to take into account both the potential benefits to society and 
the compatibility with current uses before granting a new permit.  
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Another major concern of the common-law riparian system, is that it limits the ability for 
the EPD to amend or restrict water usage in the state. Under a regulated riparian system, the 
regulating authority can adjust the quantity of water allowed under permit to be in line with the 
public interest. This does not necessarily necessitate a time of extreme shortage, as it does in 
Georgia. Rather the acting authority must prove that it is in the best interest of the public to 
redirect use. Furthermore, under a common-law system, permits are often granted for a much 
longer period of time, making it difficult to amend if necessary and plan accordingly. 
The Southeast is not alone in having a history of water strife. This country is fraught with 
contentions over resources, usually involving interstate water sources, trans-basin diversions or 
both, for centuries. However, where the Southeast differs from other parts of the country is in its 
continued reliance (despite developments of river basin compacts and decentralized governance 
platforms) on federal adjudication for any and all conflicts. In part this is due to the nature of the 
competing and fragmented authority over interstate waters which, according to Abrams (2008), 
require “major changes in the underlying state laws governing water allocation.”  
There is something to be said about how the current, legal structure, underpins an 
unwillingness to compromise.  Georgia’s common law riparian model inherently pushes states 
away from oversight and towards opposition. Over the past fifty years, a number of northeastern 
states have replaced common law riparianism in favor of regulated ripariansim.  The push 
towards regulated riparianism was fueled by desire to not be in a case-by-case, conflict-by-
conflict, and after-the-conflict-has-arisen adjudication of the common law. As Abrams (2016) 
articulates the shortcomings of a riparian system, “first, private property rules are ineffective at 
producing the maximum set of benefits from a common pool resource. Second, managerial 
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allocations offer the possibility of precise quantification of right and thereby the possibility for 
increased security of right. Third, managerial systems are proactive rather than reactive.”  
Recently, Georgia law makers have recognized the benefits of moving towards a more 
regulated riparian model as a source of creating flexibility in permitting and planning. This was 
made evident by proposals in the Georgia legislature, regarding the Flint River Basin Drought 
Protection Plans. The legislature proposed to revise the permitting system to allow the EPD to 
modify certain water permits, mandate application efficiencies, and authorizing the state to fund 
augmentation projects. However, the bill failed to pass in the House. And that failure highlights 
an issue that has underscored the water wars and interstate water resource management more 
broadly in Georgia.  
The failure to create major change in the legal underpinnings of water resource 
management was also present during the 2003-2004 Legislative Sessions, when the Georgia 
legislature recognized the need to address the looming interstate resource concerns as well as 
devise some sort of planning for future use. The Georgia General Assembly passed HB 237 – the 
Comprehensive Statewide Water Management Planning Act – which required the state to 
develop a statewide water plan that considered long-term goals in delineating methods of 
resource management. The Joint Comprehensive Water Plan Study Committee was then created 
and given the task of developing the framework for this plan. Responsibility for assembling this 
plan was shared with the EPD with oversight from the Georgia Water Council (GA Water 
Planning).  
The plan was intended to accomplish a wide variety of objectives, including: determine a 
means for settling disputes with neighboring states, protect the environment, and regulate water 
 243 
quality and quantity (GA State Univ. Law Review). While originally, HB 237 included measures 
to address water planning issues such as inter-basin water transfers and water permit sales, these 
measures were unfavorable politically and would require changes to legal statute and the author 
of the bill removed those elements. That being said, in a white paper to Georgia’s 
Comprehensive Water Plan in 2002, the Georgia Chamber of Commerce further claimed that 
laws needed to be more anticipatory so that there is a system for limiting water usage during 
water shortages (GA Chamber of Commerce). 
Despite attempts with the legislature to amend the management of the ACF, the State of 
Georgia has either continually refused or been unable to address a systematic shortcoming of 
Georgia’s legal institutions shaping water resource management. And in an absence of new 
regulations, new water laws, or an authority to specify the contours of water allocation, and in 
the absence of a framework by how these reallocations can be negotiated with neighboring and 
affected parties, there is little room to believe the regime will change. 
The legal structure underpinning the current regime is also intertwined with the policy 
institutions at the landscape level that shape the regime dynamics. The riparian system creates a 
major barrier for the federal institutions, like the Supreme Court, to change the regimes' 
approach to water resource management. Historically, the most prominent of interstate suits 
before the U.S. Supreme Court is for the equitable allocation of a water resource. However, most 
of these lawsuits have arisen in the West, where the legal doctrine of prior appropriation is in 
place and the court has recognized that the doctrine gives it guidance. In Georgia, Alabama, and 
Florida no such clear rule governs because of the nature of riparian rights as being correlative 
and not fixed. In fact, until the recent water wars, the Supreme Court had really only decided two 
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interstate water allocation disputes from the East-Connecticut v. Massachusetts and New Jersey 
v. New York. And both cases were decided over seventy years ago, and within a short time of 
each other. As a result, neither case gives firm guidance about what principles the Supreme 
Court would apply to divide water bodies between two states that adhere to the riparian rights 
system. 
The recognition that the legal underpinnings of the current regime are sustaining a 
management approach that utilizes litigation and power-plays over democratic decision-making 
is also made evident by the failed attempts at negotiation and cooperative management strategies. 
The demise of the ACF and ACT compacts has been well described by Sherk (2005), Leitman 
(2005), and Feldman (2008). Sherk (2005) noted that the compact required the federal 
representative to determine that the proposed allocation formula be consistent with federal 
regulations, something the federal commissioner found impossible to do.  
5.8 The Niche: Opposing the Regime  
The failures of the regime to resolve water resource conflict on the ACF, triggered a 
niche experiment. In 2009, recognizing that litigation processes had been unable to resolve 
conflict, a grassroots effort, the ACFS was launched by a few individuals and groups most 
impacted by the interstate conflict. Now, seven years later, the ACFS is an extremely diverse 
group representing all sectors in Georgia, Florida, and Alabama with members representing 4 
sub-basins that extend through Georgia, Alabama, and Florida-the Apalachicola Basin, the Flint 
Basin, the Lower/Middle Chattahoochee Basin, and the Upper Chattahoochee Basin (See Figure 
5.3). A list of all the interest groups as well as the governing board members is found in the 
Appendix. 
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The primary purpose of the ACFS remains to develop a Sustainable Water Management Plan 
for the basin. In fact, it was after decades of fruitless litigation that the ACFS formed, in large 
part, out of the recognition that the judicial process was not working to create a sustainable 
management strategy, and there was a great need for public involvement (Masters, 2016). While 
the ACFS is working toward a consensus-based vision, this process has been challenging.  
 
Figure 5-3 ACF Organizational Chart 
 In subsequent sections I will explore the dynamics of the ACFS but for now it is 
important to recognize that the ACFS exists today solely out of the public’s recognition that the 
current regime was insufficient in handling the multiple social, technical, environmental, and 
economic facets of water resource planning and out of the public’s recognition that collaboration 
and democratic decision-making is imperative to create a sustainable management platform. 
Following sentiments expressed by Norton (2016) whether or not the niche innovation that the 
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ACFS is working so hard to incorporate into the regime actually affects the management of the 
ACF it is clear that the establishment of the ACFS (in and of itself) is marked change in society’s 
view of resource management and represents a qualitative shift in its behavior.    
 
5.9 Understanding the Institutional Dynamics that Support Niche Innovations in Large-
Scale Water Resource Management 
It is clear that continued frustration over the regime dynamics prompted action by the public 
(characterized by the ACFS) to push for niche innovation. However, frustration alone does not 
make a transition. In the subsequent section I turn my focus to understanding the institutional 
dynamics that facilitate the inclusion of collaboration, democratic-decision making and 
grassroots actors in the management of natural resources, with the purpose of understanding 
what institutional aspects of the current niche and regime may be necessary for transition.    
In Governing the Commons, Elinor Ostrom (1990) sought to develop a series of empirical 
studies of groundwater basins to provide a “broader theory of institutional arrangements related 
to the effective governance and management of common-pool resources (CPR).” Ostrom argued 
that several social groups have struggled successfully against threats of resource degradation by 
maintaining localized, self-governing institutions and provided examples of sustainably and 
unsustainably managed meadows, forests, irrigation systems, groundwater basins, and fisheries. 
Ostrom argued that people are able to cooperate and manage natural resources jointly if 
supported by specific institutional arrangements. Her conclusion was that successful CPR 
management institutions share certain institutional aspects. Ostrom’s list of eight design 
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principles, or “essential elements,” for successful CPR management include 1) clearly defined 
boundaries, 2) congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, 3) 
collective-choice arrangements, 4) monitoring, 5) graduated sanctions, 6) conflict-resolution 
mechanisms, 7) minimal recognition of rights to organize, and 8) nested enterprises (p. 90). 
However, Ostrom did not argue that these institutional aspects are specific rules for 
success, rather they compose a set of design principles that characterize all robust CPR 
institutions (Ostrom 1990) and describe the broad structural similarities among self-organized 
systems that have been able to adapt and learn so as to be robust and resilient to many social, 
economic, and ecological disturbances that occur over time (Eggerston, 190). The “primary role 
of the design principles is to explain under what conditions trust and reciprocity can be built and 
maintained to sustain collective action in the face of social dilemmas posed by CPRs. This 
collective action, in turn, helps prevent the deterioration of a managed CPR” (Cox et al. 2010). 
Over the past 30 years, CPR scholars have compiled numerous empirical examples of the 
emergence of self-governing collaborative resource institutions (Baland & Platteau, 1996; 
McCay, 2002; National Research Council, 1986; Ostrom, 2001; Ostrom et al., 1994). Within this 
large body of empirical research, the literature has identified key characteristics of both the 
resource and the resource users that are likely to support collective management (Ostrom, 2001). 
The literature has built upon Ostrom’s argument and argued that the success of the resource 
management  depends upon additional institutional arrangements, including the congruence of 
ecosystem and governance boundaries, the specification and representation of interests, the 
matching of governance structures to ecosystem characteristics, the containment of transaction 
costs, and the establishment of monitoring, enforcement and adoption processes at the 
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appropriate scale (Eggertsson, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1991; Hanna, 1992; Hanna and 
Munasinghe, 1995). Since 1990, a substantial volume of literature has amassed debating the 
usefulness and validity of Ostrom’s (1990) design principles.  
While there has been substantial support for the principles, some scholars have criticized 
their theoretical grounding when applied to large resources and questioned whether it is still 
unclear whether all of Ostrom’s principles translate across scales (Cox, 2010). The CPR 
literature is largely limited to small-scale settings with easily defined boundaries, stable 
resources, and homogenous, users. And case studies of successful implementation of CPR 
management can be characterized as still existing at the niche-level. At the regime level – with a 
larger number of conflicting users, various types of stakeholders, and a greater geographic scope 
– it is unclear whether the conclusions of the CPR literature will translate. As Ostrom recognized 
(2009), given that many studies have focused on locally managed resources settings, a critical 
area of research is to understand the governance of larger scale resources, by analyzing 
“relationships among multiple levels of these complex systems” (E. Ostrom, 2009, p. 420). 
Logically, however, many of the key institutional arrangements necessary for small-scale CPR 
management can be applied to large-scale settings. I focus on the following aspects of CPR 
literature-trust between stakeholders, a history of interaction among actors, and the ability to 
establish cross-scale institutional linkages to reduce the transaction costs of interactions among 
diverse stakeholders.  
Among the institutional arrangements that facilitate grassroots stakeholder engagement and 
that support collective action, trust and reciprocity are considered to be essential (Ostrom, 1998). 
Indeed, many have recognized that trust and a perception of fairness between stakeholders are 
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essential ingredients in the success of any collaborative effort (Welsh and Gray 2002). In CPR 
settings, trust facilitates interaction and knowledge transfer and can work in concert with a 
number of other factors (Libecap, 1994; Ostrom, 1990; Taylor & Singleton, 1993). 
Consequently, trust is enhanced when CPR users have experience working together directly 
(Ostrom, 1990; Taylor & Singleton, 1993).  
Additionally, Ostrom and others have often emphasized the importance of nesting smaller 
common-property systems in larger and still larger ones. The primary argument being that there 
is a high probability that the social systems have cross-scale physical relationships when they 
manage different parts of a larger resource system, are polycentric in nature, and thus may need 
mechanisms to facilitate cross-scale cooperation (Lane and Scoones 1993, Niamir-Fuller 1998). 
There is a difference between nested, polycentric situations (Berkes and Folke 1998, Berkes 
2002, Yandle 2006, Cinner et al. 2009) and situations which contain multiple levels of horizontal 
organization that mirror each other (Coward, 1977).  
Inherent in the concept of ‘nestedness’ is the understanding that there is a need for 
linking action situations at smaller scales, such as local CPR user groups, with those at the 
regime level, such as state or federal bodies. These linkages may be established through 
institutions, which can include shared rules and strategies, or regularized patterns of interaction, 
creating functional interdependencies between different actors, or collective bodies (Young, 
2002). Cross-scale institutional linkages connect actors that are polycentric and function at 
different scales or levels of social organization or political jurisdiction. While other scholars use 
different terms than “linkages”, the concept of diagraming cross-scale connections across or 
between actors, organizations, or collective bodies that have distinct scales or scopes of 
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authority, are found throughout the literature (Adger, Brown, & Tomkins, 2006; Berkes, 2002; 
Carlsson & Berkes, 2005; Pinkerton, Wilson, Nielsen, & Degnbol, 2003; Wilson, Ahmed, Siar, 
& Kanagaratnam, 2006).  
The underlying reason why creation of trust and cross-scale linkages are likely to support 
cooperative and democratic management platforms comes from transaction cost theory. 
Transaction costs involve the time, money, and effort associated with searching for collective 
partners, bargaining with those partners, as well as monitoring and enforcing agreements (Taylor 
& Singleton, 1993). CPR scholars have long recognized that certain characteristics of the 
physical environment as well as the stakeholders involved in the decision-making process can 
reduce the transaction costs associated with collective action, and thus increase the likelihood 
that resource users will devise new institutional arrangements (Libecap, 1994; Lubell et al., 
2002; Ostrom, 1990; Taylor & Singleton, 1993). However, the literature has also recognized that 
there must be some element of urgency and feasibility, for collective management to work. More 
parties are likely to benefit, and thus, be interested in collaboration, in situations where problems 
are relatively severe (Lubell et al., 2002), yet where improvements are still feasible (Ostrom, 
1990, 2001).  
5.9.1 Participatory Democracy Models 
“Solving shared problems together on behalf of a shared place is the essence of democracy” 
(Kemmis 2001 p. 153).  
Over the past decade, the research into participatory and discursive democratic theory 
models has largely focused on assessing the public stakeholder and public participation. These 
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assessments have largely been responses to the failings of traditional pluralism and liberal 
democracy’s lack of democratic deliberation and public participation on environmental issues 
(Fischer 2000; Foster 2002; Schlosberg 1999; Weber 1998). Both Weber and Schlosberg 
describe an imperfect pluralist process dominated by national environmental groups and 
exclusive of the grassroots (Schlosberg 1999; Weber 1998).  
Against this backdrop, new deliberative approaches, particularly in the watershed 
management space, are advocated for a revitalization of the public sphere in which citizens 
voluntarily deliberate on social and environmental issues. Such, ‘discursive designs’ placed 
value on non-hierarchal decentralized approaches to power and regulation over centralized 
approaches (Barber 1984; Dryzek 1990; Fischer 2000). Frank Fischer praised citizen 
participation as the “touchstone of the democratic system” (Fischer 2000 p. 37). Such models 
stood in contrast with liberal representative democracy, which is distinguished by bureaucratic 
decision-making and participation that is almost exclusively dominated by interest group 
participation that often alienates the grassroots (Barber 1984; Dryzek 1990; Fischer 2000).  
Accompanying the advent of deliberative democracy in environmental policy, were 
assessments and theories on the public’s role in policy development and decision-making. 
According to Fisher (2000), citizen participation contributes three important goals: participation 
implies thoughtful deliberation of socially significant issues; participation “legitimizes policy 
development and implementation;” and participation can contribute to “professional inquiry” 
(Fischer 2000 p. 2).  
Additionally, it became widely recognized that there is inherent value in public 
participation in environmental collaboration, including the strengthening of community, 
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understanding, and skills as a consequence of citizen’s deliberation on regional and local issues 
(Born and Genskow 2000; Snow 2001; Weber 2003). Born and Genskow observed, “the ability 
to positively affect problem-solving capacity, with an emphasis on increased ability to 
implement proposed solutions within the socioeconomic, cultural, and political context of a 
particular watershed, is one of the most significant features of new watershed approaches” (Born 
and Genskow 2000 p. 47). As Putnam (1993) recognizes, public participation improves the social 
capital of community networks which helps to further facilitate coordination and communication 
and amplify information about the trustworthiness of other individuals (Putnman, 1993).  
While the benefits of public participation were clear to many, the process of engaging 
public participation and the institutions necessary to maintain a discursive democratic system 
was hardly straightforward and was further challenged by increasing complexity of 
environmental problems and inherent equity concerns. As Foster (2002) points out, the avenues 
to power are through economic means, political standing, and access to technical expertise, all of 
which potentially discriminate against grassroots actors (Foster 2002). The ability to engage with 
other stakeholders of often varying interests and expertise becomes critical for public 
participation (Webber, 2003).  
Specifically, Fischer writes, “speaking the language of science, as well as the jargon of 
particular policy communities, becomes an essential credential for participation” (Fischer 2000 
p. 23). It is also clear from the participatory literature, that the stage in which citizens engage in 
the policy process impacts their role and function. Engagement early in the decision-making 
process establishes a voice for public participation and helps to solidify trust between different 
actors (Busenberg 2000; Duram and Brown 1999). As Lubbell (2005) recognizes, trust between 
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stakeholders is imperative in order for public participation to be meaningful and sustained 
(Lubell, 2005). 
5.9.2 Policy Entrepreneurs and Social Capital 
Policy entrepreneurs are influential individuals who promote and influence policy 
changes and are key to developing niche innovations (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 
1995). Political entrepreneurs can aide in solving collective action problems within groups by 
changing beliefs, incentives, or resources of individuals in order to promote cooperation to 
achieve collective ends (Taylor, 1987). Policy entrepreneurs can include actors within and 
outside of the traditional government sources of influence and power, including policy elites, 
citizens, or experts. While much of the entrepreneurship literature focuses on the individual as an 
entrepreneur, scholars have demonstrated that groups also have the ability to act as 
entrepreneurs. Due to their size, greater resources, and political influence, these groups can at 
times be more influential than individuals. For the purpose of studying the ACFS, the policy 
entrepreneurs are defined as the initial group of grassroots advocates for the development of the 
ACFS who have invested their resources – network, knowledge, time, energy, reputation, and 
sometimes money – in the hope of future policy change or action (Kingdon, 1990).  
The literature on collaboration natural resource management has continually recognized 
the importance of policy entrepreneurs and leaders in facilitating institutional change. Blomquist 
(1992) was among the first to document policy entrepreneurs as leaders in facilitating 
institutional change and recognize entrepreneurship as vital element for collective action in CPR 
settings. In addition to leveraging individual resource, policy entrepreneurs play a key role in 
agency-level collaboration in managing natural resources and ecosystems (Thomas, 2003). As 
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(Heikell, 2005) notes, the efforts of policy entrepreneurs are likely to enhance collective action 
when they work in conjunction with other factors, such as experience working together, trust, 
and frequent communication. The result is an entrepreneur's’ ability to provide the initial and 
ongoing, social-capital necessary to facilitate collaborative management (Lubell & Scholz, 
2001). Lubell (2004) finds that this is particularly effective when entrepreneurs are helpful to 
facilitate the collaboration between agencies and individual resource users.  
In addition to their ability to promote cooperation, the literature has keyed into the 
entrepreneurship’s ability to leverage ‘external resources’ relevant to policy change (Busenberg, 
2000).  In particular, entrepreneurs' can provide the resources identified as important to policy 
change – time, energy, expertise, knowledge, and reputation (Kingdon, 1990; Roberts & King, 
1991). It is the network that accompanies an entrepreneur that will determine its level of 
engagement. The entrepreneur’s ability to provide the greatest access to human capital is its key 
value in the process and in achieving outcomes (Florress et al., 2001). And while entrepreneurs 
influence the process, the literature is clear that they do not control it (Roberts and King; 
Mintrom, 1997). Rather, entrepreneurs are seen as more autonomous, flexible, political risk-
takers that can “generate creative policy solutions, redesign governmental programs, and 
implement new management approaches” (P. J. King & Roberts, 1992, p. 173).  
The entrepreneurship literature has also recognized the unique role of grassroots actors. 
Grassroots policy entrepreneurs play a critical and unique role in the policy process, particularly 
in their ability to easily leverage social capital and form strategic partners for state or federal 
institutions seeking to accomplish policy objectives in often contentious situations (Lowery, 
1998). In studying grassroots policy entrepreneurship in watershed management, Lubell (2004, 
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353) notes that, “the interaction between local government representatives and grassroots 
stakeholders is the crucible in which social capital is formed.” As a result, the continued 
engagement of grassroots entrepreneurs and traditional government structures expand the social 
capital necessary to reduce the transaction costs of collective action and leverage policy change. 
Grassroots entrepreneurs effectively leverage their initial social capital to engage in the policy 
process and through continual engagement build the social capital necessary facilitate long-term 
cooperation.  
5.9.3 The Role of Technical Information  
 Developing a common understanding of policy problems across stakeholders is 
contingent upon building core values or beliefs between the different groups. This is especially 
critical when attempting to develop a niche innovation in a sustainable transition. When core 
values are more closely aligned, stakeholders are more likely to work with each other (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith,1993). How stakeholders develop core values is influenced by many factors 
but one factor that is continually recognized in the empirical literature is the access to scientific 
or technical information. The empirical literature shows that collaboration is better facilitated 
across differing groups when there is access to technical information for debate as technical 
information can both illuminate a new policy problem and provide solutions (Cobb & Elder, 
1972; Kingdon, 1995; Walker, 1977). As such, technical information is a critical component in 
facilitating collaboration between stakeholders. The empirical literature on collaborative resource 
management efforts have shown that collective agreement among stakeholders on problem 
definition supports the development of these institutions (Koontz et al., 2004; Wondolleck & 
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Yaffee, 2000). In small-scale CPR settings, it is easier to acquire accurate information about the 
conditions of the resource.  
Recently, this debate has gained momentum through growing interest in ‘‘knowledge 
transfer/exchange’’ between knowledge producers and users. Although this has traditionally 
focused on one-way transfer of knowledge, interest is shifting towards more collaborative 
knowledge transfers and the joint production of knowledge. This research focuses more on how 
the exchange of different types of knowledge between multiple stakeholders influences the 
decision-making process (Phillipson and Liddon, 2007). While the integration of technical and 
local knowledge is often both political and difficult, (Rhoads, 1999; Korfmacher , 2001) there is 
recognition that when blending different types of knowledge, local knowledge , while 
complementary, is ultimately subordinate to expert technical and scientific knowledge (Smit, et 
al., 2015). 
Additionally, technical information helps to clarify the physical components of a policy 
problem and define the physical scope of a resource management problem as well as define 
which actors are most impacted by different policy pathways. Similarly, technical knowledge can 
help stakeholders to understand who benefits from a change in policy, who is harmed and to 
what end (Heikell, 2005). Looking at grassroots stakeholders through the lens of the firm theory, 
and knowledge-based views of the firm, technical knowledge is seen as a key competitive asset 
for any interested party and allows actors to create strategic alliances (Grant and BadenFuller, 
1995; Conner and Prahalad, 1996). To that end, technical information can be likened to a type of 
social capital that can help facilitate the policy process by both bringing different stakeholders 
together to exchange knowledge as well as define the policy problem.  
 257 
When looking at the CPR management literature, the participatory democracy literature, 
the policy entrepreneur literature, and the informational literature together, many key elements 
become clear. First it is clear that a foundational trust between differing stakeholders is necessary 
for grassroots actors to engage in collaborative governance decisions. Additionally, a common 
understanding of the physical conditions of the resource is key to facilitating dialogue between 
grassroots actors and other stakeholders. It is also apparent that ‘grassroots’ actors can serve as 
critical links within in a collaborative, nested governance structure and across different 
institutional aisles. From these observations, the logic is that a grassroots organization’s ability to 
influence a collaborative governance process is predicated on its ability to garner the trust of 
other stakeholders, form strategic cross-scale linkages, leverage social capital, and facilitate 


















Common Pool Resource 
Literature 
• Established Trust Between 
Stakeholders 
• Ability to create linkages between 
actors 
• Nesting smaller systems management 
into the large resource governance 
• Element of urgency  








• Understanding the language of science, 
as well as the jargon of particular 
policy communities 
• The stage of engagement  
• Early engagement in the decision-
making process  
• Trust between stakeholders  
  
 
Policy Entrepreneur, Social 
Capital Literature 
• Presence of Policy Entrepreneur to 
leverage existing network 
• Established social capital that is 
valuable to other stakeholders 











The Role of Technical 
Information 
• Provides the ability to define scope of 
problem and policy impact 
• Technical knowledge may supersede 
local knowledge 
• Technical knowledge as a competitive 
asset that provides leverage in the 




In terms of what institutional dynamics help facilitate the development of collaboration 
and democratic decision-making (niche) in large-scale resource management (regime), the 
literature presents a number of scenarios. It is clear that there must be a specific compromised 
resource and that resource must be salient to actors. Additionally, we support for the idea that 
early engagement in the decision-making process establishes a voice for grassroots participation.  
Recognizing that grassroots actors can serve a specific role of providing scientific and technical 
information, this suggests that the lack of information may be a prerequisite. Again, we see the 
importance of trust between stakeholders as necessary to the formation and long-term inclusion 
of grassroots organizations in the policy process.  
In terms of what role(s) a grassroots actor may play in the large-scale collaborative 
process, in other words how to incorporate the niche at the regime, it is reasonable to assume that 
to maintain a seat at the decision table the ability to address the specific language and technical 
content of the discussion and early engagement is valuable. Accurate information increases the 
likelihood of local stakeholders creating CPR institutions (Ostrom, 1990), whereas differences in 
information about the resource can make it difficult. To that end, in situations where accurate 
information on the condition of the resource is available, more collective action will occur and 
those stakeholders facilitating the access to information will have an important role in the 
decision-making process. Likewise, given that technical knowledge can be leveraged throughout 
the policy process to both define the scope of the policy problem as well as bring diverse 
stakeholders together, the ability to provide and share technical knowledge can be viewed as a 
valuable form of social capital. Combined, an effective role that grassroots actors may play in a 
large-scale process would be as a source and network for technical knowledge.   
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Hypothesis: The institutional elements of a compromised resource, mutual trust between 
stakeholders, an established network and policy entrepreneur, early engagement, and the need 
for scientific knowledge will be present when grassroots actors are included in large-scale water 
resource management process.   
5.10 Reconciling the Literature with Reality: Assessing the evolvement of the ACFS and 
Niche Governance Innovations  
In this section I reconcile a few of the institutional elements identified in the literature with 
the creation and ongoing inclusion of the ACFS in the governance process. As noted, I use a case 
study on the development of the ACFS as a proxy to understand the institutional dynamics that 
facilitate the niche innovation of collaboration and democratic decision making in the 
management of large scale water resources.  
While initially I hoped to conduct more interviews to gain a better understanding of how 
the formation of the ACFS compared with the literature, due to the political context, many 
members of the ACF as well as other actors within the sociotechnical regime - including the 
Army Corp of Engineers, SEPA, and the EPD - were unable to speak with me.  
5.10.1 Compromised Resource Conditions and Salience of Resources 
Studies of CPR and the formation of grassroots organization highlight that users are 
compelled to engage in resource management when the resource in question is under stress, or 
certain users feel they are being denied their adequate use of the resource, i.e. the salience of the 
resource. To begin my examination with what institutional drivers may have led to the 
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establishment of ACFS, I examine both the physical state of the ACF and the salience of the 
resource to the founding members.  
The ACFS began with the purpose of creating a better management resource system for a 
river basin that spanned hundreds of miles of ecologically diverse watersheds, hosted multiple 
competing users, and where millions of people also lived. The ACF is, in itself, a major source of 
economic and social well-being. With the recognition that there were multiple, competing needs 
on the ACF, and the belief that the current management strategy was not adequate, the ACFS 
commenced. As one member put it, “we basically just wanted to see if the stakeholders, without 
the lawyers, could create a better management strategy (Masters, 2016).” 
The ACFS formed at two critical points in the water wars history.  First, as noted, in 2003 
Georgia struck an agreement with the Corps of Engineers to provide metro Atlanta with 23% of 
the water in Lake Lanier, which at the time was a 65% increase. Because Alabama and Florida 
challenged the agreement in court, Atlanta was in some degree of limbo over its water resources. 
This limbo became acutely problematic when the drought returned to Georgia in 2006. From 
2006 to 2007 the drought intensified and water levels in Lake Lanier plunged toward historic 
lows, resulting in Georgia suing the Corps of Engineer to reduce flows from the reservoir. Water 
restrictions were declared across the region; the Federal Government chose to intervene. When 
State and Federal efforts to broker a tri-state agreement by March 1, 2008, failed, the Corps took 
it upon itself to determine a new management plan. By December of 2007, Lake Lanier had 
reached an all-time low. At which point, the Corps had already been managing five federal ACF 
reservoirs under an Exceptional Drought Operations (EDO) amendment. The EDO lowered the 
minimum flow requirement for the Apalachicola River, reducing the rate of storage drawdown if 
 262 
drought persisted and allowing reservoirs to refill before normal operations resume. On ACF 
there are four species protected by the Environmental Species Act, all of which depended on 
these flows. Concern over the impact of low flows to these species began to heighten, causing 
tension between State, Federal, Corps, and environmental leaders.  
In response to the growing frustration and conflict, the Georgia Assembly approved 
funding for a statewide water management plan including a 3-year data gathering effort to 
determine how much water is available in the state. At the same the time the US Court of 
Appeals overturned the 2003 agreement between Georgia and the Corps of Engineers increasing 
the water supply from Lake Lanier for metro Atlanta. The ruling stated that such a reallocation 
requires Congressional authorization. Any transparency between States on crafting a water 
management plan essentially disappeared.  
The physical and legislative fragility of the ACF helped the ACFS founders engage other 
stakeholders and competing resource users. The original ten founders started holding stakeholder 
forums throughout the basin, which confirmed both the frustration with the litigation process and 
a desire to collaborate. Within six months, the ACFS grew from 10 to 35 volunteers representing 
all 4 regions of the ACF Basin and various, often competing, interest groups. What is very 
important to understand, and a key element that makes the case of ACF Stakeholders so 
interesting, is that unlike other cases water resource management stress and challenge (such as 
the Colorado River, Chesapeake Bay, or the Delaware River Basin) there was no mandate for the 
ACFS establishment. While the court order provided a sense of legitimacy and urgency to the 
ACFS and its role in the water wars, it did not establish or legitimize the grassroots 
organization’s role in the policy process. The court order gave a timeline for the ACFS to 
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leverage when engaging with other stakeholders and a sense of urgency for determining a new 
management strategy.  The combination of a legal need and urgency for a long-term 
management plan opened a door for local, stakeholder engagement and the space to begin 
building a governance strategy, with the inclusion of grassroots input.  
Immediately following the formation of the ACFS and as the founding members began 
gaining support, in July 2009, a Federal District Court judge ruled that the water supply was in 
fact not an authorized purpose for Lake Lanier and gave the governors of Alabama, Georgia and 
Florida three years to settle their differences and negotiate an agreement for water allocation, 
again creating a window for legitimacy and need for the ACFS. Without such an agreement, 
water supply would revert to 1970s levels by 2012 and Metro Atlanta could lose up to a half of 
its water supply from Lake Lanier and the Chattahoochee River.  
Interestingly enough, by the end of 2009 the drought began to subside, alleviating much 
of the immediate panic and creating another window for planning. At this point the ACFS had 
established itself as a grassroots organization focused on creating a collaborative process focused 
on developing a resource management plan.  While drought and failure in the state negotiation 
process prompted the original members to form the ACFS, the ACFS began engaging other 
stakeholders when the drought had subsided enough to pull the states out of crisis mode and turn 
greater attention towards long-term goals. The drought that sparked the intense judicial 
engagement, was subsiding as record-breaking floods returned Lake Lanier to full pool. The 
physical stability, albeit short-term, allowed for stakeholders to engage in conversation about the 
sustainability of the resource as opposed to shoring up immediate needs (Masters, 2016).  
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5.10.2 Established Network and the Existence of a Policy Entrepreneur  
While establishing at a time when tensions with the current system were high helped the 
ACFS emergence, the network of the founding members facilitated the initial engagement with 
other parties and was able to establish the ACFS as a platform for multiple, and often competing, 
users.  
The original ten members had different backgrounds; each was frustrated with the current 
management practices; and given the state of the ACF felt an element of urgency to try and 
establish a better platform. In the initial year of the ACFS, each founding member committed to 
leveraging their own professional network, as well as seeking out and inciting other affected 
parties to the table (Master, 2016). Unfortunately, I was not able to acquire the necessary 
interviews with the original founding members to establish how their network was leveraged or 
whether or not there was a specific policy entrepreneur in the group. However, from my 
conversation with the current Director for the ACFS, it was apparent that each of the founding 
members brought with them a network of individuals relevant to the policy debate.  
5.10.3 Need for Technical Information and Scientific Knowledge 
One issue that all members of the inaugural members of the ACFS agreed upon was the 
need for better data on the past, current, and future state of the ACF under growing demand. 
Only through accurate technical information would the ACFS be able to devise a better 
management strategy for the Basin.  To that end, analyzing the ACF and producing data on the 
resource conditions was a prominent goal, and continues to be so, on the agenda. The ACFS 
continually recognizes its core goals as: 
 265 
● Develop a consensus-based, basin-wide vision and a unified voice for the ACF Basin.  
● Enhance communication among all stakeholders in the ACF 
● Develop and disseminate a common, scientifically valid understanding of the ACF Basin, 
including the inter-related nature of water management in the Basin, the needs of all of 
its stakeholders, and the limitations of the system 
● Recommend and help implement solutions that are based on the best available 
technology and science22 
While data and information on the existence of resource problems was relatively 
widespread in the years leading up to the inception of the ACFS, the data was disaggregated and 
had not been applied to any master management strategy. Much of the research on the ACFS had 
come through either the Army Corp, which the ACFS felt was not representative of all the needs 
in the Basin, or the USGS and were focused on increasing threats to local ecosystems, limited 
supply, and long-term drought (Light, et al., 2006). Furthermore, just because the information on 
degrading ecosystem conditions, increased drought, and strained conditions did not mean that 
consensus existed on the cause of the problems or the solutions to these problems (Masters, 
2016). The ACFS acutely realized a need for a consensus-based management plan, and set off to 
create one.  
As a result, the ACFS spent much of 2010 gaining stakeholder input and membership and 
by the Spring of 2011 had developed a scope of work document for a Statewide Management 
                                                
22 ACF Stakeholders Update. Sustainable Water Management Plan. Business of Water Conference. Phoenix City, 
Alabama. October 22, 2015. http://www.troy.edu/phenixcity/assets/documents/cwre/2015-presentations/Webb-
Betty.pdf 
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Plan (SWMP). To accomplish this study the ACFS needed funding, and again the founding 
members leveraged their network towards the fundraising effort. By the fall 2011, the ACFS had 
initiated a contract with Black & Veach and Atkins to begin drafting the timeline and needs of 
developing a SWMP. 
 By determining the need for technical information, committing to creating the forum and 
to developing a SWMP, and pursuing third-party consulting, the ACFS asserted itself as playing 
a critical role in the water wars, as the entity with technical information. This approach has led to 
multiple iterations and updates of resource management plans, and in essence, new policies for 
addressing the problem. Additionally, by taking on the role of providing technical information, 
the ACFS provided a way to institutionalize the collaboration between the scientific community 
and with other stakeholders. The ACFS became the forum by which concerned stakeholders of 
all interests and the scientific community were engaged. And this was done without a State or 
Federal order supporting the efforts.  
The key take-away, however, is that despite the ongoing debates and disagreement about 
how best to resolve the resource problems along the ACF, the pursuit of collaboration in itself, 
and the ability to produce information and awareness about the nature and extent of the resource 
management problems was the source of institutional formation and evolution for the ACFS. 
This point has theoretical and empirical support from the literatures. Where the breakdown is 
that despite information playing a critical role in the formation of the ACFS, as well as the 
benefits of collective choice more broadly, these factors do not necessitate institutional change.  
ACFS has developed the data and information articulating the presence of the problem 
and a management solution. However, this has yet to lead to a change in the governance strategy 
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of the ACF, i.e. the legal battles ensue. More work is needed to understand the limit by which 
technical information influences the governance process.   
5.10.4 Trust between Actors  
Assuming the role of providing technical knowledge and developing a resource 
management plan did not come without pushback, internally and externally. To date the ACFS is 
still dealing with political and legal battles over their pursuits to create a SWMP. Interestingly 
enough, despite external conflicts, there was a significant amount of trust between ACFS 
members. Not all members agreed but there were no alliances formed between members of the 
ACFS that would not have been obvious by their represented interests. For the most part ACFS 
members largely stuck to their platform of interest and did not attempt to form any alliances with 
other members to leverage any power (Master, 2016).  
In large part this was a result of the formal structure set up by the ACFS. Every member 
received no more than one vote and every formal decision had to be supported by unanimous 
consent. (Master, 2016) The established structure resulted in a “fairly democratic process and 
one where everyone understood that people were there for their own interests but we had to be 
honest with each other (Master, 2016)”  
5.11 Discussion 
While my ability to collect interviews from ACFS members and do research on this 
active topic has been limited, I do find initial support for aspects of my hypothesis. The 
compromised condition of the ACF as well as the growing frustration over the presiding 
governance strategies were the main impetus for the formation of the ACFS. Recognizing the 
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lack of collaboration and lack of scientific-knowledge driving the governance approach, the 
purpose of the ACFS became establishing a platform for mutual collaboration and the 
development and dissemination of technical knowledge to support a consensus-driven 
management plan. Ultimately the purpose of the ACFS remains to develop and integrate a new 
management approach to the ACF, and to provide the warring states with a consensus-based, 
management plan, in hopes of ending the fruitless legal battles. To develop this niche innovation, 
the ACFS worked to establish institutions that would foster trust among participants, represented 
by the single vote system and the requirement of unanimity in decision-making. Additionally, the 
ACFS committed to being the source of scientific knowledge, as represented by its commitment 
to research and independent analyses.  
However, in terms of timing of engagement, the ACFS only became active after decades 
of legal battles between the states. This may be a reason for why the platform and the resources 
that the ACFS provides is not being utilized yet by the warring states. The regime lock-in may be 
too entrenched, and at this point in the process, the idea of incorporating collaboration and 
democratic decision-making threatens the ability of the regime actors to utilize power plays to 
dominate the ACF system.  The lack of early engagement may prove to be a hindrance to the 
success of the ACFS but this particular case study is unable to determine if early engagement 
would have produced a different outcome. It is still unclear whether or not the ACFS, the 
platform for collaboration as well as all of the wealth of knowledge it provides, will be utilized 
effectively in the governance of the ACF. It could be the case that the years of federal litigation 
have created a path dependency for Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, despite the opportunity 
provided by the ACFS.  
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To date, this research suggests that the institutional elements of a compromised resource, 
mutual trust between stakeholders, an established network and policy entrepreneur, and the need 
for scientific knowledge, support the incorporation and relevance of grass root actors, increased 
public participation, and democratic decision making in water resource management. 
Furthermore, there are hundreds of successful case studies of collaborative resource management 
regimes at the small-scale. However, despite the success at the niche level of innovation, and 
despite the presence of multiple, facilitating institutions, the ACFS has yet to impact the 
prevailing water resource regime. What is unclear is whether the timing of engagement is the 
limiting factor for the inclusion of the ACFS in the management of the ACF, or if the 
institutional elements that facilitate small-scale success simply do not transfer to the large-scale. 
From my review on the legal subsystems that have supported the current regime, it appears that 
even the best efforts of grassroots actors may be suppressed by the regime in the absence of 
fundamental changes to the water laws in the Southeast. Without qualitative change to the legal 
structures which guide the ACF water system it is unlikely that any qualitative change will occur 
in the management of the basin.  
If the goal is for Georgia to move towards a more equitable sharing of scarce resources, 
create a structure for collaboration and greater adoption of democratic decision making, as well 
as have some foresight on how to plan for changing resource conditions, at minimum a 
reexamination of the water rights and the distribution system is necessary. Continuing to follow a 
purely common law riparian system, without the managerial authority to allow for flexibility or 
the inclusion of relevant information, seems to underpin the current regimes’ path dependency 
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5.13.1 ACF Stakeholders  
The Interest Groups Represented by the ACF Stakeholders Include:  
• Water Supply  
• Farm and Urban Agriculture  
• Recreation  
• Local Government 
• Water Quality Industry and Manufacturing  
• Navigation  
• Historic and Cultural 
• Hydro Power  
• Environmental and Conservation  
• Seafood Industry  
• Thermal Power  
• Business / Economic Development 
 
The individual associations that belong to the ACFS include: 
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• Alabama Municipal Electric Authority 
• Alabama Rivers Alliance 
• Apalachicola Riverkeeper 
• Arcadis-US 
• Atlanta Fulton County Water Resource Commission 
• Atlanta Regional Commission 
• Calhoun County Board of Water Commissioners 
• Camilla Chamber of Commerce 
• CCT & Associates, Inc. 
• Chattahoochee Riverkeeper 
• City of Atlanta City of Camilla 
• City of Cumming 
• City of Dothan 
• City of Gainesville 
• City of Griffin 
• City of LaGrange 
• City of Sandy Springs 
• Clayton County Water Authority 
• Cobb County Water System 
• Cobb County-Marietta Water Authority 
• Columbus Water Works 
• Conservation/Recreation Lands, LLC 
• Council for Quality Growth 
• D J Plastics 
• Dougherty County Farm Bureau 
• Emory University 
• Flint Riverkeeper, Inc. 
• Florida Riparian Stakeholders 
• Forsyth County Water & Sewer 
• Friends of Lake Eufaula 
• Georgetown – Quitman County Commissioners 
• Georgia Conservancy 
• Georgia Green Industry Association 
• Georgia Municipal Association 
• Georgia Poultry Federation 
• Georgia Power Company 
• Golder Associates, Inc. 
• Gulf County Board of Commissioners 
• Gulf Power Company 
• Gwinnett County 
• Gwinnett Environmental and Heritage Center Historic Chattahoochee Commission 
• Jim Woodruff Preference Customers 
• Jones Ecological Research Center 
• LaGrange-Troup County CoC 
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• Lake Lanier Association 
• Lake Seminole Association 
• Liberty County Board of Commissioners 
• Liberty County Riparian Stakeholders 
• MeadWestvaco 
• Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce 
• Metro North GA Water Planning District 
• Middle Chattahoochee Water Coalition 
• MillerCoors LLC 
• Mitchell County Board of Commissioners 
• Mitchell County Development Authority 
• Mitchell County Farm Bureau 
• National Peanut Buying Point Association 
• Nature Conservancy of Georgia 
• Neal Land & Timber Co. 
• Oglethorpe Power Corporation 
• Pelham Chamber of Commerce 
• Procter and Gamble 
• Riparian County Stakeholders Coalition 
• Riverway South 
• Robert B. Ragland Foundation, Inc. 
• Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc 
• Southern Aluminum Finishing Co. 
• Stansbury Resolutions by Design, Inc 
• Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 
• SunTrust Bank 
• TOTO USA 
• Tri Rivers Development Association 
• Troup County Board of Commissioners 
• Utilities Board Tuskegee 
• West Point Lake Coalition 
 
5.13.2 Methodology Materials  
5.13.2.1  Interview Questions 
The following are the interview questions developed for meetings with relevant parties regarding 





• How well experts perceive the current water management system on the ACF to be 
working? 
• What characteristics expert think are necessary for the successful management of 
interstate river basins, including Ostrom’s eight principles? 
• What were the motivations for the current polycentric approach to management on the 
ACF? 
• What institutions are driving the current approach to water management and what 
institutional barriers may exist to achieve successful management? 
• What role do energy institutions play currently in the management of ACF?  
• What is/has been your role in working with water resources on the ACF? 
Physical Settings: 
• Can you characterize the economic value of the ACF? 
• Who is ultimately responsible for the ACF management? 
• What physical and human resources are required to manage the ACF? 
• What technologies and processes are required for management?  
• What are the resources required for successful management?  
• What physical restrictions dictate management? 
Attributes of the Community 
• What cultural attributes challenge water resource management on the ACF? 
• What cultural challenges could prevent the states from relying on decentralized, 
management? 
• Do you think the public is well informed of the issues? 
• Existing Institutional Setting (including nested enterprises) 
• How well are federal, state, and local activities coordinated? 
• What was the motivation for establishing the ACFS and pursuing greater decentralization 
in management? 
• Have any of these motivations been actualized? 
• What rulings have set the most precedence in governance approaches on the ACF? 
• What legal challenges could prevent the states from relying on decentralized, 
management? 
• How does the local management of water resources work with state and federal 
management of water resources? 
• How much authority do local, decentralized actors actually have in the decision-making 
process?  
Transaction Costs 
• Transactions costs includes the costs of including multiple levels of governance and 
multiple stakeholders in the management of interstate river basins, do you think are the 




• How well does the information that has been provided by expert scientists, responsible 
for modeling the ACF dynamics, match with the governance strategies that are currently 
playing out on the ACF? 
• What are the benefits to the current management approach? What are the costs? 
• Rules in Use (including well-defined boundaries, monitoring, granulated sanctions) : 
• Are there clear rules that specify the set of positions or roles that each level of 
governance plays?  
• Are there clear rules for establishing water rights? Or stakeholder rights in the 
management process?  
• Are there clear rules that govern water rights, energy contracts, and energy generation 
decisions?  
• Do the penalties of enforcing water management increase with the severity of the 
offense? 
• How would the ACF conflict be different if Georgia, Alabama, and Florida were not 
riparian states? 
• How has the riparian system shaped the water allocation? Data collection? Stakeholder 
involvement? 
• How role has the riparian system played in shaping the way interstate river basin 
management has developed in the south? 
• What legal doctrines are setting precedence in this allocation and management conflict? 
Who are the according responsible parties? 
• Are there currently clear boundaries of use on the ACF? What role does the legal system 
play in this? 
• How often is litigation used to settle local disputes, and interstate disputes? 
Adaptability 
• Is the current management approach sustainable to long-term consumption patterns, 
development needs, and potential for increased drought? 
• Are there benefits of a more decentralized governance system? 
The Role of Information (including the congruence between appropriation and local condition) 
• How often scientific analysis discussed by stakeholders? 
• To what extent are decisions guided by local knowledge? Scientific knowledge? Or 
determined by hierarchal decisions? 
• How are local concerns over drought or watershed resilience reflected in the 
organizational plans?  
• Are all decisions made, in regards to governance, based on scientific evidence? What 
proportions of decisions are based on scientific information? Who are the according 
stakeholders? 
• How much time, if any is dedicated toward exploring alternative means for meeting 





Stakeholder dynamics (including: minimum recognition of rights, and conflict resolution 
mechanisms) 
• How was ACFS formed? Why? 
• What were the incentives to forming ACFS? 
• What is the meeting format? 
• How often does ACFS meet? 
• What is the selection process? 
• What is the retention rate? 
• What areas of consumption (i.e. agriculture, energy, public supply) have been at the 
center of discussions over curtailing use? Why do you think this is? 
• How are local concerns over drought or watershed reflected in stakeholder interests?  
• How are decisions made? 
• What happens if there is conflict between stakeholders? How is it resolved? 
• What are the major institutional barriers to successful interstate river basin management 
on the ACF? 
• How are decisions presented to State and Federal entities? 
• What policy levers do stakeholders have? How are they used?  
• Does the current system allow for representation of all interests? 
• Are there rules to how much information can be shared between stakeholders?  
Cross-scale Actors (Focus on Army Corp and SEPA) 
• What role does water availability play in energy resource planning? 
• At how many scales of governance are energy institutions operating? 
• Do energy institutions play a larger role in decision-making on the ACF then other 
stakeholders? Including federal energy and private energy? 
• Have their ever been discussions about shifting sources of energy generation to curtail 
water? Has there been any analysis done on this?  
• What are the major institutional barriers to successful interstate river basin management 
on the ACF? 
• How have years of unmet contracts influenced the marketing of SEPA power? 
• How are SEPA contracts set? What actors have control? 
• Has there ever been an instance where SEPA operations or Southern Power were 
amended due to external pressures? 
• Are there clear rules for how USACE manages Lake Lanier in times of drought or how 
Southern Company manages generation in times of drought?  
Some examples of high-level questions for USAEs include: 




• What concerns, if any, do you have about future SEPA operations conflicting with 
ecological concerns or development requirements? 
• To what extent do concerns over drought influence your management decisions? 
• Existing Institutional Setting:  
• To what extent do you provide feedback to SEPA representatives on operations? 
• What other stakeholders are USAE in constant communication with? 
• To what extent to you have input on the setting of SEPA contracts? 
• To what extent have SEPA contracts caused conflict with other stakeholders invested in 
watershed management? 
• How has the relationship between USACE and SEPA changed overtime? 
Rules in Use:  
• How do legal doctrines shape USAE operations? 
• How do federal environmental standards shape operations?  
• Transaction Costs: 
• Are there any transaction costs associated with shifting generation strategies?  
Some examples of high-level questions for SEPA contract recipients: 
Action Situation: 
• To what extent do you provide feedback to SEPA representatives on operations? 
• To what extent to you have input on the setting of SEPA contracts? 
• To what extent have SEPA contracts caused conflict for your constituents? 
• To what extent do concerns over drought influence your contract decisions? 
• Existing Institutional Settings and Rules In Use: 
• How has the relationship between your city and SEPA changed overtime? 
• What concerns, if any, do you have about future SEPA operations conflicting with 
ecological concerns or development requirements? 
• What is the primary reason and benefit for securing a SEPA contract? 
• Are there alternatives?  
• Transaction Costs: 
• What barriers may prevent an alternative approach? 
• Are there any transaction costs associated with shifting generation strategies?  
• Some examples of high-level questions for Georgia Power and Oglethorpe Power 
Cooperation include 
Action Area: 
• How long has water supply on the ACF been a concern? 
• What concerns, if any, do you have about future Georgia Power operations conflicting 
with ecological concerns or development requirements? 




Existing Institutional Setting:  
• How have the ‘water wars’ impacted operations? 
• What role is Georgia Power or Oglethorpe Power Cooperation playing in the decision 
making of state and federal governance decisions on the ACF? 
• What other stakeholders are you in constant communication with? 
• How has the relationship between you and USGS, EPD, and USACE changed overtime? 
Rules In Use: 
• What penalties do you receive for not complying with water management laws? How 
many have you received? Do these influence your decisions?  
• How do legal doctrines shape your operations? 
• How do federal environmental standards shape operations?  
Transaction Costs 
• Are there any transaction costs associated with shifting generation strategies?  
Additional 
• Do you think that other people share your opinion? 
• What do you think is the future of the ACF system? 
• Overall, how do you think the management system is working? Explain?  What do you 
think are the characteristics that describe successful water management institutions? Are 
those present on the ACF? 
• Is there anyone else you would recommend I speak to about this topic? 
• What do you think is the level of trust between local, state, and federal entities? 
 
5.13.2.2 Methodological Approach to the Administered Survey 
In-depth semi-structured interviews with leaders among the ACFS members were used to 
gain insight into the characteristics that stakeholders felt important in successfully managing 
water resources in the ACF and to explore how well new actors engaged in the policy process 
believe the current system is working. Additional interviews were scheduled to included 
representatives from local, state, and federal water-related agencies, non-state actors, municipal, 
energy, industrial, and recreational interests within the basin. Unfortunately, due to the political 
sensitivity of the topic area, after first agreeing to be interviewed, all but two interviewees 
declined.  
Insights from these two interviews were combined with insights gleaned from work 
presented in Section 1 as well as Ostrom’s success criteria (Ostrom, 1990) and operationalized 
into an online survey. The survey consisted of three sections. The first section focuses on 




successful governance criteria items were developed from Ostrom’s eight principles and the 
literature.  All statements were positively worded (Belson 1981; Foddy 1993) because they are 
more reliable than negatively worded items (O’Muircheartaigh et al. 2000). For the second 
portion of the survey, understanding the institutional barriers to successful management on the 
ACF, the same approach was used. Before administering the survey, three cognitive surveys 
were conducted (Lietz, 2010) to test how well respondents will comprehend the survey 
questions. These cognitive surveys were administered to fellow grad students. The third portion 
of the survey allowed the participants to freely comment on their involvement in the policy 
process. 
The first section of the online survey allowed participants to systematically rank twenty-
one statements on the most important aspects of successful water resource management, with 1 
representing the aspect that the participant found to be the most important aspect of successful 
water resource management. The twenty-one statements were: 
1. Clearly defined water rights 
2. Clearly defined rules of use 
3. The costs and benefits of water use are allocated equitably among users 
4. Accurate scientific analysis on physical restrictions 
5. Clear understanding of the costs and benefits of different allocation plans 
6. Incorporation of local knowledge to state and federal resource management decisions 
7. Monitoring of water use 
8. Collection of data on water use 
9. Penalties for not complying with management decisions 
10. Penalties are reflective of the severity of the offense 
11. Flexibility in the decision-making process 
12. Ability for all levels of stakeholders to influence policy decisions 
13. The inclusion of multiple and diverse stakeholder input 
14. Coordination between local, state, and federal management entities 
15. Preservation of ecological habitats 
16. Insurance of adequate supply for agricultural production 
17. Insurance of adequate supply for energy production 
18. Insurance of adequate supply for city water supply 
19. Insurance of adequate supply for recreational use 
20. Insurance of adequate water conditions for fishing industry 
The second section of the online survey allowed participants to systematically rank 
twenty-one statements on the barriers to successful water resource management, with 1 
representing the aspect that the participant found to be the largest barrier to successful water 
resource management. The twenty-one statements were:                                                                   
                    
1. Maintaining environmental standards 
2. Unmetered surface water consumption 




4. Historical legal constraints related to the riparian legal system 
5. Uncertainty about future water supply under different climate scenarios 
6. Lack of involvement from city management  
7. The need to insure adequate water conditions for fishing 
8. The need to insure adequate water supply for agricultural use 
9. The need to insure adequate water supply for energy production 
10. The need to insure adequate water supply for Georgia cities 
11. The need to insure adequate water for recreation 
12. The need adequate water for recreation 
13. Poor cooperation between state leaders                                   
14. Uncertainty about future water demand 
15. Lack of transparency in the decision-making process 
16. Lack of clear rules or boundaries for water users 
17. Lack of public participation in resource management decisions 
18. The rules for water use allocation are not fair to all users 
19. Lack of penalties for breaking water use rules  
20. Lack of technical knowledge supporting decision making           
21. The rules governing water resources do not match the demands on the water users 
22. Inability for those impacted by changes to water resource management to participate in 
the decision-making process                             
23. State and Federal decision-makers respect for local knowledge 
24. The complexity and/or costliness of the decision-making process 
25. Lack of coordination between local, state, and federal decision makers 
 
To sort and analyze the firsts two portions of the survey responses, I chose to use a Q-
Sort Method (Zeemering 2009, Thomas and Watson 2002). The Q-sort method is used in 
environmental policy research in order to gain insight into policy discourse centered on natural 
resource and environmental problems (Addams and Proops 2001) The Q-Sort method tests the 
item agreement and the fit in order to form the basis for assessing the construct validity and to 
improve the reliability of the constructs (Nahm et al. 2002) and is particularly useful when 
researchers wish to understand and describe the variety of subjective viewpoints on an issue. The 
Q-methodology employs a factor analysis to identify the common patterns in which statements 
were sorted, using the eigenvalues as a percentage of explained variance to determine the major 
factors. A varimax rotation was then employed to obtain the final factor solutions (McKeown 


















Please Select an affiliation 
Please Select an affiliation - Other (please specify) 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - Maintaining 
environmental standards 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 





Copy of Administered Survey (Continued) 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - Lack of consistency in 
legal rulings regarding water rights 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - Historical legal 
constraints related to the riparian legal system 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - Uncertainty about 
future water supply under different climate scenarios 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - Lack of involvement 
from city management  
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - The need to 




Copy of Administered Survey (Continued) 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - The need to 
insure adequate water supply for agricultural use 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - The need to 
insure adequate water supply for energy production 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - The need to 
insure adequate water supply for Georgia cities 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - The need to 
insure adequate water for recreation 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 




water for recreation 
Copy of Administered Survey (Continued) 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - Poor cooperation 
between state leaders 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - Uncertainty about 
future water demand 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - Lack of transparency 
in the decision-making process 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - Lack of clear rules or 
boundaries for water users 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - Lack of public 






Copy of Administered Survey (Continued) 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource  
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - The rules for water use 
allocation are not fair to all users 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - Lack of penalties for 
breaking water use rules  
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - Lack of technical 
knowledge supporting decision making 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - The rules governing 





Copy of Administered Survey (Continued) 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - State and Federal 
decision-makers respect for local knowledge 
 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - The complexity and/or 
costliness of the decision-making process 
Please rank the issue that you believe to be the largest barrier to successful water resource 
management on the ACF, with 1 representing the largest barrier. The recommended way to 
rank your choices is to first go through and pick the largest barrier from the list of 25 choices. 
Then sequentially pick the largest barrier from the remaining choices. - Lack of coordination 
between local, state, and federal decision makers 
If there is a barrier(s) you believe is not included in this list, please list it below. - Open-Ended 
Response 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Clearly defined water rights 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 




Copy of Administered Survey (Continued) 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - The costs and benefits of water use are allocated equitably among users 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Accurate scientific analysis on physical restrictions 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Clear understanding of the costs and benefits of different allocation plans 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Recognition of the importance of local knowledge into the decision-making 
process 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 





Copy of Administered Survey (Continued) 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Monitoring of water use 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Collection of data on water use 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Penalties for not complying with management decisions 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Penalties are reflective of the severity of the offense 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 




Copy of Administered Survey (Continued) 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Ability for all levels of stakeholders to influence policy decisions 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - The inclusion of multiple and diverse stakeholder input 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Coordination between local, state, and federal management entities 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Preservation of ecological habitats 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 




Copy of Administered Survey (Continued) 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Insurance of adequate supply for energy production 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Insurance of adequate supply for city water supply 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Insurance of adequate supply for recreational use 
 
Please systematically rank the most important aspect of successful water resource 
management. With 1 representing the aspect you believe to be the most important. The 
recommended way to answer this question is to first pick the aspect you think is most 
important and then systematically go through and rank the most important aspect from the 
remaining list. - Insurance of adequate water conditions for fishing industry 
If there is an aspect(s) that you believe is critical to successful water resource management, 
please list below. - Open-Ended Response 
• I believe that energy production is the most important issue driving the management of 
the ACF 
• I believe water use allocation for energy production should take precedence over water 
use allocation for agriculture 




Copy of Administered Survey (Continued) 
• I believe water use allocation for energy production should take precedence over 
maintaining water supply/characteristics that will ensure constant ecosystem 
preservation 
• I believe energy producers should pursue investments in energy technologies that 
reduce energy production's water use 
• I believe energy producers are adequately investing in technologies that reduce the 
water use of energy production 
• I believe energy producers should pursue investment in energy production technologies 
that use little water even if that increases the cost of energy to consumers 
• I believe stakeholders representing energy production have more influence in water 
resource management than stakeholders representing other industry interests 
• I believe stakeholders representing energy production have more influence in water 
resource management than stakeholders representing environmental issues 
• I believe energy actors should have less influence in water resource management 
decisions 
• I believe thermoelectric power production is a major threat to sustainable water 
resource management  
• I believe hydroelectric power production is a major threat to sustainable water resource 
management 
• I believe federal policies guiding electric power production should account for water 
resource impacts 
• I believe current state policies guiding electric power production in Georgia are made 
with attention to water resource impacts 
• I believe state policies guiding electric power production should include water resource 
impacts 
• I believe stakeholders representing energy production have more influence in water 
resource management decisions than any other stakeholder group 
• I believe the water use of energy production should be more regulated 
• I believe more research should be conducted on the water use of energy production 
• I believe current water regulations for energy production are sufficient  
• I believe there is enough water on the ACF to support all current demands 
• I believe there is enough water in the ACF to support all projected demands over the 
next 25 years 
• I believe the general public is educated on the water use of energy production 
• I believe greater integration between energy planning and water resource management 
is needed 
• I believe there are adequate penalties in place for energy production facilities that 
violate water use regulations 
• I believe there should be stronger penalties in place for energy production facilities that 




Copy of Administered Survey (Continued) 
• I believe there should be an established governing body dedicated strictly to ensuring 
the water use of energy production is in line with water resource management  
• I believe adequate municipal water supply is the most important issue facing water 
resource management 
• I believe cities do an adequate job of managing municipal water supply in accordance 
with state water resource management 
• Cities should be actively trying to decrease their water consumption 
• City managers are well informed on the water resource management strategies of the 
State 
• City managers are actively engaged in State water policy decision-making 
• Georgia cities have local support for water conservation or efficiency policies or 
programs 
• The Georgia legislature supports city water conservation or efficiency policies or 
programs 
• Georgia cities have adequate resources (staff/funding) to develop water conservation or 
efficiency programs 
• Georgia residents expect city managers to be active in state and regional water policy 
issues 
• City conservation or efficiency policies and programs can effectively reduce municipal 
water consumption 
• City managers have the flexibility necessary to enact effective water efficiency or 
conservation policies and programs   
• The city managers that are most involved in water resource management are 
• The city managers that are most involved in water resource management are - Other 
(please specify) 
• The city managers that should be most involved in water resource management are 
• The city managers that should be most involved in water resource management are - 
Other (please specify) 
o Federal or state preemption of local authority -  
o Difficulty coordinating with other agencies -  
o Lack of clarity in the law -  
o Lack of state mandated actions, policies, or programs -  
o Conflicting state mandates -  
• Why did you want to be involved in water resource management for the ACF? - Open-
Ended Response 
• Do you believe the current stakeholder process has been successful? Why or why not? 
Please define successful. - Open-Ended Response 
• What do you think that other states facing water resource management conflicts could 





5.13.4 Results of Administered Survey 
 The online survey was administered to all one-hundred and seventy-two, past and present 
members of the ACF Stakeholders. Unfortunately, do the political sensitivity of the topic, only 
25 members initiated the survey and only 8 members completed the survey. As a result, the 
sample set was very small and there was not enough data to provide statistical significance. 
Therefore, instead of providing a full analysis of the results, I offer a summary of the two 
sections of the survey that received the greatest response.  
While the results of the survey administered to the ACFS is by no means conclusive, it is 
relevant to note that of the 25 completed surveys, the top three barriers that the ACFS members 
ranked as barriers to largest barriers to successful water resource management on the ACF, were: 
● Poor Cooperation between State Leaders 
● Lack of coordination between local, state, and federal decision makers, and  
● Lack of consistency in legal rulings regarding water rights 
Table 5-2 Results of ACF Stakeholder Survey on Barriers to Water Resource Management 
Attribute Total Score 
Poor cooperation between state leaders 11 21 
Lack of coordination between local, state, and federal decision makers 11 20.36 
Lack of consistency in legal rulings regarding water rights 8 19.75 
The need to insure adequate water supply for agricultural use 7 18 
The rules for water use allocation are not fair to all users 7 16.86 
Historical legal constraints related to the riparian legal system 7 15.57 
Maintaining environmental standards 8 15.38 




Table 5-2 (Continued) 
Lack of clear rules or boundaries for water users 9 15.33 
State and Federal decision-makers respect for local knowledge 6 15.17 
Unmetered surface water consumption 8 14.88 
The need to insure adequate water supply for Georgia cities 7 14.86 
Uncertainty about future water demand 7 14.86 
The rules governing water resources do not match the demands on the water 
users 
7 14.86 
The need to insure adequate water for recreation 5 13.4 
Lack of transparency in the decision-making process 8 13.38 
The complexity and/or costliness of the decision-making process 6 13.33 
Inability for those impacted by changes to water resource management to 
participate in the decision-making process 
7 13.29 
The need to insure adequate water supply for energy production 5 12.8 
The need to insure adequate water conditions for fishing 7 12.57 
The need adequate water for recreation 5 11.8 
Uncertainty about future water supply under different climate scenarios 8 11.13 




Table 5-2 (Continued) 
Lack of penalties for breaking water use rules  7 8.71 
Lack of involvement from municipalities 6 5.5 
 
Additionally, survey respondents noted that the lack of a regional governing authority, 
and the continual reliance on the courts as major barriers. Combined these results suggest that 
there are large structural barriers, underscoring the ‘rules-in-use’ regarding water rights that are 
inhibiting successful collaboration. Interestingly, the survey respondents did not list a lack of 
penalties for breaking water use rules as a major barrier. This suggests that penalties are less 
important in collaboration as consistency in the law structuring use. Possible most surprising was 
the survey respondents listing that ‘the need to insure adequate water supply for agricultural 
use’ was more inhibiting than the ‘need to insure adequate supplies for Georgia cities.’ This runs 
counter to what most summaries on the source of water conflict on the ACF would report.  
In regards to what is needed for successful water resource management on the ACF, 
survey respondents ranked accurate scientific information, clearly defined water rights, and 
coordination between local, state, and federal management entities as the major attributes 
necessary.  
 
Table 5-3 Results of ACF Stakeholder Survey on Institutions Necessary to Successful 
Water Resource Management 
Attribute  Total Count Score 
Accurate scientific analysis on physical restrictions 9 16.56 
Clearly defined water rights 9 16.33 
Coordination between local, state, and federal management entities 9 16.33 




Clearly defined rules of use 9 14.89 
Preservation of ecological habitats 8 13.63 
Collection of data on water use 7 13.43 
Monitoring of water use 8 13.38 
Clear understanding of the costs and benefits of different allocation plans 8 12.38 
Ability for all levels of stakeholders to influence policy decisions 8 12.38 
Flexibility in the decision-making process 8 11.88 
Insurance of adequate supply for agricultural production 7 11.14 
The costs and benefits of water use are allocated equitably among users 7 10.71 
Penalties for not complying with management decisions 7 9.86 
Incorporation of local knowledge to management decisions 7 9.71 
Insurance of adequate supply for recreational use 6 9.67 
Insurance of adequate supply for energy production 6 9.5 
Insurance of adequate supply for city water supply 6 9 
Insurance of adequate water conditions for fishing industry 7 8.86 
Recognition of the importance of local knowledge into the decision-making 
process 
6 7.83 





Again, penalties are not a major concern for members of the ACFS. Most surprising is 
that the ACFS members ranked ‘recognition of the importance of local knowledge into the 
decision-making process’ as the second least important aspect for successful management. This 
runs counter to what the literature states are the benefits of grassroots actors and potentially the 
benefits of including the ACFS in the governance process. This also suggests that while the 
ACFS recognize the importance of including a diversity of stakeholders in the governance 
process, ultimately the most important foundation is accurate scientific information. This, 
however, is not that surprising given that largely the purpose of the ACFS is to develop and 






CHAPTER 6. EXPLORING THE URBAN WATER-ENERGY-
CLIMATE NEXUS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR NICHE INNOVATIONS 
IN WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  
6.1 Introduction 
Throughout this dissertation, I have examined the multiple facets related to the 
sustainable transition of energy and water systems. In each chapter I looked at the water systems 
and energy systems separately. In this chapter I begin the necessary evaluation of examining 
sustainable transitions through a nexus view. As explored in all previous chapters, the 
management of water and energy systems is directly linked to sustainable development because 
they incorporate different technological, technical, sociopolitical, geographical, and institutional 
dimensions. While the engineering and policy literatures are increasingly recognizing such 
linkages, often studies have been fragmented in their focus - isolating systems and their 
dynamics to their functional articulation or by trying to assess their individual response to 
landscape level pressures, such as climate change and demographic changes (Gasmelseid, 2012).  
However, the complexity experienced in understanding the context of water and energy 
systems cannot be conceptualized through such partial views, but instead a holistic view must be 
taken. Separating water and energy policies as well as the stakeholders and technological 
solutions designed to combat against issues of resource constraints, economic development, and 
climate change is unlikely to address the development issues at the scale and pace needed (Perri, 
2005). Rather, innovations that cut across both water and energy resource constraints are 




The energy and water systems in the United States are two separate, established regimes, 
each with their own institutional, economic, regulatory, and behavioral dynamics. Each have 
created a lock-in that makes it difficult for niche technological and governance innovations to 
transition (see chapters 2,4, and 5). And while the two regimes hold different attributes, 
technological innovations in each of them significantly affect the sustainability of the entire 
environmental system. However, despite the growing recognition throughout the policy and 
engineering literature our water, energy, and climate systems are fundamentally interwoven, 
there has been little research conducted to facilitate the role of niche technologies beyond their 
primary functional scope.  
To accomplish this, a wider integrated approach is essential for identifying innovative 
transition pathways to sustainability. Such an approach will require a new paradigm orientation 
to enable mainstreamed transition towards more nexus-focused development pathways and will 
inevitably involve the destabilization of incumbent regimes and the emergence of new regimes 
involving novel configurations of technologies, actors, behaviors and rules (Geels, 2014).  
Movement towards more holistic approaches to water and energy management will also 
require an expansion on the functional purpose of the niche innovations from solving a single 
system problem to solving a nexus of problems. However, despite the growing emphasis on 
improving the integration of water and energy systems by focusing on efficiency, involvement of 
cross-system stakeholders, and of improved resource planning practices (Gasmelseid, 2011), 
little has been done to understand sustainable transitions by the expanded purpose of niche 




sustainable transition, continue to be deployed as single purpose technologies (Helpman, 1998). 
23 This approach of articulating niche technologies as only functionally relevant to one system, 
creates a path-dependency of isolation between the two systems and limits the potential for niche 
technological adoption (Gasmelseid, 2012) 
Such functional limiting of niche innovations is even reinforced by the dominant 
management framework aimed at facilitating sustainable transitions. For example, the Integrated 
Urban Water Management (IUWM), a water management and policy framework focused on the 
coordinated and efficient management of water supply systems, focuses only on technological 
innovations ability to improve water system efficiency (Wilkinson 2012). These technologies are 
referred to as low-impact development (LID) water techniques and include such innovations as 
green water infrastructure, grey-water reuse, wastewater recycling, decentralized wastewater 
treatment, and repair and replacement of leaking water and sewer pipes (Garrison et al. 2009; 
Griffiths-Sattenspiel and Wilson 2009; University of California Berkeley (UCB) and University 
of California Los Angeles (UCLA) 2011).   And while recently the literature has paid attention to 
the energy impacts of shifts in water use as well as how LIDs can contribute to decrease energy 
use (Malinowski et al., 2015; Allen et al. 2010; Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2011; 
USEPA 2013a, b), very little attention has been paid to how LID technologies may be 
strategically deployed to serve as tools for both energy and water systems.  
                                                
23 Single purpose technologies are ones that have wide range of use across the economy but lack the characteristic of having 





Considering that the vast majority of population growth is occurring in urban areas, in a 
time of increasing climatic change, cities become an excellent analytical space to understand 
how innovative policies and practices can be deployed to meet these changing conditions. The 
urban energy-water-climate nexus is an innovation in the policy framework for localities that 
recognizes the deep sociotechnical interdependence between these two systems within the 
current urban framework and the impacts of climate change that will shape governing policy 
accordingly (Yang, 2014). While investigations into how water and energy regimes must adapt 
to better account for their interlinked behavior have been extensively investigated across 
geographic regions (Cooley, 2011; Zhou, 2013; Dodder, 2011; Stillwell, 2015), there is a gap in 
the literature in regards to urban settings. 
Yet, the challenges to urbanization also pose opportunities for niche innovation 
development, paradigm shifts in resource planning, and the institutional dimensions of 
sustainable transitions; there are opportunities in urban areas to develop and test the innovative 
policies, technologies, and behaviors needed to sustainably meet the expanding needs of society 
(Dodman, 2009).  
Also, given the interlinked sociotechnical nature and associated trade-offs between water 
and energy consumption and production, it is important to contextualize research to evaluate 
specific opportunities and limitations within the appropriate scale. The urban water-energy nexus 
is location specific (Perrone et al. 2011). Differences in socioeconomic and political dynamics 
can create city-specific challenges and opportunities in water-energy management (Yang and 




regional differences influence the embodied energy, the GHG emissions, and energy costs of 
water (Mo et al. 2014) and regional differences greatly alter the embodied water and GHG 
emissions of energy production (Stillwell, 2012). From a political perspective, different legal and 
regulatory institutions, at different scales, not only shape the function and flexibility of energy 
and water systems but the opportunities for niche innovation adoption (See Chapters 2,3 and 5).  
Therefore, detailed understanding of the water-energy-climate nexus and how to deploy 
technologies to meet cross-system challenges of sustainable transition in an urban analysis is 
needed.  
From a nexus perspective, better understandings are needed on the interdependencies and 
feedbacks between both systems. With improved information on the potential for niche 
technologies to serve as tools in the cross-system sustainable transition, it may be that policy 
makers and city planners can expand the scope and deployment of niche innovations. It also may 
be that with increased understanding of the expanded benefits of certain niche technologies, 
adoption will diffuse beyond the system niche and improve the pace of sustainable transition 
across systems.  However, in order for policy makers to broaden their technological purview, and 
engage in an innovative nexus policy platform, more information is needed on the interactions 
between the water, energy, and climate in the urban setting as well as detailed analysis testing the 
potential technological and policy opportunities for a sustainable transition.  
In this final chapter, I move beyond examining active subsystems and process within the 
energy and water subsystem to explore the potential for a qualitative shift in the management of 




technologies. In this chapter, I return to the city and adopt a Water-Energy-Climate Nexus 
approach and access how niche innovations can support cross-system sustainable transitions.  
6.2 Research Questions 
In order to understand the potential for niche technologies to serve as cross-system solutions for 
sustainable transition, detailed analytics are necessary to facilitate improved policy. The research 
in this chapter seeks to answer four primary questions.  
RQ1. What are the interactions between electricity use, water use, and emissions, in the city?  
RQ2. Can niche energy innovations serve as tools for cross-system sustainable transition?  
RQ3. What implications does this analysis hold for a nexus policy approach to sustainable 
transition? 
To answer these three questions, I develop a tailored water-energy-climate nexus 
evaluation tool and apply it to a case study in Atlanta, GA. I evaluate two popular niche 
technologies from the energy and water system literature - distributed solar photovoltaics 
(DGPV) and rainwater harvesting (RWH) - and compare how the expanded use of each 
technology contributes to reductions in water use, reduce carbon emissions, reduce resource 
expenditures, and alleviates local water resource management concerns. I use these metrics to 
assess which technology produces the greatest amount of cross-system benefits.  The primary 
purpose of this chapter is to lay the groundwork regarding the understanding of nexus 
interactions in the urban space and to contribute to the research on the urban water-energy nexus 




relationships between energy use, water use, and climate. Our hope is that policymakers and 
researchers will build on the analysis provided in this study to further evaluate how to best 
strategically deploy niche technologies for cross-system sustainability gains and develop support 
better policies to foster adoption. To that end, I am interested in whether niche technologies that 
have largely been viewed as primarily energy purpose technologies are being undervalued, and if 
examined for their impact across systems could be given greater support. While RWH has 
consistently been framed as an innovative tool for sustainable transition of the water system, to 
my knowledge, no one has explored the potential for DGPV as a tool for meeting urban water 
transition challenges. Furthermore, despite growing recognition that nationally DGPV is a tool 
for reducing water-use stress in the power sector (NREL, 2016), to my knowledge this has not 
been explored at the city scale.  
For my evaluation, I develop the Georgia Policy Analysis Tool (GPAT) and apply it to 
analysis of Atlanta, GA - a city at the center of a long-standing water resource management 
challenge (See Chapter 5). I analyze the impacts of a hypothetical deployment of RWH cisterns 
and DGPV on 2% of all new commercial and residential constructions in Fulton County. I adapt 
the model to scale to Atlanta’s water supply system and to Georgia Power’s electricity network.  
From my results, I explore what the implications may mean for innovations in urban water-
energy-climate policy. This research provides policy makers with a better understanding of the 
connections between water and energy production, consumption, and management and seeks to 
expand the scope of technologies and pathways for water resource management and sustainable 




6.3 Literature Review   
Analysis on the urban water-energy-climate nexus aims to reveal the water-energy 
interactions within the context of urban development and climate changes. The past two decades 
have seen an increase in the research on the urban water-energy-climate nexus, driven in large 
part by an exploration on how current systems will adapt in response to increasing urbanization 
and climate pressures (C.A Scott, 2010). Understanding the connection between water use and 
energy use in urban areas and the connection between urban and regional impacts is becoming 
more critical as the demand increases (Cohen et al. 2004; Garrison et al. 2009; Griffiths-
Sattenspiel and Wilson 2009; Sovacool and Sovacool 2009; Wilkinson 2012). Overwhelmingly 
this research has been focused in Australia (Kenway et al., 2011; Kenway et al., 2008; Marsh, 
2008, Sharma et al., 2008a, Lundie et al., 2004, Kenway et al., 2008 and Fagan et al., 2010) with 
growing research in Asia (Rothausen and Conway, 2011; Fang, 2016; Y Gu, 2016) and South 
Africa (Landu and Brent, 2006, Friedrich et al., 2007 and Buckley et al., 2011).  
Much of the literature in this space focuses on how the current silos of centralized 
resource delivery infrastructure (i.e energy and water delivery) are inefficient and in need of 
fundamental programmatic, institutional, and technological changes. With regard to urban water 
supply, the transition research has continually recognized that the vast majority of existing 
centralized conventional urban water systems are inefficient; likewise, are conventional 
centralized technologies for wastewater. With the increasing landscape pressures such as the 
changing environment of rapid urbanization, population growth, and environmental stressors 




Often the debate over technological innovation focuses on whether urban areas should continue 
the incumbent approach of expansion and maintenance of centralized systems that use 
conventional technologies for urban water supply or if there are more efficient, and economical 
means of meeting a growing water demand. And if the later, what institutional arrangements are 
necessary to facilitate a transition (Sovacool, 2015; Herring, 2010).  
Within this growing discussion, Integrated Urban Water Management (IUWM) has 
become the leading paradigm for sustainable urban water resource management. IUWM 
considers water supply, wastewater treatment and disposal as an integrated system (Mitchell, 
2006) and seeks to manage the entire centralized system holistically. Often this centers on the 
coordinated and efficient management of storm water, potable water, and wastewater-
infrastructure systems within the urban water cycle with the solutions predominantly focused on 
supply-side approaches and technology shifts to alleviate water stress (Wilkinson 2012). 
However, the lack of existing infrastructure in some parts of the world and extreme scarcity in 
others, together with the compounding threat of climate change, increasing recognition of the 
tradeoffs between water and energy, and increasing demand for resources pose new challenges to 
the concept of Integrated Urban Water Management (IUWM). Simply put, is incrementally 
improving the efficiency of the incumbent system enough or is there a need to frame all urban 
decisions within a nexus platform?  
While not in direct contrast to IUWM but often seen as an alternative or subordinate 
approach to IUWM, is the focus on the greater adoption of innovative decentralized low-impact 




wastewater recycling, decentralized wastewater treatment, and repair and replacement of leaking 
water and sewer pipes (Garrison et al. 2009; Griffiths-Sattenspiel and Wilson 2009; University of 
California Berkeley and University of California Los Angeles, 2011) to solve water resources 
challenges as opposed to perfecting the centralized system (Cook et al., 2009). From a 
sociotechnical perspective, these technologies and the switch to a centralized resource 
management system represent niche innovations against the incumbent, centralized approach to 
water supply. Interestingly enough, much of the research on decentralized water resources has 
been conducted explicitly with the goal of ensuring that these new measures also contribute to 
climate change mitigation by reducing energy use and greenhouse gas emissions (Nair, 2014). 
The research has been deliberate in diagraming the relationship between water supply and energy 
use in water delivery and wastewater (Plappally and Lienhard, 2012; Stillwell, 2010; Yang, 
2013).  
Yet there are still many knowledge gaps including various aspects of energy intensity, 
regional impacts, and environmental impacts (Sharma et al., 2010). The studies that do provide 
the different aspects and impacts of decentralized urban water and wastewater technologies have 
been largely conducted in a piece meal fashion and do not account for how urban management 
decisions can have broader sectoral as well as geographic impacts (Venkatesh and Brattebo, 
2011). There are a few notable exceptions. American Rivers et al. (2012) estimated that 
groundwater recharge from green infrastructure could save the City of Los Angeles over $23 
million in energy costs each year.  Garrison et al. (2009) estimated that the use of LIDs24 in the 
urbanized areas of southern California and portions of the San Francisco Bay area could result in 






electricity savings up to approximately 1.2 billion kWh per year. Malinowski and Stillwell 
(2015) come the closest to conducting a nexus analysis that explores how urban resource 
management decisions can have regional impacts by including consumer-level energy savings 
and estimating that nationally, up to 3.8 billion kWh and $270 M could be potentially saved 
annually by replacing landscape irrigation and other outdoor water uses through rainwater 
harvesting alone.  
However, despite the recognition of the co-benefit of LIDs, the scope of research on LIDs 
utilized to meet water resource challenges has been limited to decentralized water technologies, 
as such there is little research on the impact of the use of decentralized energy within the urban 
water-energy-climate nexus and how decentralized energy technologies may be used as tools to 
solve cross-system sustainability challenges. Under a water-energy nexus framework, future 
energy pathways would be contingent on water resource availability and in context of other 
competing resource needs (Webber, 2015). Following this thinking, there has been recognition 
that the use of renewable energy technologies is critical in any improved future water supply 
scenario (Yates, 2015) and the recognition that distributed energy resources, specifically DGPV, 
can be used to reduce water resource stress. Most recently NREL included the potential water 
savings from achieving National Sunshot initiative goals. NREL estimates that if Sunshot goals 
are met, the U.S could see a 4% reduction in power-sector water withdrawals and 9% reduction 







This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications. 
Figure 19. Changes in water withdrawals (top) and water consumption (bottom) in the SunShot 
Vision Scenario Relative to the NNS Baseline Scenario 
 
The water consumption and withdrawal savings described above assume that all new CSP plants 
are deployed with dry-cooling technologies. To evaluate the robustness of these impacts to 
different assumptions about CSP cooling, we considered a scenario in which new CSP capacity 
is built with equal shares of dry cooling, wet cooling, and hybrid wet-dry cooling systems. 
Because wet-cooled CSP systems are assumed to use recirculating cooling, whether wet, dry, or 
hybrid cooling is used has a larger impact on consumption than on withdrawals; we therefore 
focus on consumption impacts. As shown in Figure 20, of the eight states with CSP deployment, 
six still show lower levels of water consumption in 2050 under the SunShot cooling-sensitivity 
scenario than under the NNS baseline scenario—California and New Mexico are the exceptions, 
although New Mexico’s water consumption under the sensitivity scenario is still lower than its 
consumption in 2015. California’s increased consumption is largely due to its relatively low 
levels of consumption in 2015 and the transition of once-through-cooled thermal generators on 
the coast to inland-based generation using freshwater.xliv Relatively high levels of modeled CSP 
deployment in California indicate that CSP cooling system decisions can affect state-level 
power-sector water use. That said, on a national basis, 2050 water withdrawals remain 5% lower 
in the SunShot cooling-sensitivity scenario than in the NNS baseline scenario, and 2050 water 
(a) 2050 Avoided Water Withdrawal (~700 billion gallons) 
 
 




Figure 6-1-NREL’s estimates of chang s in water withdrawals (top) and water 
consumption (bottom) if SunShot goals are reached (NREL, 2016). 
 
The ability of DGPV to reduce water withdrawals and consumption offers economic and 
environmental benefits, especially in regions where water is scarce or strained by competing 
demands. By reducing electric-sector water use, solar energy reduces the vulnerability of 
electricity supply to the availability or temperature of water, potentially avoiding electric-sector 
reliability events and/or the effects of reduced thermal plant efficiencies — concerns that might 
otherwise grow as the climate changes (DOE 2013). Moreover, increased DGPV can free up 
water for other purposes, including agricultural, industrial, or municipal use.  
Unfortunately, despite recognition of the benefits that DGPV poses for water resource 




goals is a major gap within the nexus literature, even more so in an urban nexus platform. Very 
few have examined the role of distributed energy resources (DERs) or DGPV within a full nexus 
view, and those that have done have predominantly focused on DERs as means to powering 
decentralized water supply technologies (Zhang, 2013; Gold, 2015; Kjellsson, 2015). This gap in 
the literature makes it difficult for city planners, policy makers, and regulators to explore 
innovative cross-system policies that develop and employ cross-system innovation to meet 
sustainability goals.  
6.4 Background on the Water and Energy Systems in Atlanta Georgia 
Metro Atlanta straddles the headwaters of six river basins while relying on Lake Lanier, 
an impoundment on the Chattahoochee River, for more than two-thirds of its water supply 
(North Georgia Metropolitan Water Planning District, 2009). However, the Chattahoochee River 
watershed is among the smallest watersheds in the nation that provides the primary water supply 
source for a large metropolitan area. Lake Lanier’s watershed covers a roughly 1,000 square 
miles and provides drinking water for nearly 5.5 million people.  
As detailed in Chapter 5, for decades Atlanta has been at the center of a Tri-state water 
war — a conflict that is inherently a water-energy-climate nexus concern. Since 1990, Georgia, 
Alabama, and Florida have been engaged in a legal battle, over the use of water in the 
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin and the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River 
Basin (ACT). At the heart of the conflict is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) operation 




hydropower generation and flood control) could be used to supply water to Atlanta — which the 
Corps had been allowing without any evaluation and without any Congressional authorization.   
Over the course of the Tri-State water wars, Atlanta's population has increased threefold, 
and the growth is expected to continue. At the same time, Georgia has experienced severe 
droughts, particularly in 2007, which exacerbated the on-going inter-state legal disputes over 
water rights and use. According to NOAA (2015) these droughts are expected to increase as the 
Southeast experiences hotter and dryer temperatures as a result of climate change. 
Largely promoted by the ensuing legal battles, and to a lesser extent the growing 
recognition of resource constraints, in 2001 Georgia created the Comprehensive State-wide 
Water Management Plan. In concert with the State plan, the Metropolitan North Georgia Water 
Planning District was created, including 15 counties as well as 91 municipalities partially or fully 
within these counties. With the adoption of the Georgia State-wide Water Management Plan, the 
Metro Water District became one of eleven regional water-planning councils in the state. Within 
the Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning District, the City of Atlanta was also responsible 
for creating a management plan that would both contribute to the North Georgia Metropolitan 
agenda as well as the greater Statewide objectives including water supply and conservation, 
wastewater management, and watershed protection.  
With a planning horizon of 2030, the Metro District Board approved the first water plans 
in 2003. This was also the same year negotiations among Georgia, Alabama and Florida over the 
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) Basin collapsed. While the original plan included a 




achieve 20% water savings by 2030. The target was replaced with a goal of 13% water savings 
by 2035. The plan also assumed that Lake Lanier withdrawals and the operation of Buford Dam 
would continue as they had over the past three decades.  
In 2012, the city of Atlanta began drafting new water resource management measures. 
While there have been no explicit conservation goals put forward yet, objectives included:  
1.) minimizing water use to generate electricity; 
2.) quantifying water conservation/energy savings relationship;  
3.) integrate water and energy practices; and  
4.) maximize supply and end-use of water systems.  
 
“The ultimate goal of water conservation is not to prevent water use, but to maximize efficiency 
and the benefit from each gallon used (North Georgia Metropolitan Water Supply and Water 
Conservation Management Plan, 2012).” 
Despite the emphasis on better management and conservation, and the need to assess how 
shifts in Atlanta’s water resource management may impact greater regional goals, there has been 
little headway in understanding how Atlanta policies can contribute to greater water use 
management goals in Georgia. In part this may be because to date, state leaders have been 
largely reluctant to impose any mandates on local governments or businesses, choosing to rely 
primarily on voluntary measures, with few associated metrics or benchmarks to track progress. 
However, according to Hart (2011) “perhaps the biggest impediment to achieving meaningful 
and measurable water savings through conservation is a misplaced focus. Instead of 




leaders have chosen to focus largely on expensive, highly-engineered solutions such as new 
reservoirs and interbasin transfers, i.e., moving water from other river basins, to supply metro 
Atlanta. These “solutions not only send the wrong message as far as any commitment to 
conservation goes, but also undermine negotiations. Any future withdrawals out of the ACF 
River system are unlikely to be condoned by our downstream neighbors, at least until we 
maximize our water supply options through increased conservation efforts and existing water 
supply sources, including Lake Lanier (Hart, 2011, pg. 13).” 
This may be the reason why despite recent analysis on the benefits of LIDs in Atlanta 
(Jeong, et al, 2016) as a means to achieve conservation efforts — there is little policy support for 
their use. For example, in many ways, RWH (a leading LID) just recently became legal in 
Atlanta. In 2009, Georgia’s State plumbing code — Georgia Amendments to the 2006 
international plumbing code, Appendix I, “Rainwater Recycling systems” — allowed rainwater 
to be collected, treated and used indoors for toilet and urinal flushing, and as cooling tower 
make-up water. However, it wasn’t until 2011 that the city of Atlanta amended the plumbing 
codes, adopted the City of Atlanta Potable Rainwater Harvesting Ordinance (2011), and 
developed a permitting system for RWH, legitimizing their use. Before 2011, while it wasn’t 
illegal to install RWH systems, there was no permitting system that allowed their operation, 
leaving it up to local officials to decide whether or not to allow a potable rainwater system.  
Of course, legal ambiguity around the deployment of decentralized resources is not 
unique to Atlanta. Legal barriers regarding the classification and use of water have prohibited the 




distinction between grey and black water, rendering domestic capture efforts technically illegal. 
Until recently, in many western states, water law stated all precipitation belonged to existing 
water-rights owners, and rain needed to flow to join its rightful water drainage. Other states have 
limited RWH use based on concerns over water-quality standards.  
However, regulation is only one barrier in the greater adoption of RWH — cost is the 
other. Nationally, the average cost of water is less that 1 cent per gallon with an average 
residential water bill of around $85 (Circle of Blue, 2015). In comparison, the average cost of a 
residential RWH system is $5,250, which will supply between 50-70% of a residential water use, 
if local regulations allow RWH to be used for potable supply (Ecovarian, 2014). Comparatively, 
this makes the investment in RWH seem economically unjustified in the short run, with a 
payback period over eight years. With absolutely no government incentive to reduce the cost, it 
is not surprising that RWH is still not widely deployed.  
Given Atlanta’s lack of policy support for RWH, a traditional LID, it is not surprising 
that there has been no conversation on how non-traditional LIDs may be a tool for meeting water 
resource challenges. However, the energy sector represents a significant portion of statewide 
water demand in Georgia and as such has been at the center of the state’s legal battles and water 
management concerns. With increased climate variability, increasing temperatures, increased 
drought, and increasing demand for electricity and water resources — water shortages might put 
the state of Georgia in a position where it is choosing between drinking water and energy. As 
with many regions in the U.S, water scarcity is more likely to occur in the summer and coincide 




(Field et al, 2014). Given that the electricity sector is such a major consumer of water resources 
and is highly sensitive to resource constraints, it is rational to look towards the electricity sector 
for innovative solutions. 
While currently, water levels are sufficient to generate peaking power in Georgia, in low 
water years, once-through plants have experienced issues with thermal discharge. For example, 
in September 2007 Southern Company took one of the generators at Joseph M. Farley offline for 
maintenance. The overburdened ACF gave the utility little choice: flows past the Farley plant 
dropped below 2,000 cfs in October, and by late November had reached a low of 1,048 cfs 
(Carter et al. 2008). A study by the Union of Concerned Scientists recently studied the impacts of 
energy generation on the ACT in Georgia and concluded that: 
“If current power generation and climate trends continue, the Coosa River will exceed a 
90° threshold for thermal pollution 18 days a year from 2040 to 2049, which would significantly 
impact the health of the river. Basin wide, the annual average stream flow in the ACT is expected 
to fall 24% below the historical average for the same time period.” (UCS, 2013, pg. 135) 
In 2015 Georgia’s thermoelectric power sector withdrew an average of 2,737 million 
gallons per day with about 187 million gallons per day consumed. Almost all of the water 
withdrawals associated with thermoelectric power generation in Georgia are from surface water 
sources. Coal-fired power plants, older (steam electric) gas-fired plants, nuclear power plants, 
and modern combined cycle gas plants are all dependent on water for steam processing, and 
primarily cooling. Older power plants, constructed prior to 1972, which use a once-through 




discharge water, but use cooling towers to evaporate the water. During 2005, Georgia’s facilities 
with once-through cooling were responsible for about 88 percent of the thermoelectric sector’s 
water withdrawals.  
Georgia Power Company (GPC) has come under scrutiny over the past decade for its 
water use and potential exacerbation of the drought in Georgia. In 2008, the Governor's Office of 
Planning and Budget showed that the capacity of existing facilities and those planned through the 
year 2017 will not meet future statewide power generation needs through the planning horizon of 
2050. One pathway to decreasing water use in the energy sector is to transition away from 
traditional thermoelectric generation and towards non-hydro, renewable energy. In Georgia, the 
primary, non-hydro renewable energy technology is solar photovoltaics. Overwhelmingly, the 
majority of solar in Georgia is in the form of large, utility-scale installations. There is very little 
DGPV in the state.  
In large part, this is a result of the policy landscape. In terms of DGPV, there are a few 
programs in place to encourage adoption and there is no renewable portfolio standard in place for 
the state. And while Georgia Power operates two solar incentive programs in the state, 
overwhelmingly, the majority of projects developed under these programs were ground-mounted 
small solar farms in South Georgia. As of May 2016, there were 133 solar electric installations, 
with a capacity of 5 MW and an annual production of 6,973 MWhs in Fulton County (the main 
county for City of Atlanta).  
However, the ability to pursue greater DGPV in Atlanta may be expanding. Recently, 




the Solar Power Free-Market Financing Act, establishing the legality of “solar energy 
procurement agreements” (SEPAs), known elsewhere in the country as “power purchase 
agreements” (PPAs) to finance the construction and operation of a solar electric generation 
system.  A solar company can now finance the construction of solar panels for a home, business 
or institution in Georgia, including public schools, government buildings, colleges and 
universities, military bases, etc., and be repaid for the system through payment by the property 
owner for the electricity produced by the solar system.  
To date, the use of DGPV in Georgia has generally been framed solely in terms of 
economic costs and benefits (i.e bill reductions), and to a lesser extent marketed as a tool for CO2 
emissions reductions. To the best of my knowledge, DGPV has never been framed as a water 
savings technology in Georgia. However, the deployment of DGPV has the benefits of both 
reducing CO2 emissions and decreasing regional water use. Considering the scale of the Atlanta 
region, which in 2010 was the 9th most populated, 6th largest energy consuming, 4th largest CO2 
emitting region in the nation, and facing drought and water supply shortfalls, framing DGPV as a 
tool for reducing water consumption, as well as energy and emissions, could incentivize greater 
policy support for the City and the State (Cox, 2014) 
When looking at the policy landscape for decentralized water and energy combined, 
while the DGPV landscape has greater policy support, both technologies are not being widely 
adopted. In part, this is a cost barrier to both technology adoptions. However, the DGPV market 
is far more established in Georgia when compared to the RWH market, and the passing of 




deploying DGPV are accounted for, there may be greater incentives for local policy makers to 
develop supportive niche policies and promote adoption. Particularly given Atlanta’s strategic 
position in a tri-state water war, positioning distributed energy as a tool for sustainable water 
management may further incentivize adoption.   
6.5  Examining the Cross-System Sustainability Opportunities for decentralized 
infrastructure in Atlanta, GA under a Water-Energy-Climate Nexus platform.  
The purpose of this paper is to lay the groundwork for utilizing a water-energy-climate-
nexus framework in Atlanta, GA for evaluating the potential of niche technologies to meet cross-
system sustainability goals. In doing so I holistically asses the benefits and costs of distributed 
water and energy resources, and explore the validity of utilizing distributed energy as a tool for 
reducing water resource constraints in Georgia. To that end, I compare the deployment of rooftop 
DGPV with RWH cisterns under a full nexus analysis. For our analysis, I develop and apply the 
GPAT model to analyze and compare a hypothetical deployment of RWH and DGPV cisterns on 
2% of all new commercial and residential square footage in Atlanta, GA from 2013-2020. I 
analyze the deployment of each technology in a water-energy-nexus system and account for 
water, energy, CO2, and air quality impacts. I model both technologies from 2015 through 2030, 
assuming that both technologies will be deployed in Fulton County. While these distributed 
technologies have been analyzed for life-cycle impacts, to our knowledge, no study has analyzed 
the localized, system-wide dynamics of RWH and DGPV, comparing supply and demand 




Since I am specifically interested in how both technologies compare in meeting water 
resource management concerns, providing both the direct and indirect water savings is critical. 
RWH water savings are determined by the productivity of RWH cisterns to meet non-potable 
demand for commercial and residential buildings for the average day of a specific month coupled 
with the reduced water required to cool Georgia Power Company power-plants used to meet 
electricity needs of water distribution. DGPV water savings are comprised of the hourly 
reductions in water withdrawals and water consumption required to cool Georgia Power 
Company power-plants used to meet Atlanta commercial and residential load requirements.  
6.5.1 GPAT Model Description  
In order to understand and evaluate the nexus tradeoffs in Atlanta, we developed and 
applied the GPAT Model. GPAT is an integrated systems-environmental-economic modeling 
tool designed specifically to understand the holistic costs, benefits, and tradeoffs of distributed 
supply options for energy and water. The GPAT model combines GIS land-use data, hourly load 
and consumption profiles, detailed information about solar insolation and precipitation rates, 
health and welfare benefits of reduced pollution created by the AP2 model (Muller, Mendelsohn, 
& Nordhaus, 2011), capital and maintenance costs, degradation rates, water supply and 
electricity rates, withdrawal and consumption rates of water for electricity generation (scaled to 
technology source) as well as energy use rates for water supply. The model was developed in 
partnership between Matt Cox and Caroline Golin to analyze existing and possible future policy 
scenarios in Atlanta, GA. Currently GPAT is calibrated to Georgia Power Company electricity 




GPAT accounts for feed-back loops between water, energy, and climate impacts, builds hourly 
profiles (as opposed to annual projections), can be calibrated to any geographical scale, and 
provides both supply or demand metrics. For complete documentation see the Appendix. 
In calibrating GPAT, a number of model specifications were required. To determine 
average hourly load profiles and generation characteristics for electric power production, 
information from GPC reports to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Energy 
Information Administration, and Integrated Resource Planning documents. To determine the 
water-use of power production, average daily load profiles and supply characteristics were 
developed from the EIA, Union of Concerned Scientists EW3 database (UCS, 2012), and direct 
conversations with Georgia Power Company. To determine average hourly emissions profiles, 
we utilized information from EIA (EIA, 860) and EPA (APMD, 2015) databases. Table 6.1 
provides the water use and emissions profiles for GPC generation resources. GPC is unique in 
that despite large generation resources, GPC purchases over a quarter of its power. The majority 
of GPC purchased power is from Alabama Power, which has a very different hourly generation 
profile then GPC. To determine the carbon and water use of purchased power, we applied the 
SERC average. This resulted in a withdrawal rate of 15,029 gallons/MWh and a consumption 


















Barnett	Shoals N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Oconee	River 0.00 5,100.00
Bartletts	Ferry N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Oconee	River 0.00 5,100.00
Bowen Y 10,532,524 1.10422096 3118.548 0.00032695 4651.1165 0.00048762 Etowah	River 1,005.00 687.00
Bowen	CT N 0 1 0.2805 0.00800514 0.2145 0.00612158 Etowah	River 780.3267475 468.1960485
Burton N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tallulah 0 0
Edwin	I	Hatch Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 Altamaha 1101 672
Estatoah N 0 0 0 0 0 0 None 0 5510
Flint	River N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Flint	River 0 5510
Goat	Rock N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chattahochee 0 5510
Hammond Y 1,745,622 1.23620883 978.3095 0.00069282 1917.191 0.00135771 Coosa	River 36,350.00 250.00
Harllee	Branch Y 2,359,265 1.12705672 20984.2775 0.01002451 4810.6065 0.0022981 Lake	Sinclair 36,350.00 250.00
Jack	McDonough	CC Y 5,111,251 0.4292513 26 2.1836E-06 245.6495 2.063E-05 Chattahoochee	River 6738.076186 1604.303854
Jack	McDonough	CT N 0 0 0.147 0 0.1715 0 Chattahoochee	River 6738.076186 1604.303854
Kraft	CT N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Savannah 35,000.00 240.00
Kraft	ST Y 515,345 0.82962919 1190.1375 0.00191595 920.1835 0.00148136 Savannah 36,350.00 250.00
Langdale N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chattahochee 0 5100




0 0 0 None 0 0
McIntosh Y 87,181 0 691.6 0 257.5295 0 Savannah 36,350.00 250.00
McIntosh	Combined	Cycle Y
3,105,802 0.4133875 15.642 2.082E-06 161.476 2.1493E-05 Savannah 2530 150
McIntosh N 25,969 1.30709776 0.1265 6.3671E-06 16.0075 0.00080571 Savannah 36,350.00 250.00
McManus N 0 1 0 0 0 0 Turtle	River 0 0
McManus	CT N 0 1 20.094 0.04471414 10.085 0.02244163 Turtle	River 35,000.00 240.00
McManus	IC N 0 1 0 0 0 0 Turtle	River 36350 250
Mitchell	(GA) Y 3,588 0 39.1845 0 10.187 0 Flint	River 36350 250
Mitchell	CT N 0 1 0 0 0 Flint	River 0 0
Morgan	Falls N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chattahochee 0 5100
Nacoochee N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tallulah 0 5100
North	Highlands N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chattahoochee	River 0 5100
Oliver	Dam N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chattahoochee	River 0 5100
Riverview N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chattahoochee	River 0 5100
Robins N 2,129 1.18786183 0.0265 1.4786E-05 1.5595 0.00087011 Ocmulgee 0 5100
Scherer Y 5,535,247 1.19425867 42349.1615 0.00913705 14986.591 0.00323344 Ocmulgee 1005 687
Sinclair	Dam N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Oconee	River 0 5100
Tallulah	Falls N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tallulah 0 5100
Terrora N 0 0 0 0 0 0 None 0 0
Tugalo N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tugalo 253 198
Vogtle Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 Savannah 1101 672
Wallace	Dam	1 N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lake	Sinclair 0 510
Wallace	Dam	2 N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lake	Sinclair 0 510
Wansley Y 5,291,958 2.03356276 2101.742 0.00080765 1668.4815 0.00064115 Chattahoochee	River 0 0
Wansley	CT N 0 1 0.596 0.166 0 Chattahoochee	River 1005 687
Wilson N 0 1 7.7615 0.0110201 16.185 0.02298013 None 0 0
Wilson	IC N 0 1 0 0 0 0 None 0 0
Yates Y 2,644,335 1.11776911 29789.8645 0.01259227 3764.5455 0.00159129 Chattahoochee	River 1,005.00 687.00
Yonah N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tugalo 0 5100  
 
To determine the public health and welfare benefits of reduced pollution (from reduced 
grid energy) GPAT utilizes the AP2 model (N. Z. Muller, Mendelsohn, & Nordhaus, 2011), 
which generates damage estimates for six pollutants at various emission heights for every county 
in the United States through a Gaussian plume and Monte Carlo simulation procedure. Using this 




Information Administration State Energy Data System, Georgia Power Annual Reports, and 
others, a pollution-damage estimate for baseload and peaking generation was created. Matching 
these values with the hourly load profiles as a percent of baseload and percent of peaking 
enabled a refined picture of pollution reduction benefits to be determined. AP2 does not include 
a value for carbon dioxide emissions; this is included by applying the social cost of carbon, as 
determined by the US Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon (Interagency 
Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013).  
Table 6-2-GPC’s Characterized Emissions Damage from GPAT 
2016
BASELOAD GPC Characteristics NH3 PM25 NOX SO2 VOC PM10 CO2 Sum Value
MEAN MARGINAL DAMAGE (2009-$/Ton) 5654.0 5848.5 647.8 5031.6 556.5 168.1 36.68
Tons Emitted 0 1910 38245 109907 548 3532 40275376
Net Generation 0 61010000 61010000 61010000 61010000 61010000 61010000
Tons/MWh 1.51472E-05 3.13062E-05 0.000626868 0.001801459 8.98973E-06 5.78883E-05 0.660143851
Damage ($)/MWh 0.09 0.18 0.41 9.06 0.01 0.01 24.22 33.97
NON-BASELOAD GPC Characteristics NH3 PM25 NOX SO2 VOC PM10 CO2 Sum Value
MEAN MARGINAL DAMAGE (2009-$/Ton) 9,565.00            9,015.39           697.59              5,763.82           824.84              326.67              36.68
Tons Emitted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Generation -                     -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                     
Tons/MWh 7.4192E-07 8.26125E-07 0.003091196 1.99391E-05 3.68716E-07 1.00178E-06 0.024393035
Damage ($)/MWh 0.01 0.01 2.16 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.89 3.18
Purchased GPC Characteristics* NH3 PM25 NOX SO2 VOC PM10 CO2 Sum Value
MEAN MARGINAL DAMAGE (2009-$/Ton) 6,436.17            6,481.85           657.76              5,178.08           610.16              199.79              36.68
Tons/MWh 1.22661E-05 2.52102E-05 0.00 0.00 7.26553E-06 4.6511E-05 0.60
Damage ($)/MWh 0.08 0.16 0.29 1.67 0.00 0.01 21.92
24.14  
To calculate social benefits and costs, GPAT uses a framework that builds off previous 
work analyzing energy policy alternatives by researchers with Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
and Georgia Tech (see Brown, Cox, & Baer, 2013; Brown et al., 2011 for more description and 
applications). This framework incorporates the monetary benefits of saved energy, saved water, 
the public health and welfare value associated with reductions in pollution, and the costs of 






6.5.2 Determining Rooftop Capacity for RWH and DGPV 
To determine potential grid water savings from RWH as well potential rooftop space for 
DGPV, I first estimated the rooftop capacity for residential and commercial buildings using GIS 
and census data and regression models (For complete description see the Appendix). To estimate 
future size of residential and commercial roofing areas, numerous logistic regression models 
were developed and tested based on actual size of residential and commercial building footprint 
GIS layer called LandBase Structure from Fulton County.  
LandBase Structure Data from Fulton County represent the base ground-level outline, or 
footprint of buildings and other man-made structures in Fulton County, Georgia. The original 
data was produced by digitizing structures from 1988 aerial ortho-photography combined with 
updates from aerial ortho-photography from 1999 to 2009.  As individual polygons of residential 
and commercial building footprints can be directly interpreted as roofing area, we calculated 
total size of building footprint polygons and summarized by census tracts, which becomes 





Figure 6-2-Residential and commercial building footprints in LandBase, Fulton County, 
GA 
 
I conducted two series of regression models. One series for residential square footage and 
one for commercial square footage. The units of analysis in both models were census tract and 
the independent variables were:  
• employment 
• population 
• average building square-footage (residential and commercial) 
• population density 
• commercial employment density 
• total employment density 
• distance to highways 
• distance to city center 
• distance to activity center 
• tract size in the base year 2009.   
 
The size of tract was included in the model as control variable because larger sizes of 




models were tested for a size of roofing area with different data scales (e.g. log transformation) 
in case the variables show a high level of skewness in its data distribution.  
When various models were tested to estimate future the size of total commercial and 
residential roof area, population, employment, and population density were significant 
independent variables that explained 69% of the variation in the total size of commercial roof 
area and 78% of the variation in the total size of residential roof area. The t-statistic of these 
variables and the F-statistic test also show the overall model is statistically significant.  Since the 
variables included log-transformations, the R-square value cannot be directly interpreted as the 
prediction power as taking exponentials to retransform the function might produce a bias 
(Stynes, Peterson, and Rosenthal 1986); however, the transformed model would still provide 
better results than raw-data model.   
In the commercial model, population, population density, distance to city center, distance 
to highways, distance to activity centers and employment density in the model showed a positive 
impact, which indicates that as population and employment increase so too does the total size of 
roof.  Interestingly, population density had a negative sign, meaning that higher density areas 
would have less total rooftop area if other conditions remain the same.   
In the residential model only population and population density showed a positive 
impact, which indicates that as population increase so too does the total size of roof.  Again, in 
the residential model, population density had a negative sign, meaning that higher density areas 
would have less total rooftop area if other conditions remain the same.  This makes sense 




or high-density residential units, which typically reside in the region with a higher density than 
low-density suburban area.  Based on the results, the total size of roofing areas in each tract was 
predicted using the following regression equations:  
Equation 6.1 Total Roofing Areas for Commercial and Residential Buildings 
!"# $%,' = 5.391 + 2.239 ∗ log 4' + 	1.057 ∗ log 8' -	0.609 ∗ ;'   +.047*
!"-.150 ∗ ℎ"-.170 ∗ +"   
!"# $%,' = 5.37 + 	2.94 ∗ log 6' -	0.738 ∗ log :'  
 
where:  
!",$   = square feet of commercial roofing area k 
!",$   = square feet of residential roofing area k 
!"   = population k  
!"   = residential count in k  
!" =  employment density k 




ℎ" =  distance to highway in tract k 
!" =  distance to activity center in tract k 
!" =  distance to city center in tract k 
Once I produced a significant model for estimating both commercial and residential 
rooftop in each land parcel, we projected future rooftop capacity through 2030 using census data 
projections on employment, population growth, and density. I assumed all other variables would 
remain constant. Table 6.3 shows the estimated roofing area in each projection year and the 
predicted new roofing area between 2010 and 2030. The result indicates that between 2013-
2020, 442.8 million square feet of new roofing areas would be available by 2030. 
Table 6-3-Total predicted roofing area through 2030 based on regression model for 13 
counties 
 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 Total Predicted new 
roofing Area (million 
sqft) 
87.2 89.1 92 88 86.5 
 
In my analysis, we did not assume that all rooftop would be used for RWH or DGPV. 
Rather we assumed that 2% of all new rooftop from 2013-2020 would be available to have 
DGPV and RWH, translating to a total available rooftop space of 8.85 million square feet. 
through 2020. 




Using GPAT we modeled the potential amount of non-potable water that could be 
supplied by rainwater harvesting from 2013-2020. I assumed collection efficiency of 0.50 (50%), 
which is in line with the current empirical literature (Stephen et al, 2013). I also assumed that 
only 75% of the rooftop would contribute to the rainwater cistern (Ecovarian, 2014).  For 
determining daily rainfall, we averaged the daily precipitation rates for Fulton County from 
2004-2014 using historical precipitation data from National Ocean and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA, 2014). I felt this was a good range of values as Fulton County 
experienced both wet and dry years during that time frame. Precipitation estimates were coupled 
with system efficiency estimates provided by industry reports to determine daily potential 
supply.  
Equation 6.2 Rainwater Harvesting Supply 
!"#	%&''() = +*-*.*/ 
 
where: 
r= average daily rainfall  
a= area of roof surface (sqft)* [144 square inches/sqft * 0.00433 gal/cubic inch]  
e= the collection efficiency of 0.50 
c= rooftop contribution efficiency of .75 
 
Next, I estimated the actual daily water demand for RWH supply to determine how much 




important especially when considering system wide impacts and feedbacks. It is also important 
when determining cost because most RWH systems are sized and priced by gallon of demand. I 
assumed that RWH would only be used for non-potable indoor use and irrigation. I also assumed 
that rainwater could only be stored for 3 days.  Since non-potable demand looks very different 
between commercial and residential buildings, and there is no formal data or reporting on water 
use in residential or commercial buildings in Atlanta, I combined 2003 estimates of per-capita 
residential water use and estimates of gallons per employee day provided by the Metropolitan 
North Georgia Water Planning District (see Table 6.4) with estimates on the water use in 
commercial buildings (Pacific Institute, 2010).  
Table 6-4-Estimates on water use breakdown (Metropolitan North Georgia Water 




















Indoor Use 70 70 65 77% 72% 86% 
Outdoor 
Use 21 27 11 23% 28% 14% 







Figure 6-3-Water Use in Commercial Office Buildings (Pacific Institute, 2010) 
 
Once the size of roofing area and amount of potential water saving through RWH was 
predicted, we estimated the net energy saved by using RWH systems as opposed to distributed 
public water supply. I utilized data provided by the Atlanta Watershed Department for two of the 
three, treatment plants — Hemphill and Chattahoochee — to determine a monthly average kWh/ 
gallon of public water, which ranged between 0.0039 and 0.0028 kWh/gallon.25  
 






Figure 6-4-Monthly Energy Use of Water Treatment in Atlanta, 2014 (kWh/gallon) 
 
In my estimation, I only included the energy needed to acquire and treat each gallon of 
water, as all water, potable or non-potable water, is treated in Atlanta. I did not include the costs 
of wastewater management. I also only attributed energy saved to water used within a three-day 
time period. Meaning that I did not attribute any energy saving to excess rainwater that is not 
utilized within three days. Grid water savings from decreased energy needed to distribute water 
were also calculated and integrated in to the daily, monthly, and annual water savings.  
Table 6-5-Water and Energy Metrics for Water Distribution in Fulton County 
Water Treatment Plant 
(WTP) 
Plant Capacity  
 (Dept. of 
Watershed)  
103 m3/day 
Average Daily Flow 














Chattahoochee 246 144 .00175 .06 
 
The costs of RWH installations were priced based on square-footage and demand. From 
personal communications with a leading commercial-scale RWH developer (Ecovarian, 2014) in 
the Atlanta area, I estimated a $2.50 (commercial) and $3 (residential) per gallon of demand for 
the cost of a RWH rooftop cistern, pump, and initial permitting fees. Since I was only estimating 
non-potable use, we did not include the cost of a filtration system. The costs of a pump are 
included for residential units but not for commercial units. I assumed that commercial buildings 
will already be outfitted with pumps, making it difficult to determine how much extra pumping 
capacity (if any) would be needed with the use of RWH. Unlike the solar modules, we do not 
model a decrease in installation prices. I estimated that RWH performance would degrade at 
0.05% per year (Ecovarian, 2014).  Given that there is no public data on the number of installed 
RWH we baselined our starting participation per our conversations with industry specialist 
(Ecovarian, 2014). 



























Cost of public 
water supply 
($/gallon) 




Commercial $2.50 18 .05% $1637 7,000 9 $.01 
 
6.5.4 Determining DGPV Potential  
Based on conversation with local developers, we assumed that 50% of all residential 
rooftop space was suitable for DGPV and 40% of all commercial rooftop space was suitable for 
DGPV (Moreland, 2016). On average, solar panels in Atlanta will produce 15 watts per square 
foot of solar panel area (SolarPowerRocks, 2015).  
Equation 6.3 DGPV Production 
!"#$	&'(()*	 = 9.2 ∗ 	01,3 	*5 
 
where: 
a= area of roof surface   
!",$   = rooftop suitability for r residential and c commercial 
 
To calculate the total hourly energy potential for DGPV I utilize the National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory’s PV Watts calculator, which provides hourly production curves per kW of 




The costs of solar installations were baselined to costs of new solar installations in 
Georgia as reported by the NREL’s OpenPV database and Solar Power Rocks Reports 
(SolarPower Rocks, 2015). These costs have been declining, at a rate of roughly $0.80/W-
installed/year over the last few years, but I assume this rate of decline will slow and estimate 
declining costs of 10% per year. Also included are parameters to capture the effects of improving 
technology and declining cell efficiencies over time. Solar cell efficiencies are anticipated to 
improve at 0.5% per year (IRENA, 2012), and performance is also modeled as degrading at 0.5% 
per year (Jordan and Kurtz, 2013). Commercial installations are modeled at a 25% price 
reduction from residential installed prices (SolarPower Rocks, 2015). Fees related to grid 
connectivity and permitting were determined from GPC documents regarding the costs of 
metering. Metering fees were estimated to be $48 and Interconnection Fees were estimated at 
$100.  





































Residential $2.88. 132 19 .5% 600 $2.88. $148 12.2 c/kWHh 





To determine the water saving potential from DGPV I used the average hourly electricity 
supply demand curves for residential and commercial buildings developed in GPAT, scaled to 
Georgia Power. The load profile curves where integrated with hourly emissions characteristics, 
scaled by fuel source and power plant, as well as water consumption and withdrawal rates. By 
using hourly electricity supply curves, I am able to determine how much local energy would 
actually be utilized and which power plants would be displaced by utilizing DGPV. This hourly 
calibration is an analysis that many studies do not explore but is very important especially when 
considering the emissions and water use impacts of investing in different technologies.  
6.6 Results 
 I analyze the impacts of a hypothetical deployment of RWH cisterns and DGPV on 2% of 
all new commercial and residential constructions in Fulton County from 2013-2020. By 2020, 
the cumulative water savings from RWH, which includes the direct reductions in water demand 
as well as the water reductions associated with decreased power production for the distribution of 
water, totals to 3,294 Mgals. The cumulative water savings from DGPV totals 2,684 Mgals by 
2020. Interestingly, while RWH directly contributes to substantial water reductions, when 
looking at RWH and DGPV combined, the greatest source of water reductions actually results 
not from on-site reductions (i.e from reduced water consumption in residential and commercial 
buildings) but from decreased water consumption and withdrawals from the power production as 
a result of DGPV and reduced energy needs to power the water distribution system. The fact that 
power plant water use is the major source water reductions is largely due to the generation 




production as well as coincident with water distribution energy demands. In Atlanta, DGPV 
production as well as the production curves of water distribution is largely coincident with 
Georgia Power’s hydropower, coal-fired power plants, and nuclear plants, which require 






















Powerplant	Withdrawals Powerplant	Consumption On-Site	Reductions  
Figure 6-5-Breakdown of Water Savings by Source for RWH and DGPV 
 
The cumulative reductions in grid energy reach 8.2 MWs of capacity. To put that amount 
of energy in perspective, that is enough energy to avoid building five to six peaker gas-powered 
plants. While the bulk of the energy savings is from DGPV, with total of 490,022 MWhs saved, 
RWH does result in a saving of over 2,641 MWhs from 2013-2020. As a result of these energy 




emissions. These estimates are determined by the reduced grid energy during a specific hour 
during the average day of a specific month coupled with the reduced grid energy required to 
distribute water equal to the capacity that could be obtained on an average day. GPAT estimates 
the avoided common pollutants of NH3, PM25, NOx, SO2, VOC, and PM10. By 2030, DGPV 
results in combined reduction of 1,018 metric tons of common pollutants and a total reduction of 
297,451 tons of CO2. RWH results in combined reduction of 5.64 metric tons of common 
pollutants and a total reduction of 1,592 metric tons of CO2. The result of these reductions in 
common pollutants and CO2 is improved air quality and according health savings. The quantity 
and value of avoided emissions grows with the expansion of RWH and DGPV. However, the 
addition of natural gas and nuclear to the grid also reduces the average damage per kWh, such 






















Figure 6-6.6-Emissions Savings from DGPV 
The public health benefits to Atlanta that result from RWH and DGPV are still sizeable, 
with a cumulative value of $14.2 million (2014-$) through 2020. The overwhelming majority of 





























Energy	Expenditure	Savings	from	RWH Energy	Expenditure	Savings	from	DGPV Water	Expenditure	Savings	 from	RWH  
Figure 6-7-Expenditure Savings from RWH and DGPV (Discounted 2014-$) 
 
6.7 Discussion  
When examining the benefits of RWH and DGPV it is clear that both technologies result 
in environmental, social, and economic gains in addition to reductions in water use. What is 
interesting about this particular analysis is that despite DGPV being seen as primarily as a clean 
energy technology or a pathway for CO2 reductions, it is surprisingly an extremely effective tool 




large part this is due to Georgia’s specific generation profile, which tends to be extremely water 
intensive during the hours when DGPV is generating and displacing centralized production. 
When compared to RWH, DGPV is over 80% as effective at reducing water use. However, 
DGPV results in much greater gains in terms of CO2 reductions and social benefits of improved 
air quality and decreased energy and water expenditures.  
 

























DGPV 2,700 490,000 $47 N/A 300 $ 12.78 
RWH 3,300 26,400 $3.1 $8.8 1.6 $1.42 
 
These results suggest that DG, particularly DGPV, may be a niche technology capable of 
solving cross-system sustainability goals and a tool that Atlanta can use to help contribute to 
regional water resource management goals and increased conservation. While this may not be 
true for every geography, certainly the generation profile of Georgia Power significantly shapes 
the water gains that can be provided by DGPV, it does provide tools and support for local policy 
makers to start exploring nexus solutions and assessing energy technologies as a means to 




Of course, there are standing barriers to greater adoption of DGPV and RWH in Atlanta, 
including the lack of support within GPC and the economics of RWH. However, with the 
passing of HB57, there may be a potential for greater adoption if the market is able to deliver 
financing. The same cannot be said for RWH.  Choosing between the two, this analysis suggests 
that DGPV may also be an economically efficient option for reducing water use in GA compared 
to RWH. 
   
6.8 Conclusions and Policy Implications  
 The primary purpose of this analysis was to lay the groundwork necessary for 
taking a nexus view to sustainable transition, and assess niche innovations for their cross-system 
capabilities. To do this, I conducted a thorough examination of the interactions between energy 
use, water use, and emissions, as they relate to distributed resources in the urban space. I 
developed an integrated modeling tool, GPAT, designed to assess the direct and indirect relations 
between water, energy, and emissions in Atlanta, GA. I focused my analysis on the City of 
Atlanta, because it is a city that is at the center of a tri-state water war and is facing significant 
concerns in terms of water availability over the next decade and has yet to embrace niche 
technological innovations as a pathway to resource management. I used GPAT to understand 
how non-traditional innovations may be used to solve water resource management challenges. 
Specifically, I analyzed how DGPV may be used to alleviate local water resource concerns in 
cities with water stress. I compared the impacts of deploying RWH and DGPV, in their 




improve air quality, produce health cost savings, and expenditure savings. With this analysis, I 
questioned whether sufficient water, emissions, and economic savings could be realized from the 
implementation of DGPV to provide economic incentives that might encourage local policy 
makers to put greater support behind the niche technology, if recognized as a water savings tool, 
not only a clean energy tool.  
My results show that DGPV produces significantly higher CO2 reductions, expenditure 
savings, as well as health savings when compared to RWH. Additionally, DGPV results in 
comparable levels of water reductions, primarily from decreased water withdrawals from electric 
power production. Taken together, these results also suggest that policy makers need to 
reexamine the tools used to meet sustainability needs, a seek to examine a range of technological 
options for their cross-system capabilities. It also may be that by taking advantage of niche 
innovations, cross-system benefits may provide greater support, depending on the political 
climate. Given that Atlanta is at the center of a Tri-State water war, facing increasing pressures 
from climate change and urbanization, and the primary energy provider in Georgia has also been 
under scrutiny for its water profile, framing the use of DGPV as a means to reduce water use 
from power production, thereby alleviating stress on Atlanta’s water consumption needs, as well 
as reduce CO2 emissions and produce health benefits, may be an effective platform to pursue 
greater adoption of distributed resource technologies generally, and DGPV specifically.  
However, incentivizing the cross-system benefits of DGPV is not without challenge and 
may take fundamental changes to the institutions which underpin the incumbent water system in 




there is no direct financial benefit for DGPV owners for doing so. Currently in Georgia there is 
no price attached to water use for thermoelectric or nuclear power generation. This is not unique 
to Georgia but is a major market failure facing much of the developed world (Golin et al, 2015). 
Without creating a direct incentive or compensation for the water reductions provided by DGPV, 
it will be difficult to improve adoption rates to the scale necessary to really utilize DGPV as an 
effective tool for water resource management. Notwithstanding that there are additional policy 
barriers to the adoption of DGPV as an energy technology.  
Additionally, policy-making between the water and energy systems remains largely 
disconnected in Atlanta, thus posing a problem for adopting a nexus viewpoint. Policymakers 
currently working to establish long-term water resource management strategies for Atlanta have 
yet to incorporate the influence of power generation in the State as a major variable. However, a 
first step of recognizing the potential of DERs may move policymakers towards a nexus 
viewpoint without the need to incorporate GPC into the management strategy, which may prove 
difficult. Moreover, under the current assessment framework for Atlanta’s water resource 
management goals, evaluation is tied to intake from Lake Lanier. Water savings from DGPV, 
while providing benefits to the State and freeing up water resources for other interests, does not 
translate directly to reduced withdrawals from Lake Lanier. In order to recognize how Atlanta, 
through the use of DGPV, could contribute to state wide water resource management goals the 
City would need to develop a framework for accounting for all water use reductions- not just 




Moving forward I hope to build on the groundwork analytics I have established in this 
research and explore niche innovations for their cross-system benefits. The research presented 
here is just one exploration into the opportunities for niche innovations if visualized through a 
nexus perspective. I hope the GPAT model and metrics provided in this research can provide 
tools for more research examining the best technological deployment strategies to meeting 
sustainability challenges. I also hope to explore expanding GPAT to other cities so as to 
understand how different technologies may contribute to a national transition and which 
investment patterns will speed the pace of transition and the ability to meet sustainability goals. 
Through building a strong resource of analytical and empirical results, policymakers will be able 
to expand their scope of tools to manage the growing development challenges of resource-
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6.10.1 Description of GPAT 
The Georgia Policy Analysis Tool (GPAT) is a spreadsheet input-output model developed to 
understand policy implications regarding distributed energy and water policy options. It was 
designed, in partnership between Matt Cox, PhD and Caroline Golin, to provide relevant 
information regarding quantifiable streams of costs and benefits to different parties and to 
society overall. The model has the ability to provide information on: 
• Hourly anticipated program energy and water savings to the grid  
• Feedback between energy and water savings for shifts in supply technologies 
• Public health and associated emissions benefits or costs  
 
Model Description 
GPAT is comprised of four main modules. It is also possible to use the outputs of these 
modules to inform and link to other models, like GT-DSM, which produce more detailed 
economic impact assessments for utilities and customers (such as rate and bill impacts, which 
can also be useful in energy policy dialogues).  
The DS Inputs module is the main control module and the source of key inputs for the 
other modules. It requires a number of details about expected supply program characteristics and 
baselines in order to produce annual estimates of future performance. 
The Generation module is calibrated to the major local water and energy utilities, 
detailing the generation profile of the utility as well as likely deployment class. Similar attributes 
for purchased power or water for the utility are added here as well, if available. Lastly, it 
determines hourly avoided generation based in part on DS Inputs module data. 
The Emissions module determines the social costs of emissions based on the generation 
profile of the energy utility from the generation module, which assigns a dollar value to the 
public health consequences of the electricity generating technologies. This information is 




The following section details the inputs required for a specific module to run, starting 
with the DS Inputs module, followed by the Generation module and the Emissions module.  




The DS Inputs module requires a similar set of inputs, which can be expanded to any 
number of programs given user-supplied information. The inputs can also be divided between 
sectors (residential and commercial/industrial) to allow for more accurate representations of local 
conditions, if such data is available. What follows is a list of inputs necessary to successfully run 
the DS Input Module, along with a description of the input. 
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This is the expected average avoided generation of centrally produced electricity per unit-
capacity installed as a result of the program. For example, an average residential photovoltaic 
(PV) system in Georgia is expected to produce roughly 1400 kWh/kW installed. This reduces the 
amount of electricity that has to be produced centrally by the amount that would be generated by 







This is the expected average avoided distribution of public water per square foot of installed 
RWH capacity as a result of the program. This reduces the amount of water that has to be 
distributed centrally by the amount that would be captured by the RWH system. Similar values 
can be determined for water efficiency programs. 
 




Units: kW; mgallons 
Programs are not always analyzed from the point of introduction. This is the total capacity of 
distributed resources that existed prior to Y1. If the program is new to the area or is prospective 
and being analyzed prior to implementation using GPAT, this value should be set to 0.  
 
Y1 New Capacity  
Units: kW; mgallons 
This is the expected new capacity brought online in Y1 as a result of the program.  
Annual Efficiency Improvement  
Units: % 
This is the expected improvement in the efficiency of deployed distributed technologies that 
participate in the program. Cisterns, efficient technologies and renewable energy technologies 
may be anticipated to improve in energy performance over time. This value can be set to 0 if a 
user wants to produce a “no technology improvement” case, or believes that the technology will 
remain static over the modeling horizon.  
Annual Degradation Rate  
Units: % 
This is the expected decline in performance of technologies deployed in the program. Many 
technologies experience a loss in operational efficiency over time, and this parameter allows for 
users to make such considerations.  
Annual Growth Rate (capacity)  
Units: % 
This is the expected growth in capacity additions. Using this input simplifies calculations for 
users, but may not be applicable in all situations, as some programs have clearly defined capacity 
allocations and timelines. In such circumstances, this parameter should be set to 0 and the 
Defined Program Inputs (detailed below) should be used instead.  
Installed Cost  




This is the total installed cost of a system. For solar pv the cost is based on a per-capacity basis. 
For RWH the cost is based on a per-square foot basis. The user must provide inputs for estimated 
installed costs through 2020. It is recommended that users take advantage reference materials 
from utilities, state and federal government, trade groups, industry specialists, and the academic 
literature in order to make such judgments.  
Interconnection Fees  
Units: $; $/gallon 
This is the fee that the utility charges to connect a distributed system to the grid. For solar pv the 
fee is typically a flat fee in $. For efficiency measures, this may be $0, but is likely >$0 for 
renewable generating technologies.   For RWH the fee in many areas is based on the size of the 
cistern and expected capture. 
Meter Fees  
Units: $ 
This is the fee that the utility charges to meter a distributed pv system on the grid. For efficiency 
measures, this may be $0, but is >$0 for renewable generating technologies.  
Total Participants in Y0  
Units: Building Units 
This is the number of building units (customers) that participated in the program prior to the 
model iteration start. For a new program, this value is 0.  
Average Participant Growth Rate 
 Units: % 
This is the percent of new building (customers) expected to request service annually; 
alternatively, this can be the annual percent change in demand.  
Defined Program Capacity  
Units: kW; total sqft 
This is the amount of new capacity added to a program if program additions are dictated by 
program design. For example, a pv program may exist for 2 years and add 10,000 kW of capacity 
each year. Or a RWH program may add a percentage of existing or projected roof top area.  In 
which case, using the Annual Growth Rate input would not capture the installation 




Defined Program Portions (residential and commercial/industrial)  
Units: % 
This is the amount of Defined Program Capacity to be allocated to the residential sector or the 
commercial/industrial sectors. Such details may be contained in program design documents and 
will enable more accurate modeling if included. 
 
II. Centralized Electricity Generation and Centralized Water Production Module 
The Centralized Electricity Generation Module combines information about hourly energy 
demand, estimations of hourly water demand based on daily water demand data, and the means 
of production used to meet that demand to estimate how centralized water and power production 
is deployed. The data required for the energy generation module are generally available for 
investor-owned utilities from the Energy Information Administration, Forms 923 and 860, SEC 
Filing 10-K, FERC Form 1, and the Environmental Protection Agency National Emissions 
Inventory.  
However, information on hourly water demand and distribution is not readily available. Unless 
higher resolution is provided, we assume that water distribution follows a similar supply curve as 
energy and utilize daily supply estimates provided by local watershed management departments 
and fit total distribution to the hourly curve. In general, this section is the most data-intensive 
portion of GPAT. 
Power Plants and Water Treatment Facilities Sub-Module 
The Power Plants Sub-Module uses information about each power plant to construct a summary 
of plant operations by the major utility serving load in the geography of question. The capacity, 
capacity factor, water withdrawal, water consumption, and emission rates are necessary inputs, 
as is a determination of whether the plant is a baseload plant (plants that run most of the time to 
meet demand; they tend to be cheaper to operate but are also less capable of responding to quick 
changes in demand. Examples include coal and nuclear power plants, although others, like 
natural gas, can and are regularly used.). The units for each of these inputs are detailed below.  
The Water Treatment Facilities Sub-Module uses information about each water treatment facility 
to construct a summary of plant operations by the major utility serving water demand in the 
geography of question. The capacity, operations, energy use, and average distance from water 
source and demand source are necessary inputs. The units for each of these inputs are detailed 
below.  
There are also optional inputs that GPAT can use to produce some financial estimates for the 






Capacity for Powerplants 
Units: MW 
Capacity for Water Treatment Facilities: 
Units: Mgals 
Power plant Capacity Factor  
Units: % 
Water Withdrawal for Power plants: 
Units Mgal/MW 
Water Consumption for Power plants: 
Units Mgal/MW 
Energy Use for Water Treatment Facilities: 
kWh/gal 
Energy Use for Water Distribution: 
kWh/mile 
Total Energy Use for Water Supply: 
kWh/gal 
Emissions Rates Units:  
Tons/MWh 
Short tons of pollutants produced per MWh of electricity generated. Pollutants tracked, if 
possible, should include: SO2, NOx, PM2.5, PM10, VOCs, NH3, and CO2. If emissions rates 
cannot be discovered for each power plant by pollutant, the US EPA National Emissions 
Inventory can be matched to the US EPA eGrid data or EIA-923/860 to derive approximation 
values across all plants.  
 





A Yes/No determination of whether or not an electric generating unit is a baseload unit or not. In 
general, very large plants tend to be baseload, as do coal and nuclear plants. Plants with higher 
capacity factors are also likely being used to meet baseload demands. Optional Costs 
Inputs Units: $/MWh 
These include the fuel cost per plant and the operations and maintenance cost per plant. 
Purchased Power Sub-Module 
The Purchased Power Sub-module calculates the average cost of power purchased by the utility 
based on financial filings. The preferred inputs are the price paid per MWh and the total 
purchased MWh by the utility, disaggregated by generator. However, an average price per 
purchased MWh can be used to produce estimates. These estimates are provided by GPC annual 
reports as well as in Southern Company’s annual SEC filings.  
Historical and Future Electricity Generation Capacity Sub-Module 
The Historical and Future Capacity takes the existing capacity by fuel- type and based on 
existing characteristics, projects generation by fuel-type into the future, grouped as baseload or 
non-baseload generation. Future capacity is based on actual planned/under construction projects, 
and not based on any projections of unreported new developments or retirements. This module is 
capable of reporting power purchased from other providers that the utility buys energy from to 
meet demand, if this occurs, but the information related to purchased power is only reported by 
this sub-module. Characteristics related to purchased power are drawn from Load Curve – 
Centralized Generation sub-module. Inputs required for this sub-module are limited to the 
characterization of planned capacity additions (see below). If the user wishes to estimate the 
value of coal and natural gas fuel costs or savings, this module is also where the prices for those 
fuels should be input; it is recommended that appropriate EMM regional price trajectories from 






Table C.1 2012 Capacity by Fuel Type, Georgia Power Company 










Average Avoided Emissions and Distributed Generation Sub-Module 
 
 The Average Avoided Emissions and Distributed Generation Sub-module 
produces estimates of demand met on-site through renewable or efficiency technologies 
on the average day of each month. 
Hourly Average Production 
Units: Watts 
This is the watts of energy (or avoided energy, in the case of energy efficiency 
programs) produced by systems on-site per kW of system capacity, by hour, on average 
days. 
Max Avoided Emissions and Distributed Generation Sub-Module 
!
The Max Avoided Emissions and Distributed Generation Sub-module produces 
estimates of demand met on-site through renewable or efficiency technologies on the 
maximum day of production for each month. 
Hourly Average Production 
Units: Watts 
 




Capacity in Yx 
Total utility-owned capacity by fuel-type by Year is required for this sub-module to operate. 
Users should input as many years of data as they can document to ensure the most accurate 
representation of utility operations. 
 
Avoided Emissions and Distributed Generation Sub-Module 
The Average Avoided Emissions and Distributed Generation Sub-module produces estimates of 
demand met on-site through renewable or efficiency technologies and RWH systems on the 
average day of each month.  
Hourly Average Production  
Units: Watts; Mgals 
For solar pv, this is the watts of energy (or avoided energy, in the case of energy efficiency 
programs) produced by systems on-site per kW of system capacity, by hour, on average days. 
For RWH systems, this is the Mgals of water (or avoided water, in the case of water efficiency 





Max Avoided Emissions, Water and Distributed Generation Sub-Module 
The Max Avoided Emissions and Distributed Generation Sub-module produces estimates of 
demand met on-site through renewable or efficiency technologies and RWH systems on the 
maximum day of production for each month.   
Hourly Average Production  
Units: Watts; Mgals 
For renewables this is the average watts of energy (or avoided energy, in the case of energy 
efficiency programs) produced by systems on-site per kW of system capacity, by hour, on 
highest production days.  
For RWH this is the average Mgals of water (or avoided water, in the case of water efficiency 
programs) produced by systems on-site per square foot of system capacity, by day, on highest 
production days. 
Water-Energy-Emissions Module  
Emissions Damages Sub-module 
The Emissions module derives monetary damages from pollutants from electricity generation 
from APEEP2 model outputs, used in a number of studies that estimate the societal damages 
from air pollution (N. Muller, Mendelsohn, & Nordhaus, 2011; National Research Council, 
2010). Testing of the APEEP2 model by its authors has shown its marginal damage functions are 
essentially flat, meaning the marginal benefits will not decline as a new ton of pollutant is 
avoided (N. Z. Muller, 2011). APEEP2 calculates damages by pollutant (NH3, SO2, NOx, 
PM2.5, PM10, and VOCs) by county for all counties in the United States. CO2 emissions are 
also included in the Emissions Damages Sub-module, as determined by the US government 
(Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013).  
Non-CO2 Pollutant Damages 
 Unit: 2000-$/short ton 
Expected marginal damage per short ton of pollutant (NH3, SO2, NOx, PM2.5, PM10, and 
VOCs) by county at effective emission heights of 250-500m and >500m. Taken from A2 model 






Table 6-9 Point Sources for Power Plants in GPAT 
 















Table 6-10 Marginal Damages utilized for GPC in GPAT provided by AP2(N. Z. Muller, 
Mendelsohn, & Nordhaus, 2011) 
PM10
Marginal Damage 
(2009-$/Short Ton) fips NH3 PM25 NOX SO2 VOC PM10 Associated Power Plant
140.4 13015 4601.57 5018.013 586.0334 4283.71 476.2572 142.2675 GA POWER CO:  BOWEN
133.4 13015 4601.57 5018.013 586.0334 4283.71 476.2572 142.2675 GA POWER CO:  BOWEN
141.0 13015 4403.45 4895.925 585.0523 4268.26 465.2671 137.985 GA POWER CO:  BOWEN
140.6 13015 4403.45 4895.925 585.0523 4268.26 465.2671 137.985 GA POWER CO:  BOWEN
199.9 13021 4022.1 4062.875 442.1276 3689.75 389.4484 116.475 ARKWRIGHT
340.3 13021 4022.1 4062.875 442.1276 3689.75 389.4484 116.475 ARKWRIGHT
446.3 13021 4022.1 4062.875 442.1276 3689.75 389.4484 116.475 ARKWRIGHT
432.0 13021 4022.1 4062.875 442.1276 3689.75 389.4484 116.475 ARKWRIGHT
156.6 13067 4616.23 4917.178 564.6949 4133.52 466.8566 141.9525 GA POWER CO:  MCDONOUGH
160.7 13067 4616.23 4917.178 564.6949 4133.52 466.8566 141.9525 GA POWER CO:  MCDONOUGH
253.6 13077 5804.43 5452.513 550.6616 4240.08 515.0447 159.2775 GA POWER CO: YATES
177.3 13077 5804.43 5452.513 550.6616 4240.08 515.0447 159.2775 GA POWER CO: YATES
125.2 13077 5804.43 5452.513 550.6616 4240.08 515.0447 159.2775 GA POWER CO: YATES
151.9 13077 5532.17 5254.99 541.7682 4156.9 497.1948 153.96 GA POWER CO: YATES
215.3 13077 5532.17 5254.99 541.7682 4156.9 497.1948 153.96 GA POWER CO: YATES
162.7 13115 4736.06 5224.198 580.877 4312.05 494.8512 148.9725 GA POWER CO: HAMMOND
201.5 13115 4736.06 5224.198 580.877 4312.05 494.8512 148.9725 GA POWER CO: HAMMOND
264.5 13115 4736.06 5224.198 580.877 4312.05 494.8512 148.9725 GA POWER CO: HAMMOND
141.0 13115 4409.62 4975.175 577.3749 4278.45 472.4189 140.565 GA POWER CO: HAMMOND
122.7 13121 4619.84 4809.045 554.5198 4137.6 457.0839 138.675 Owens Corning Asphalt/Roofing
149.3 13149 4723.54 4823.285 547.0672 4148.71 458.3542 138.585 GA POWER CO:  WANSLEY
392.1 13149 4723.54 4823.285 547.0672 4148.71 458.3542 138.585 GA POWER CO:  WANSLEY
377.5 13207 4000.36 4112.588 457.5761 3771.54 393.9459 117.7725 GA POWER CO: SCHERER
146.7 13207 4000.36 4112.588 457.5761 3771.54 393.9459 117.7725 GA POWER CO: SCHERER
178.4 13207 3971.38 4084.478 455.5263 3746.53 391.3829 117.2325 GA POWER CO: SCHERER
244.2 13207 4003.46 4117.898 457.8063 3772.43 394.4259 117.9225 GA POWER CO: SCHERER
331.6 13237 3935.32 4142.318 456.8117 3823.42 396.5567 119.6325 GA POWER CO: HARLLEE BRANCH
478.9 13237 3935.32 4142.318 456.8117 3823.42 396.5567 119.6325 GA POWER CO: HARLLEE BRANCH
353.8 13237 3903.27 4116.318 456.3656 3819.12 394.1973 118.9125 GA POWER CO: HARLLEE BRANCH
139.4 13237 3903.27 4116.318 456.3656 3819.12 394.1973 118.9125 GA POWER CO: HARLLEE BRANCH
Point Sources: Effective Height  > 500 meters
 
 
CO2 Pollutant Damages  
Unit: 2012-$/metric ton 
Expected marginal damage per metric ton of CO2 emitted as a result of power generation at any 
height. Taken from the US government’s Social Cost of Carbon determination(EPA, 2016). 
Water Usage Submodule 
Powerplant Water Withdrawal by Fuel, Capacity, Capacity Factor, Cooling technology, and  
Baseload Determination 
Unit: Mgallons/MWH 
The Union of Concerned Scientists publishes the water withdrawal rates of power plants in 
Georgia in the EW3 database (UCS, 2012). The database provides the estimates for minimum 
and maximum withdrawal with the associated fuel source, capacity, capacity factor, and cooling 




a baseload determination for the system. We were also able to determine estimates for water 
withdrawal during peak and off-peak generation hours. We assumed that water withdrawal rates 
would be at their highest during peak summer months, and that lowest during a specific power-
plant’s lowest output.  
Powerplant Water Consumption by Fuel, Capacity, Capacity Factor, Cooling technology, and 
Baseload Determination  
Unit: Mgallons/MWH 
The Union of Concerned Scientists published the water consumption rates of power plants in 
Georgia in the EW3 database. We followed the same methodology as water withdrawal 
calculations. For the few plants that were not reported we used literature estimates to determine 
the sum of the water consumption of plants that share similar characteristics. For example, a 
baseload, combined cycle, natural gas plant, that uses a cooling tower, has an average minimum 
water consumption of 198 gls/MWH and an average maximum of 300 gls/MWH.  
Major calculated results in the Power Plant Sub-module are baseline year capacity, generation, 




























Barnett	Shoals N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Oconee	River 0.00 5,100.00
Bartletts	Ferry N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Oconee	River 0.00 5,100.00
Bowen Y 10,532,524 1.10422096 3118.548 0.00032695 4651.1165 0.00048762 Etowah	River 1,005.00 687.00
Bowen	CT N 0 1 0.2805 0.00800514 0.2145 0.00612158 Etowah	River 780.3267475 468.1960485
Burton N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tallulah 0 0
Edwin	I	Hatch Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 Altamaha 1101 672
Estatoah N 0 0 0 0 0 0 None 0 5510
Flint	River N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Flint	River 0 5510
Goat	Rock N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chattahochee 0 5510
Hammond Y 1,745,622 1.23620883 978.3095 0.00069282 1917.191 0.00135771 Coosa	River 36,350.00 250.00
Harllee	Branch Y 2,359,265 1.12705672 20984.2775 0.01002451 4810.6065 0.0022981 Lake	Sinclair 36,350.00 250.00
Jack	McDonough	CC Y 5,111,251 0.4292513 26 2.1836E-06 245.6495 2.063E-05 Chattahoochee	River 6738.076186 1604.303854
Jack	McDonough	CT N 0 0 0.147 0 0.1715 0 Chattahoochee	River 6738.076186 1604.303854
Kraft	CT N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Savannah 35,000.00 240.00
Kraft	ST Y 515,345 0.82962919 1190.1375 0.00191595 920.1835 0.00148136 Savannah 36,350.00 250.00
Langdale N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chattahochee 0 5100




0 0 0 None 0 0
McIntosh Y 87,181 0 691.6 0 257.5295 0 Savannah 36,350.00 250.00
McIntosh	Combined	Cycle Y
3,105,802 0.4133875 15.642 2.082E-06 161.476 2.1493E-05 Savannah 2530 150
McIntosh N 25,969 1.30709776 0.1265 6.3671E-06 16.0075 0.00080571 Savannah 36,350.00 250.00
McManus N 0 1 0 0 0 0 Turtle	River 0 0
McManus	CT N 0 1 20.094 0.04471414 10.085 0.02244163 Turtle	River 35,000.00 240.00
McManus	IC N 0 1 0 0 0 0 Turtle	River 36350 250
Mitchell	(GA) Y 3,588 0 39.1845 0 10.187 0 Flint	River 36350 250
Mitchell	CT N 0 1 0 0 0 Flint	River 0 0
Morgan	Falls N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chattahochee 0 5100
Nacoochee N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tallulah 0 5100
North	Highlands N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chattahoochee	River 0 5100
Oliver	Dam N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chattahoochee	River 0 5100
Riverview N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chattahoochee	River 0 5100
Robins N 2,129 1.18786183 0.0265 1.4786E-05 1.5595 0.00087011 Ocmulgee 0 5100
Scherer Y 5,535,247 1.19425867 42349.1615 0.00913705 14986.591 0.00323344 Ocmulgee 1005 687
Sinclair	Dam N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Oconee	River 0 5100
Tallulah	Falls N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tallulah 0 5100
Terrora N 0 0 0 0 0 0 None 0 0
Tugalo N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tugalo 253 198
Vogtle Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 Savannah 1101 672
Wallace	Dam	1 N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lake	Sinclair 0 510
Wallace	Dam	2 N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lake	Sinclair 0 510
Wansley Y 5,291,958 2.03356276 2101.742 0.00080765 1668.4815 0.00064115 Chattahoochee	River 0 0
Wansley	CT N 0 1 0.596 0.166 0 Chattahoochee	River 1005 687
Wilson N 0 1 7.7615 0.0110201 16.185 0.02298013 None 0 0
Wilson	IC N 0 1 0 0 0 0 None 0 0
Yates Y 2,644,335 1.11776911 29789.8645 0.01259227 3764.5455 0.00159129 Chattahoochee	River 1,005.00 687.00
Yonah N 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tugalo 0 5100  
 
The coefficients presented in Table AV.4 were calculated from using emissions data and water 
use data with matched generation data from the US EPA eGrid data, EIA-923/860/823, and UCS 
EW3 database.   
 
Energy Use of Water Distribution Submodule 
Unit: kWh/gallon 
This is the marginal energy used obtain and distribute water for daily public supply. This data 





Calculations Module  
The Calculations Module provides the calculations for the modules and sub-modules and are 
listed below. Some of the sub-modules that are a part of the GPAT model do not have inputs, 
rather taking endogenous outputs from other sub-modules for their routines. As a result, they 
were only mentioned in glancing in the inputs section, but will have a larger role in this section. 
The calculations here will be generalized, but may have sector-specific forms in actuality based 
on the input data and calibration of the model. 
DS Inputs Module 
From the inputs provided to the DS Inputs Module, a number of values are calculated forward as 
a % increase over existing characteristics. These equations generally follow the form of Equation 
E.1: 
Equation 6.4 General Rate of Change 
Xt = Xt-1 x (1+%Change) 
Calculations following this form include: annual capacity additions; new participants; kWh/kW 
and Mgal/sqft for installations from Year Yt, where Yt experience an increase in efficiency as 
technology improves, yet also a decrease in efficiency each year the systems are operational. 
Total generation and capture (or generation and supply avoided, as the case may be) and Total 
participant outputs are calculated as the sum of efficiency-adjusted existing generation and new 
generation, or the sum of existing participants and new participants. 
Other outputs from the DS Inputs Module are aggregations of information from other 
calculations, like total annual generation and total installation costs. 
Generation Module 
The different sub-modules of the Generation module calculate a number of outputs, many of 
which are intermediary outputs used to inform another sub-module. Eventually, the calculations 
result in the creation of two hourly demand profiles; one that would occur without the evaluated 
program, and one with the program. 
Power Plant and Water Treatment Facility Sub-Module 
Major calculated results in the Power Plant Sub-module are baseline year capacity, generation, 
generation-weighted capacity factor, and emission rates by fuel and baseload determination.  




This is the sum of the capacity of plants that share these characteristics; for example, there might 
be five baseload bituminous coal plants of 500MW capacity each, so the value calculated would 
2500MW of baseload bituminous coal.  
Generation by Fuel and Baseload Determination 
Generation is calculated from capacity and capacity factor inputs for each plant by multiplying 
capacity, capacity factor, and hours-per-year values. These plant-specific generation values are 
then summed in similar fashion to capacity to produce baseload determination specific 
generation estimates by fuel. 
% of Generation by Baseload Determination  
This value is calculated as the sum of generation by fuel and baseload determination and 
dividing by all generation of that baseload determination.  
Generation-Weighted Capacity Factor 
Generation-weighted capacity factors are calculated to provide an estimate of the average 
capacity factor of the plants by generation-type, as shown in Equation E.2: 
Equation 6.5 Generation-Weighted Capacity Factor 
CFF,B = GF,B/(8760 x CF,B) 
where: CFF,B is the generation-weighted capacity factor by fuel and baseload determination; 
GF,B is generation by fuel and baseload determination  
CFF,B is capacity by fuel and baseload determination, and  
8760 is the number of hours in a year.  
The same value is calculated irrespective of fuel to produce a generation-weighted baseload 
capacity factor and a generation-weighted non-baseload capacity factor.  
Water treatment plant Capacity  
This is the sum of the capacity of the water treatment plants in the geographical region 
Energy Use of Water treatment plant Capacity  
This is the total energy used to treat water for daily public supply. This is based on the type of 
treatment and the total daily capacity of the plant. Energy use is calculated from multiplying 




technology), and days-per-year values. These plant-specific values are then summed to produce 
energy estimates by Mgal. 
Energy Use of Water Distribution   
This is the total energy used obtain and distribute water for daily public supply. This is based on 
the average distance of the treatment facility to water source, the total water distributed, and the 
average distance from the treatment facility to the end-demand source. Energy use is calculated 
by dividing the total daily supply by the sum of the total distance traveled in miles, and then 
multiplying by the average energy use for distribution based on water source (ground or surface).  
( "# *%) 
 
where S is the total daily supply for each treatment facility, in Mgals and 
D is Sum of the total distance traveled, in miles 
 A= the average energy use for distributing water based on water source, in kWh/Mgal  
 This metric is then multiplied by days-per-year values to produce annual estimates.  
 
Generation-Weighted Emissions Rates 
Generation-weighted emissions rates are calculated for the seven pollutants. Rates specific to the 
utility should be calculated when possible, however, utility-reported information doesn’t always 
contain all seven pollutants. In general, it should be possible to get utility emissions data for 
CO2, SO2, and NOx, while EPA National Emissions Inventory estimates for emissions by fuel-
type may be needed for other pollutants. This calculation generally takes the form shown in 
Equation E.3: 
 
Equation 6.6 Generation-Weighted Emissions Rates 
PollutantRateF,B = (G1F,B x PollutantRateG1 + G2F,B x PollutantRateG2 … GnF,B x 
PollutantRateGn)/GF,B 
 where G1F,B is the generation from plant 1, etc.  




Power plant Historical and Future Capacity Sub-Module 
The Historical and Future Capacity Sub-module takes the generation characteristics produced by 
the Power Plant Sub-module and produces a number of outputs for future years based on planned 
capacity additions and retirements. It assumes that the capacity factor by fuel and baseload 
determination remains a constant over the modeling horizon. Inputs to this sub-module 
determine the capacity additions and retirements. 
Using CFF,B and total capacity figures, GF,B, % of Generation by Baseload Determination, and 
non-fuel specific generation-weighted capacity factors are calculated for each year that data is 
available; any year beyond the final inputs provided to the Historical and Future Capacity Sub-
module are assumed to have the same characteristics as the final year of input data. Non fuel-
specific generation-weighted capacity factors are important, as they are used to calculate the 
capacity that is ready for dispatch in any given hour, as shown below. Ready-for-Dispatch 
Capacity 
Ready-for-dispatch capacity is determined by calculating the overall capacity by baseload 
determination and multiplying it by the generation-weighted capacity factor by baseload 
determination from the baseline year, as shown in Equation E.4: 
Equation 6.7  Ready-for-Dispatch Capacity 
DCB,Y = ΣCB,Y x (ΣGB,0/(ΣCB,0 x 8760)) 
 
 where:  DCB,Y is the ready-for-dispatch capacity by baseload determination in year y 
 ΣCB,Y is the sum of capacity in the same baseload determination in year y 
 ΣGB,0 is the sum of generation in the same baseload determination in year 0 
 ΣCB,0 is the sum of capacity in the same baseload determination in year 0 
 
Load Curve and Centralized Generation Sub-Module 
The Load Curve and Centralized Generation Sub-module takes historical average hourly demand 
data by month.  
For energy use this data is reported to FERC and makes a projection of hourly demand 
into the future. This is done by multiplying the hourly demand in the baseline year by the Annual 
Average Demand Growth Rate from the DS Inputs Module. It then apportions this demand into 
baseload, non-baseload, and if called for, purchased power. Ready for dispatch capacity is 




with 100% capacity factors, and thus should always be deployed. If demand drops below the sum 
of baseload and non-baseload ready-for- dispatch capacity, non-baseload capacity is taken 
offline. If demand exceeds the sum of baseload and non-baseload ready-for-dispatch capacity, 
power purchases are made until demand is met. 
For creating an hourly water supply, data is limited. Currently GPAT uses the metric 
Gallons per Employee Day (GED) to estimate the use of potable and non-potable water for the 
commercial sector and the estimate of gallons per person (GPP) to estimate the demand of 
residential buildings. Both GED and GPP estimates are provided by USEPA, USGS, and local 
reports (if applicable). To determine number of employees and residents, GPAT uses the 
estimates based on census projections. If hourly water use data is not provided, GPAT matches 





But, this amount is only the portion that we use directly.
There is also an indirect water usage caused by each of us 
to produce the food that we eat and the things that we buy.





























































The average daily domestic demands 
in commercial/industrial settings range 
between 20 and 35 gallons per day 
(gpd) per employee. 




















































Water consumption in the home
US average domestic 
Indoor water consumption:
37.2 n + 69.2 gallons/day
with n = number of people





But, this amount is only the portion that we use directly.
There is also an indirect water usage caused by each of us 
to produce the food that we eat and the things that we buy.





























































The average daily domestic demands 
in commercial/industrial settings range 
between 20 and 35 gallons per day 
(gpd) per employee. 




















































Water consumption in the home
US average domestic 
Indoor water consumption:
37.2 n + 69.2 gallons/day
with n = number of people
(Mihelcic & Zimmerman, 2010)
 
Figure 6-9 Estimated water use per employee (left) and per person in a household (right) 
 
Average and Max Avoided Emissions and Distributed Generation Sub-Modules 
For solar pv, the average production by a distributed system (residential or 
commercial/industrial) is calculated by the hourly power per rated capacity data input to the 
module, multiplied by the capacity of the average system, input to the DS Inputs Module.  
Average hourly generation by month from distributed resources is calculated in the Average 
Avoided Emissions and Distributed Generation Sub-module.  
For RWH, the average production by a distributed system (residential or commercial/industrial) 
is calculated by the daily capacity data input to the module, multiplied by the capacity of the 
average system, input to the DS Inputs Module.  Average hourly generation is determined from 
daily capacity.  Then average hourly generation by month from distributed resources is 




For any given hour, the calculation of demand met by distributed resources resulting from the 
program is shown in Equation A.V.5: 
Equation 6.7  Hourly Distributed Demand 
ADDh,m,y = APh,m,y x Participants 
where: ADD is the average distributed demand met in a specific hour, month, and year; 
AP is the average production by a distributed system in a specific hour, month, and year; 
Participants are the number of program participants from the DS Inputs 
Module From these values, hourly, daily, monthly, and annual distributed generation/capture (or 
avoided centralized generation/supply) can be calculated. However, not every day will be an 
average day for all technologies. The Max Avoided Emissions and Distributed Generation Sub-
module enables users to have 1 maximum day for each month included in the assessment of 
distributed generation (or avoided centralized generation). The calculations for producing 
outputs are the same, relying on different APh,m,y inputs from users. 
Final Generation Sub-Module 
The outputs of the Load Curve and Centralized Generation Sub-module are combined with the 
outputs of the Average and Max Avoided Emissions and Distributed Generation Sub-modules to 
produce hourly projections of demand, and how that demand is met, whether by baseload, non-
baseload, purchased power, or distributed pv for energy, and public supply or distributed RWH 
systems for water. As a general rule, demand met by distributed resources is used on-site and 
thus avoids the use of centralized, grid-provided water and power. This is calculated by giving 
each month one max day, with all others being average days, and producing a new hourly 
generation value. In determining the final generation picture, distributed generation and capture 
is subtracted from centralized generation and supply.  
However, specifically with energy, there are multiple blocks of centralized power. Since non-
baseload power contains peaking generation, typically the most expensive source of generation 
to the utility, distributed resources are subtracted from the non-baseload ready-to-dispatch 
capacity first. Should distributed resources exceed the capacity met by non-baseload capacity in 
a given hour, they would then reduce purchased power, followed finally by baseload generation. 
The result of this calculation is the generation supplied by non-distributed resources to the grid. 
Emissions Module 
The Emissions Module calculations combine a number of the Emissions Module inputs with the 
outputs from the Generation Modules to produce estimates of the effects of different approaches 
on total emissions and related social costs. 




The Emissions Module takes the damages per ton inputs and converts it to damages per MWh by 
baseload generation type and for purchased power. Using the mean marginal damage per ton 
inputs to the module and the pollutant emissions rate (tons/MWh) from the Power Plants Sub-
module, damage/MWh can be determined for the baseline year for baseload and non-baseload 
generation. Purchased power, since it may vary year-to-year, uses a generation profile that is 
taken from the Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook, referencing the 
generation profile and emissions from the appropriate Electric Market Module region. 
Damages are reported in $/MWh, and continue to be calculated annually for baseload, non-
baseload, and purchased power generation, from the changes in generation mix determined in the 
Historical and Future Capacity Sub-module and the Power Plants Sub-module. 
 
 
Table 6-12 Emissions Calculations for GPC 
2016
BASELOAD GPC Characteristics NH3 PM25 NOX SO2 VOC PM10 CO2 Sum Value
MEAN MARGINAL DAMAGE (2009-$/Ton) 5654.0 5848.5 647.8 5031.6 556.5 168.1 36.68
Tons Emitted 0 1910 38245 109907 548 3532 40275376
Net Generation 0 61010000 61010000 61010000 61010000 61010000 61010000
Tons/MWh 1.51472E-05 3.13062E-05 0.000626868 0.001801459 8.98973E-06 5.78883E-05 0.660143851
Damage ($)/MWh 0.09 0.18 0.41 9.06 0.01 0.01 24.22 33.97
NON-BASELOAD GPC Characteristics NH3 PM25 NOX SO2 VOC PM10 CO2 Sum Value
MEAN MARGINAL DAMAGE (2009-$/Ton) 9,565.00            9,015.39           697.59              5,763.82           824.84              326.67              36.68
Tons Emitted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Generation -                     -                    -                    -                    -                    -                    -                     
Tons/MWh 7.4192E-07 8.26125E-07 0.003091196 1.99391E-05 3.68716E-07 1.00178E-06 0.024393035
Damage ($)/MWh 0.01 0.01 2.16 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.89 3.18  
 
Purchased GPC Characteristics* NH3 PM25 NOX SO2 VOC PM10 CO2 Sum Value
MEAN MARGINAL DAMAGE (2009-$/Ton) 6,436.17            6,481.85           657.76              5,178.08           610.16              199.79              36.68
Tons/MWh 1.22661E-05 2.52102E-05 0.00 0.00 7.26553E-06 4.6511E-05 0.60
Damage ($)/MWh 0.08 0.16 0.29 1.67 0.00 0.01 21.92
24.14   
 
Average and Max Avoided Emissions and DG Sub-Module 
The process for calculating avoided emissions benefits is the same for the Average and the Max 
Avoided Emissions and DG Sub-module. 
Hourly production by baseload determination (baseload, non-baseload, purchased) from the Load 
Curve and Centralized Generation Sub-module is matched to emissions damages from the 
Emissions Damages Sub-module to produce the marginal damage per MWh from the grid. The 
percent of generation from each of the three baseload determinations is multiplied by the damage 
per MWh, and then all products are summed to produce the marginal damage per MWh. These 
values are calculated hourly for the average day in each month through the modeling horizon, as 




Equation 6.8 Hourly Marginal Damage 
HMD = Σ%Gb,h,m,y x MDb 
  where: HMD is hourly marginal damage, in $/MWh 
%Gb,h,m,y is the percent of all generation by baseload determination in a specific hour, month, and 
year 
  MDb is the marginal damage ($/MWh) by baseload determination 
The value of avoided emissions damages are calculated by taking total avoided centralized 
generation outputs from this module and multiplying by HMD. The result is the hourly emissions 
benefit from the modeled distributed resources program. These are then aggregated to daily, 
monthly, and annual output values. 
 
 
6.10.2 Estimating volume of water from rainwater harvesting using GIS building footprint and 
regression models Sub-module 
To estimate future size of residential and commercial roofing areas, numerous logistic 
regression models were developed and tested based on actual size of residential and commercial 
building footprint GIS layer called LandBase Structure from Fulton County. LandBase Structure 
Data from Fulton County represent the base ground-level outline, or footprint of buildings and 
other man-made structures in Fulton County, Georgia. The original data were produced by 
digitizing structures from 1988 aerial ortho-photography and updates were made from aerial 
ortho-photography from 1999 to 2009.  As individual polygons of residential and commercial 
building footprints can be directly interpreted as roofing area, we calculated total size of building 
footprint polygons and summarized by census tracts, which becomes dependent variable in our 
regression models.  
We conducted two regression models. One for residential square footage and one for commercial 
square footage. The units of analysis in both models were census tract and the independent 
variables were:  
• employment 
• population 
• average building square-footage (residential and commercial) 
• population density 
• commercial employment density 
• total employment density 
• distance to highways 




• distance to activity center 
• tract size in the base year 2009.   
 
The size of tract was included in the model as control variable because larger sizes of tracts are 
more likely to have more residential and commercial buildings. Numerous regression models 
were tested for a size of roofing area with different data scales (e.g. log transformation) in case 
the variables show a high level of skewness in its data distribution. 
 




Table 6-13 Summary of Commercial Regressions 
Variables OBS. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
SIZE.ROOF  (SQFT) 198 241,971 23,422,075 3,900,304 2,888,309 
POP2009 (PERSON) 166 424 36,788 5,778 4,125 
Emp2009 (PERSON) 166 3 37746 3,298 5,560 
POPDEN(PERSON/AC
RE) 
166 .15 64.34 6.45 6.41 






Table 6-13 (Continued) 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .831a .690 .670 .75913 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DistToActvCtr_Mile, COMEMP_09, Tract_SQFT, COMsqft_per, 







Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 193.982 10 19.398 33.661 .000b 
Residual 87.017 151 .576   
Total 280.999 161    
a. Dependent Variable: LN_CommericalSQFT 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DistToActvCtr_Mile, COMEMP_09, Tract_SQFT, COMsqft_per, AVGSzCOM, LNPOP_09, 













t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5.391 .984  5.480 .000 
Tract_SQFT -4.012E-010 .000 -.060 -.825 .411 
LNPOP_09 2.239 .299 .512 7.484 .000 
LN_COMEmp_Dens 1.057 .157 .527 6.747 .000 
COMEMP_09 -6.423E-006 .000 -.034 -.482 .631 
LN_POPDEN09 -.609 .133 -.355 -4.571 .000 
COMsqft_per -.044 .620 -.005 -.070 .944 
AVGSzCOM 1.794E-005 .000 .078 1.331 .185 
DistToAtlCtr_Mile .047 .017 .261 2.824 .005 
DistToHwyExits_Mile -.150 .069 -.165 -2.155 .033 
DistToActvCtr_Mile -.170 .070 -.174 -2.437 .016 






Table 6.13 (Continued) 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .884a .782 .769 .58973 
a. Predictors: (Constant), REScount_per, size09, Tract_SQFT, DistToActvCtr_Mile, 
LNPOP_09, DistToHwyExits_Mile, LN_POPDEN09, sf09, DistToAtlCtr_Mile 
 
 




Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 194.238 9 21.582 62.056 .000b 
Residual 54.254 156 .348   
Total 248.492 165    
a. Dependent Variable: LN_RESSQFT 
b. Predictors: (Constant), REScount_per, size09, Tract_SQFT, DistToActvCtr_Mile, LNPOP_09, DistToHwyExits_Mile, 














t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5.371 .956  5.616 .000 
Tract_SQFT -1.665E-009 .000 -.267 -4.291 .000 
LNPOP_09 2.948 .256 .736 11.505 .000 
LN_POPDEN09 -.738 .105 -.464 -7.054 .000 
DistToAtlCtr_Mile .001 .015 .006 .066 .947 
DistToHwyExits_Mile .067 .054 .079 1.237 .218 
DistToActvCtr_Mile -.010 .052 -.011 -.184 .855 
size09 -.177 .109 -.071 -1.631 .105 
sf09 9.528E-005 .000 .112 1.599 .112 
REScount_per .309 .177 .131 1.749 .082 
a. Dependent Variable: LN_RESSQFT 
 
The t-statistic of these variables and the F-statistic test show both models are statistically 




directly interpreted as the prediction power as taking exponentials to retransform the function 





CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation is a compilation of five research projects investigating the emerging 
dynamics of sustainable transitions in energy and water systems.  For every research project, I 
employ a Multi-Level Perspective, a heuristic developed from the sociotechnical transition 
literature to diagram the relationship between three primary levels of any transition - the niche, 
the regime, and the sociotechnical landscape. While each research project is distinct, in 
collection this work offers three important contributions to the literature.  
First, the dynamics of intermediary actors and niche level actors working at the local 
level hold far more relevance to the pathways taken in a sustainable transition than the MLP 
literature acknowledges. More work is needed to understand the ‘how’ of these actors as their 
agency potential has institutional implications that stretch beyond the city.  When looking at 
Chapters 4 and 5 in concert, it is also evident that the institutions that support the development of 
niche actors will look different at different scales. At the local level, a combination of sustained 
devolution in public services coupled with strong third-sector organizational structures, allowed 
for the third sector intermediaries to directly intervene and guide the policy process towards a 
sustainable transition of the energy system. In contrast, when examining water resource 
management conflicts at the regional level, niche actors have failed to make any qualitative 
impact on the incumbent regime governance arrangement, despite having many of the 
institutional components present that the literature suggests will facilitate integration, 
collaboration, and greater democratic decision making. This may suggest that scale may play a 




space to analyze success of actors’ strategies. Additionally, both Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that 
public participation may be neither a guiding value of the regime, as made evident by the 
continued resistance towards cooperation and inclusion of grassroots actors in the governance of 
the ACF,  or a principle value of the third-sector intermediaries working to shape the sustainable 
transition of our energy sector through cities, as made evident by the disregard for public 
participation from both the City and the intermediaries in the pursuit of passing energy efficiency 
policies.  
Second, in recognition of the importance of scale, the transition literature must give 
greater attention to ‘figuring out’ how innovations diffuse in cities, what are the institutional 
implications of diffusion, and what institutional arrangements may need to shift in order to 
collectively transition the country from the bottom up. While in theory, every locality could 
employ a wide range of trial-and-error policies and shape the institutional contours of sustainable 
transitions to fit the specific social, economic, political, and environmental attributes, at some 
point there are nationally rooted institutions and policies, which underscore both energy and 
water systems which must be addressed. My work in Chapters 2 and 3 illustrate how even strong 
user preferences, supportive niche policies, and favorable economic landscapes can be 
insufficient to facilitate a regime change without qualitative changes to the regulatory models 
that guide our electricity use and the utility business models they support. In order for 
researchers and decision-makers to understand the true challenges of transition and separate 
legitimate concerns from regime argumentation, more analysis and thoughtful articulation of the 




Third, as evident in Chapters 2 and 3 and 6, for those parties concerned over the pace of 
transition, it is critical we examine the policies and technologies framed as solutions towards a 
sustainable state, more holistically. While the majority of this dissertation examined the 
dynamics of sustainable transitions in the energy and water system as functionally different 
constructs, in reality these two regimes are deeply interwoven throughout the sociotechnical 
landscape. Attempting to develop technological and policy solutions in silo will not only slow 
the pace of transition but could have the unintended consequence of entrenching the incumbent 
industrial and technological regime constructs. Such a paradigm shift will require a much deeper 
and fuller understanding of the technological and behavioral dynamics of both the incumbent 
regime and the niche innovations, so as to shift the purpose of niche innovations to produce 
cross-system change.  
Of course, in order to do this the analytics necessary to start assessing niche innovation as 
cross-system solution needs to evolve. As we see in the research conducted in Chapter 6, taking a 
water-energy-climate nexus approach to technological evaluation revealed that while RWH has 
consistently been framed as a tool for water resource management, DGPV holds promise as a 
tool for meeting urban water resource management challenges and comparatively produces far 
greater savings in terms of emission reductions and expenditures. While this is only one case 
study, it does suggest that reframing DGPV as a cross-system solution may facilitate greater 
adoption in areas where political concerns over a sustainable water system may outweigh 
concerns over transitioning the energy system. When combining the work done in Chapters 2, 3, 




definition of ‘value’ for these niche technologies, as well as the institutions and regulations 
which dictate how value is determined.  
Finally, this body of work made a number of methodological contributions. First, 
Chapters 2, 3, and 6 provide new methods and models for valuing the benefits of distributed 
resources, namely DGPV and RWH. Second, every chapter advances the use of the MLP in 
studying sustainable transitions. Chapters 4 and 6 contribute to the much-needed research on 
sustainable transitions in cities. These chapters develop a stronger understanding on the role that 
cities play in sustainable transitions, locally and nationally, as well as the barriers to niche 
development and the strategies employed by supporting actors and their institutional 
implications. Additionally, Chapters 4 and 5 contribute to the growing field of research 
examining the role of public participation in sustainable transitions. Finally, Chapter 5, albeit 
stalled due to political sensitivities, advances the use of the MLP framework from one that 
characterizes innovations as technological and policies as supporting, to characterizing 
governance arrangements as innovations with actors and technologies as supporting roles. While 
such a characterization may not be appropriate at every scale, it is evident from my work in 
Chapter 2 that more innovative work needs to be done at the policy and regulatory level to 
facilitate transition. If there is one lesson to be learned from this research it is that the 
technologies to transition our energy and water systems are viable, but the regulatory structures 
and legal frameworks which shape our markets and user behaviors are still very much path 
dependent.  
 
